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ABSTRACT 
Regulations governing the operation of electric power systems in North America and many other areas of 
the world are undergoing major changes designed to promote competition. This process of change is often 
referred to as deregulation. Participants in deregulated electridQr systems may find that their profits will 
greatiy benefit from the implementation of successful bidding strategies. While the goal of the regulators m^ 
be to create niles which balance reliable power system operation with maximization of the total benefit to 
society, the goal of generation companies is to maximize their profit, Le.. return to their shareholders. The 
majority of the research described here is conducted firom the point of view of generation companies 
(GENCOs) wishing to mayimiTw their expected utility function, which is generally comprised of expected 
profit and risk. Strategies that help a GENCO to maximize its objective function must consider the impact of 
(and aid in making) (^lerating decisions that may occur within a few seconds to multiple years. 
The work described here assumes an environment in which energy service companies (ESCOs) buy and 
GENCOs sell power via double auctions in regional commodity exchanges. Power is transpoited on wires 
owned by transmission companies (TRANSCOs) and distribution companies (DISTCOs). The proposed 
maricet firamework (Kumar and Shebl^ 1996a] allows participants to trade electrical energy contracts via the 
spot, futures, options, planning, and swap maricets. 
An important method of studying these proposed markets and the behavior of participating agents is the 
field of experimental/computational economics. For much of the research reported here, the market simulator 
developed by Kumar and Shebl^ and similar simulators has been adapted to allow computerized agents to 
trade energy. Creating computerized agents that can reaa as rationally or irrationally as a human trader is a 
difficult problem for which we have turned to the field of artificial intelligence. Some of our work uses GP-
Automata, a technique which combines genetic programming and finite state machines, to represent adaptive 
agents. We use a genetic algorithm to evolve these adaptive agents (each with its own bidding strategy) for 
use in a double auction. The agent's strategies may be judged by the amount of profit they produce and are 
tested by computerized agents repeatedly buying and selling electricity in an auction simulator. In addition to 
the obvious profit-maximization strategies, one can also design strategies which exhibit other types of trading 
behaviors. The resulting strategies can be used directly in on-line trading, or as realistic models of competitors 
in a trading simulator. 
In addition to developing double auction bidding strategies, we investigate and discuss methods of 
minimizing an energy trader's risk. This can be done using such financial vehicles as futures and options 
contracts or through the inclusion of risk while judging strategies used in the market simulations described 
above. We discuss the role of fiizay logic in the competitive electric marketplace, including how it can be 
applied in developing bidding strategies. Since competition promises to drive the power sy stem closer to its 
operating limits, improvements in measurement and system control will be important. We provide an example 
of using fiizzv- logic to do automatic generation control and discuss extensions that would make it superior to 
traditional controllers. Since the GENCO's forte is primarily generating electricity, we e.\aniine unit 
commitment and discuss how to update it for the competitive emironment. We discuss the role of umt 
commitment in developing bidding strategies, as well as, the role of bidding strategies in soKing the unit 
commitment problem. Depending on the market struaure adopted by a particular location, large amounts of 
bidding data may be available to regulators or market participants. Ideally, regulators could use this data to 
verify- that the market is efficient. Market participants with access to this data might gain an ad\-antage over 
their competitors if they could somehow determine their competitor's bidding strategy-. We outline methods of 
automatically inferring other participants' trading rules based on historical data. Much of the work described 
here should aid in the design of effective operating procedures, trading strategies and profitable portfolios for 
energy producers. 
1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Histor>- of the electric industr>-
The elearic utility- industry which most of us take for granted began over one hundred years ago with the 
electncal pioneers of the late 1800s. The electric light bulb had just been mvented. but wasn't going to be a 
big hit until people had a place to plug it in. According to a famous humorist [Barry. 1985. p 2231: 
The greatest electrical pioneer of them all was Thomas Edison, who was a brilliant mventor despite 
the faa that he had little formal education and lived in New Jersey. ..Edison's greatest achie\-ement 
came in 1879 when he invented the electric company. His design was a brilliant adaptation of the 
simple elearical circuit. The electric company sends electricity through a wire to a customer, then 
immediately gets the electricity back through another wire. then, (this is the brilliant part) sends it 
nght back to the customer again. This means that an electnc company can sell a customer the same 
batch of electricity thousands of times a day and ne%'er get caught, since very few customers take the 
time to e.xaimne their electricit>' closely. In faa. the last year any new electncity was generated was 
1937. The electric compames have been merely reselling it ever since, which is why the>- have so 
much time to apply for rate increases. 
Most people in the electric utilit>- industr\- would agree that it is more comple.\ than Dave Barry makes it 
out to be. Hundreds of brilliant people have been working throughout the past centun to make our power 
s\stem what it is today. Having worked in a electnc generating plant. I can say that at least some electncit> 
has been generated after 1937. The days when electnc compames had so much time to apply for rate increases 
are gone, and the forces of supply and demand w ill be setting US electnc rates in the very near future. 
For decades, electric consumers in the US had only their local vertically integrated utilm as a source of 
elearicit\. In e.xchange for the guarantee to be the only electncit>' provider within a given serv ice temtory. 
the electric utilit}' had the obligation to serve e\eryone within its temtorv". The electnc utility was sole 
producer, transporter, and distributor of electric energy to the customer. The electricit> rates it decided to 
charge were subjea to a review b>' regulatory bodies (e.g.. a Public Utilities Commission) to prevent pnce 
gouging. The E^blic Utilities Commission (PUC) allowed the rates to cover the utility's cost, plus a 
respectable return on investment. This system of vertically integrated monopolies evolved to prevent 
e.xpensive duplication of transmission and distribution by competing companies. Economies of scale meant 
that a single large power plant operated by the monopoly utilitv' could produce clectricit>- more efficiently than 
two smaller power plants operated by competing utilities. The efficiencies gained from economies of scale 
outweighed the deadweight losses associated with monopoly operation and system over-building. For most of 
the 20th century, the electric industry was viewed as a natural monopoly. 
The fhift toward deregiilatioa 
2 
The high energy prices during the 1970's oil embargo focused attentions on iiuther efficiencies that might 
mmp with cnmprtitinn The countiy began to take small steps toward a competitive electricity system. 
power producers were granted the right to produce and sell power to the local electric utility at a 
price which costs avoided by the utility assodated with not having to produce an equivalent 
annnimt of electrical energy at utility-owned plants. While, for the most part, the electric energy industry was 
still hanging on to its monopolistic structure, other industries including the natural gas, airline, and 
communication industries in the US were being deregulated. Countries throughout the world in which the 
government owned maity industries began to see the benefits of privatization. 
Attention on monqx)listic inefBciendes due to high fuel prices was probably not the only reason 
deregulation began to happen in the late 20tb century. It may be that the countries around the world needed to 
wait until it was mature enough to meet the prerequisites to competition. A recent article [Clayton and 
Mukeqi, 1996] lists the following intuitive prerequisites to competition without which it would be di£5cult to 
implement competition successfully: 
• Mature physical system 
• Stable national economy 
• Trust in the sanctity of contracts 
• Relatively high and/or diverse prices 
• Regulated market imperfection 
The regulators decided it was time for increased competition in the US electrical system. Increasing 
competition via re-regulation of the electrical system, they would increase power system efficiencies and see 
benefits for electric consumers. With the passage of the Energy Policy Aa in 1992. entities that did not own 
transmission-lines were granted the right to use the transmission system. This was termed open access and 
US electric utilities began to see limited competition in power production. Countries outside of North America 
(e.g.. United Kingdom, Norway, Chile) had already changed, or were in the process of changing their 
regulations, (commonly referred to as deregulating), to allow a more competitive electric marketplace. The 
Federal Energy Regulatoiy Commission (FERC), in various Notices of Proposed Regulation (NOPRs), 
announced its intent to expand competition in the US electric marketplace. Attitudes toward these rhangtn; in 
regulation still vary firom region to region. Many electric utilities in the US have been reluctant to change firom 
the status quo. Regulating bodies and consumers in regions with high electrical rates have more receptive to 
change. In 1998, California became the first state in the union to adopt a competitive structure, and utilities in 
other states are observing the outcome. As California's markets continue to evolve, electric utilities in other 
areas of the countiy continue to form their opinions on what market and operational structures would suit them 
best 
3 
U Cbooaiiig a competitive fnunework 
There are many electrici^ fiamewoiks that could be used to introduce competition to the electric 
of the US. Almost eveiy country embracing competitive markets for their electric sjrstem has done so 
in a different manner. The research described here assumes an electric marketplace derived from commodities 
PYrhanges like the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Chicago Board of Trade, and New York Mercantile 
Exchange (NYMEX) where commodities (other than electricity) have been traded for many years. The tacl 
that in 1996, NYMEX actually added electricity fiituies to their ofiferings supports the predictions [Kumar and 
Shd>I^ 1996a; Richter and Shebid, 1997a; Shebid, 1996; Shebld, 1994b] regarding the fiamework of the 
coming competitive enviroiunenL The fitamework we are assuming has some similarities to the Norw^ian 
electric system. The of our fiamework and some of its major differences from the emerging power 
markets/pools will be described in detail later. 
M^ believe the ultimate competitive electric industry enviromnent is one in which retail consumers 
have the ability to choose their own electric supplier. Often referred to as retail access, this is quite a contrast 
to the vertical integrated monopoly of the past v^ch served the typical electricity consumer as it saw fit 
Soon, telemarketers will be contacting consumers asking to speak to the person in charge of making decisions 
about the electricity service. Dq)ending on consumer preference and the installed technology it may be 
possible to do this on an almost real-time basis. Real-time pricing, where electricity is priced as it is used, is 
getting closer to being a reality as information technology advances. However, at present, customers in most 
regions of the US lack the sophisticated metering equipment necessary to implement retail access at this level. 
Whether or not retail access with real-time pricing becomes a reality in the near future may have big 
implications for energy service companies (ESCOs). With an ESCO or distribution company (DISTCO) 
standing between the consumers and the GENCO. the implementation of retail access is less important from 
the perspective of the electric generation company (GENCO). 
Charging rates that were deemed &ir by the public utilities commission, the average monopolistic electric 
utility of the old enviromnent met all consumer demand while attempting to minimize their costs. In times of 
need or disaster, neighboring utilities might cooperate without charging for their assistance. The costs were 
passed on to the rate payers. The electric companies in a region were all members of one big happy family 
The GENCOs and DISTCOs of the future competitive environment will also be happy to help out in timf!< of 
disaster, but each dollar spent will be accounted for. No longer guaranteed a rate of return, buyers and sellers 
participating in the "new and improved" competitive electric utility industry must be profit driven. The 
competitive GENCO will attempt to maximize its profit. 
4 
1.4 Preparing the utility of the future for competition 
In the summer of 1998 electric energv- prices in the midwest rose to more than $4500/MWhr due to a 
combination of high temperatures and several units on forced outage for various reasons. Many midw estem 
electric utilities bought energy at that high price, and then sold it to consumers for the normal rate. Unless 
these companies thought they were going to be fined heavily, or lose all customers for a very long time, it may 
have behooved them to think twice before doing such a thing. 
Under highly competitive scenarios, the successfiil GENCO will recover its incremental costs as well as 
the fi.\ed costs through the prices it charges. For a short time, producers may sell below their costs, but will 
need to make up the losses during another time. Econonuc theory- says that eventually, under perfect 
competition. ESCOs and GENCOs will arrive at a point where their economic profit is zero It should be 
noted that economic profit is different from accounting profit, which is used commonly in business. This pomt 
of zero economic profit is the point at which all companies surviving participants can break even. Supply 
e.\aaly equals demand. At that point, the best the producer can do in an auction, ignonng fi.\ed costs, is to bid 
his incremental cost. Since the ibced and transition costs associated with generating elearicity are quite large. 
Ignoring fixed costs is something that we in the electrical industry- are not able to do reasonably In contrast to 
the assumptions of some theoretical economic research, perfea competition is not often found in the real 
world, and there are things that the compeutive producer can do to increase the odds of surviving and 
remaining profitable. 
The operaf.onal tools used and decisions made by GENCOs operating in a competitive environment are 
dependent on the structure and rules of the power system operation. In each of the various market struaures. 
the GENCO's goal is to maximize his profit. Entities such as an independent system operator (ISO), or a 
national grid operator, are responsible for ensuring that the sy stem operates in a secure manner The rules of 
operation themselves should be designed by regulators prior to implementation to be fair. Fairness depends on 
what the policy- makers consider fair. It could call for maximization of social welfare (i.e.. maximize the total 
happiness of every one) or perhaps maximization of consumer surplus (i.e.. make the customers happy). 
Changing regulations are affecting the GENCO's way of doing business and to remain profitable 
GENCOs need new tools to help them make the transition from operation in the old environment to the 
competitive world of the fiiture. This dissertation describes and develops methods and tools that are designed 
for the competitive GENCO. Some of these tools include bidding strategy developers, software to infer the 
bidding rules of others, and updates of common tools like economic dispatch and unit commitment. 
1.5 Contents of this dissertation 
5 
Chapter 2 presents the reader \\ith general information and methods that are used and referred to in 
subsequent chapters. Much of our research relies heavily on the use of genetic algorithms, therefore, the 
details of the basic genetic algorithm are presented in this chapter. Chapter 2 also describes the market 
framework and auction framework assumed for our research. Within that market framevvork. we discuss how 
we can create energ\- trader portfohos that combine the spot market contracts with options and futures 
contracts to achieve increased profitabilitv* and decreased risk. 
An important method of studying the proposed markets and the behavior of participating agents is the 
field of e.xpenmental/computationaI economics. Chapter 3 presents some of our work with OA and with GP-
Automata. a technique which combines genetic programming and finite state machines, to represent adaptive 
agents. We present work on ev olving agents (each with its own bidding strategv ) for use m a double auction. 
The first part of the chapter describes work with fixed stnng/non-adaptive bidding strategies, and the 
remainder of the chapter discusses an attempt to ev olve adaptive strategies with GP-Automata. 
In chapter 4 we discuss the role of fiizzv- logic in the competitive electric marketplace, including how it 
can be applied in developing bidding strategies. Since competition promises to drive the power svstem closer 
to Its operating limits, improvements in measurement and svstem control will be important. We provide an 
c.xample of using fiizzv- logic to do automatic generation control and discuss extensions that would make it 
supenor to traditional controllers. 
Since the GENCO's forte is pnmarily generating electricitv-. in chapter 5 we e.xamme unit commitment 
and discuss how to update it for the competitive environment. We discuss the role of unit commitment in 
developing bidding strategies, as well as the role of bidding strategies in solving the unit commitment 
problem. 
Depending on the market structure adopted by a particular location, large amounts of bidding data may be 
available to regulators or market participants. Ideally, regulators could use this data to verify- that the market 
is efficient. Market participants with access to this data might gain an advantage over their competitors if thev 
could somehow determine their competitor s bidding strategy-. In chapter 6 we outline methods of 
automatically inferring other participants' trading rules based on histoncal data. 
Finally, in chapter 7 we present some general commentary on the upcoming competitive environment. 
We present conclusions for each the chapter topics in this dissertation, and ideas for future research. 
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2 BASIC CONCEPTS, METHODS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
2.1 Chapter summary 
Within a competitive framework the objective of electric energ\- producers is to maximize their profit, 
subjea to a particular risk level. The bidding strategies are designed to maximize a trader's utilit\- (a fiinaion 
of risk and profit). Although much of the research described here focuses on double auaion bidding strategies 
for the spot market, it is also independently applicable for the futures, options, and forwards markets. This 
chapter shows how the research in the following chapters can be used together to come up with bids for the 
various markets. This chapter presents the reader with general information and methods that are used and 
referred to in subsequent chapters. Many of the later chapters use genetic algorithms and genetic 
programming; to prevent duplication, the details of the basic genetic algorithm are presented in this chapter. 
The market framework and auction framework assumed for this research is described here Within that 
market framework, this chapter discusses how to create energ>- trader portfolios that combine the spot market 
contracts with options and futures contracts with the overall goal of increasing profitabilit>- and decreasing 
risk 
2.2 Developing a coherent bidding strategy 
Much of the research reponed in this dissertation relies hea\ily on computational economics This section 
describes how computational economics can be used to develop sensible bidding strategies and to influence a 
GENCO's position in the markets. Figure 2.1 provides an o\ eniew of the process this research proposes. In 
the figure, simulated auction markets are used to develop the forward pnce and demand curves. To obtain 
realistic data, these simulated markets are populated with computerized trading agents. The computerized 
agents have been seeded with models of the competing GENCOs and of the ESCOs to whom the> wish to sell 
electricit\-. Expected prices and demands are developed from the forward curves are given to the unit 
commitment scheduler. Based on the predicted price and demand information, the unit commitment scheduler 
attempts to provide the GENCO with the schedule of generating units that maximizes e.xpeaed profit. The 
GENCO then uses this information to develop bids and take market positions with the aid of the double 
auction bidding strateg\- de\'eloper. It should be noted that the models are microeconomical. constructed for 
the firm, and are not necessarily consistent with macroeconomic assumptions. 
7 
auction 
market 
auction 
market 
auction 
market 
auction 
market 
Period 0 
Quantity 
Price 
Forward Curves 
^ Time 
Unit commitment scheduler (7-day plan) 
Bids 
Figure 2.1 An overview of bidding strategy' development 
De\ eloping the competitor models is an involved process Under the market framework assumed for this 
research, the results of the auctions are public information, similar to the Australian eleanc power market. As 
shown in Figure 2.2. a database of auctions from prev ious periods contains competitor (GENCO and ESCO) 
bidding information, and can be intelligently mined to determine the general rules that the competitors are 
using. This information can be combined with any additional information known about the sy stem or about 
the competitors and timed to develop a model of the competition that will be used in computenzed agents in 
the simulated markets. Chapter 6 describes the intelligent data mining process. 
-w period 0 
auction 
market 
auction 
market 
auction 
market 
auction 
market 
competitor 
model 
competitor 
model 
competitor 
model 
competitor 
model 
additional 
information 
rule tuning process 
(fuzzy logic) 
intelligent data miner determines 
competitors' bidding rules 
Figure 2.2 Determining competitor models. 
s 
The competitor models developed as described abo\'e are used to populate computerized agents 
participating in simulated auctions for each period of interest. The competitor models may represent an 
aggregated GENCO competitor and an aggregated ESCO, or individual GENCOs and ESCOs Important 
information like weather, imit outage information, status of transmission system, and time of day. which will 
influence the bidding process in markets is fed into the competitor model as shown in Figure 2.3. 
auction 
m arket 
auction 
market 
auction 
m arket 
auction 
market 
competitor 
modei(s) 
Period 0 1 2 T 
Figure 2.3 Using the competitor models in the auction markets. 
For each auction market penod. it is possible to determine a curve relating the pnce to the quantm 
demanded and a curve relating the pnce to the quantit> supplied. For an individual market, the process of 
determining this relationship uses a horizontal summing of each GENCO's supply curves. Figure 2.4 shows 
how an aggregate demand can be determined from three individual GENCO supply curves. Each of the 
GENCO curves is bounded on the left b>- the minimum generation level, and on the nght by the maximum 
generation level. The aggregated ESCO curve can be found in a similar manner. These curves from each time 
period are then put together to get the forward price and demand curves shown in Figure 2.5. 
GENCO 2 GENCO 1 GENCO 3 Aggregate GENCO 
quantity 
Figure 2.4 Determining the single period aggregate supply curve. 
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Figure 2.5 Determining the fomard demand and price cur>-es. 
Once the for\^•a^d curves have been calculated these can be used to determine a unit commitment (UC) 
schedule that maximizes a GENCO's expeaed profit. For simplification, the UC algonthm m chapter 5 does 
not use the entire for\vard cur\ e. Instead it uses a single expected pnce and quantit>- for each penod as shown 
in Figure 2.6. An hourly UC schedule is t^-pically calculated for the following week Ever\ penod. based on 
the new auction results, the market information is updated and the UC is run again with the latest information. 
2.3 Genetic algorithms (GAs) 
De\eloped b\- John Holland, genetic algonthms (GAs) are non-traditional general-purpose search 
techniques inspired by the biological model of evolution. One of the first books on genetic algorithms was 
Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems written by Holland in 1975, but only recently have the\' been 
gaining wider popularit>' among researchers. Holland's formulation was motivated by the observation that 
se.xual reproduction, in conjunction with the pressure of natural selection, could result in the development of 
highly adapted species. 
GAs typically involve the use of a population of data siruaures which are capable of containing the 
solution to the problem in question. The contents of the data structures evolve according to natural selection, 
the Dan\inian principle of survival of the fittest (Goldberg. 19891. GAs are often able to find solutions to 
problems which can not be handled by more traditional optimization techniques. GAs have been shown to 
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work on problems like the unit commitment [Kazarlis et al.. 1995; Maifeld and Sheble. 1996: Kondragunta. 
1997] and the economic dispatch [Walters and Shd)le, 1992] problems in the electrical power s\-stems field. 
GAs can search solution spaces in a parallel fashion. An entire population of candidate solutions (data 
structiucs with a form suitable for solving for the problem being studied) is "randomly" initialized and e\-olves 
according to GA rules. Although they could consist of anything, the data structures often consist of strings of 
binary numbers which are mapped onto the solution space for evaluation. Each solution (often termed a 
creature) is assigned a fitness, which is simply a heuristic measure of its quality. During the e\-olutionar\-
process. those creatures having higher fitness are favored in the parent seleaion process and are allowed to 
procreate. The parent selection is essentially a random selection with a fitness bias. The t>pe of fitness bias is 
determined by the parent selection method. Following the parent selection process, the processes of crossover 
and mutation are utilized and new- creatures are developed which ideally e.xplore a different area of the 
solution space. These new creatures replace less fit creatures from the e.xisting population. Figure 2.7 shows a 
block diagram of the general GA. The following subsections provide additional detail on the different 
processes involved in the genetic algorithm. 
pA expected price curve qa expedsd demand curve 
unit connrntment (7-day schedule) 
t 
Hour 123456789.... T 
unit 1:011111111.... 0 
unit2: Oil 111111.... 1 
unit 3:11 1 1 00001.... 1 
unit 4:111111111.... 1 
unitN:011111111.... 0 
Cost: $Y.OOO.OO 
Pram: $X,000.00 
Call bid generator to rnake bid in the rnari^  
Figure 2.6 Using unit commitment as an Input to bid generator. 
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Else, gen = gen+1 
Initialize Creatures 
Crossover 
Replace less fit creatures 
Parent Selection 
Evaluate Fitness 
Figure 2.7 A simple genetic algorithm. 
2.3.1 Parent selection 
In biolog)-. a polar bear that is white enough to blend mto the snowy backdrop has a slightly greater 
chance of sneaking up on its pre>-. On average we might expect that a well-fed male polar bear would be more 
likely to win the dating game for the bachelorette of his choice than would be his hungr\- nval. The genes for 
producing a snowy-white polar bear live on through the bachelorette "s bear cub and continue to propagate 
throughout the species as long as the trait of whiteness doesn't become a huge disadvantage. Similar to 
Darwin's theory of survival of the fittest for evolving biological species, members of the GA population are 
allowed to reproduce based on the fitness they e.\lubit. Creatures seleaed for reproduction are called parents. 
Parents are selected randomly from the population with a fitness bias which tends to selea highly fit creatures 
for reproduction. There are several successful ways of selecting parents, and each method biases the random 
selection in a different way. Three commonly used methods are described below. 
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2.3.1.1 Roulette selection 
With rouiene selection, a probabilitv- wheel with values ranging from 0 to I is used to detennine which 
creatures are selected to become parents. The fitnesses of the creatures are nonnaiized and mapped onto the 
probabilit>- wheel. The probability of selecting a creature corresponds to its contribution to the sum of all 
creatures' fitnesses. See Figure 2.8. Roulette selection has a tendency to highly favor the fittest creature m the 
population. This tendency- can be undesirable in small populations and may cause the population to converge 
early to a suboptimal solution. To illustrate this, consider a population where there are many zero fit creatures 
and only one creature with non-zero fitness, the single creature will be chosen as the parent for all new 
children. The only way the child can be different from the parent in this case will be due to mutation which 
will be e.xplained later. 
2.3.1.2 Rank selection 
Similar to roulette selection, rank selection assigns selection probabilities to creatures based on the 
creature's rank when soned by their fitness. By using the rank rather than the fitness to assign the selection 
probabilities we remo\'e the problem with premature convergence to a suboptimal solution discussed in roulette 
selection. We say that this parent selection mechanism tends to preserve biodi\ersit>- better than roulette 
selection. See Figure 2.8. 
Roulette Rank 
Figure 2.8 Roulette and rank probabilit>' wheels. 
2.3.1.3 Tournament selection 
Tournament selection is substantially different from the roulette and rank selection methods. It maintains 
biodiversity and works well for those problems which have a fimess landscape with tall narrow peaks. Each 
creature is assigned to a group of four (tournament) based on a number randomly seleaed from a uniform 
distribution. Within each group, the two creatures with the highest fitness are selected as parents, and their 
offspring replace the t\vo creatures with the lowest fitness in their group. Using tournament selection 
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generally results in half of the population being replaced each generation, whereas the number of new 
creatures when using other parent selection techniques is an independent parameter that needs to be speciiled. 
2.3.2 Crossover 
New creatures, or children, are created in the reproduction process. Crossover is the first part of 
reproduaion and is borrowed from the biological process where the DNA from a father and a mother are 
shared to create the genetic instructions for producing a child. As in biolog>-. most genetic algorithms reqmre 
two parents for reproduction, and the result is two children. In genetic algorithms, children are created b>' 
cop>ing the contents of the data struaure representing parent 1 into the data structure that will e\entually 
represent child 1 and from the data structure of parent 2 into child 2 until a randomly selected crossover point 
IS reached. At this point, the contents of parent 1 are copied into child 2. and the contents of parent 2 mto 
child 1 This is commonly referred to as single point crossover and is presented graphically in Figure 2.9. 
Multiple point crossover operates on the same principle but includes more crossover locations, which can be 
helpful in GAs with long DNA strings. 
Parent 1 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Parent 2 1 1 1 1  1 I 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Crossover Point (selected randomly) 
Child I 0 0 0  0  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
Child 2 1 1 1 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0  
Figure 2.9 Single point crossover. 
2.3.3 Mutation 
Following crossover, we encounter mutation, which is the second pan of the reproduction process. In 
biolog\-, mutation consists of random copying errors during DNA replication of the billions of base pairs which 
contain the instructions for building a member of a species. In the short run. these random errors may or may 
not have a large effea on the resulting creature. In genetic algorithms, mutation can prevent the search from 
getting stuck in local optima. Mutation constantly introduces new genetic material into the gene at some low 
rate. If the gene to be mutated in the child is represented bv- a binary string, mutation involves flipping the bit 
(0 goes to 1. 1 goes to 0) at each location in the string with some probabilit\-. If the gene is represented by an 
integer, mutation might involve adding an integer that will result in a different valid integer occup\ing that 
gene location (loci). Depending on the problem, one might find it usefiil to change the mutation rate 
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depending on the maturity of the evolution. Initially when much biodiversity is alread>' in the population, 
mutation may not be as important. Later, when crossover tends to make the population look fairly identical, 
the mutation rate could be increased. See Figure 2.10 for an example of a simple mutation. 
2.3.4 Fitness evaluation 
In biolog>-. the goal is to have one's genes live on. Anything that helps a member of a speaes (and its 
kin) propagate its genetic makeup to future generations adds to its fitness. In genetic algorithms, we generally 
have a more concrete goal in mind. Once that goal is knowru there are many ways of creating fitness 
functions that will get the population to e\'olve the way the designer wants. The GA designer must use 
engineering judgment in determining how to award fitness. For e.\ample. if a GA was being used to solve the 
traditional unit commitment problem, a creature's fitness might be inversely proportional to the cost of the 
solution that it finds. Costs are first evaluated for the corresponding solution using our cost equations, and 
those creatures with higher associated costs are awarded a lower fitness. If the goal of the GA is to de%'elop 
bidding strategies for auctions which ma.ximize profit, creatures which find a solution resulting in a higher 
profit, are awarded higher fimess than those making a smaller profit. The designer can be creative in 
developing fitness evaluation criteria. While the pnmarv- fitness fimaion might be profit or cost, secondary 
fitness criteria may be added (e.g.. less risky strategies are better than risk\- ones for a given profit level). 
Child: 
Randomly 
selected bit 
locations ^ 
Child after 
mutaUon: 
Figure 2.10 GA mutation. 
2.3.5 A GA example: The string evolver 
A simple example of a genetic algorithm is the string e\ olver. In the string evolver. the goal is to have 
the GA find a target string of your choosing. First, a population of solutions is initialized randomly from an 
appropriate alphabet. Then, using only the parent selection, crossover, mutation, and replacement operators 
we've already discussed, the GA can find the answer. See Figure 2.11 for an example of the siring evolver. 
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Randomly initialize a population: 
• lH"*N'M9xl$d]3J*,qU;=?pC:[,530q? 
• u-Lp3CqhGF:8J#vVy•w*WrnblT'o)-DS 
• fPaep-UBCrUm:Ffd&\"hYuvPlQd3?la? 
• C\fSOu#c@•s-.AX<DH8$?[V.!T/iOtR 
• PVQF%v9fUfxNwedHU9)7\hM5=".+> ]D 
• s?"''APJ?5] 6JJtZW=Ah&9M) iJb [le 'pb 
• -"n;#DWc8M(sA8=]+I[Is(.VNUmET@&T 
• AX6nldsY5sRPw9@aw6p\lsQM0L@]$M)h 
B xrugNUa!O) oAId./oIs_wSN.xw+?C:JE 
• SAxN/\HO*Ql*S%b6m\iYT<r!"flqk<ip 
• ck"f-N:lcscL]4*K..G/L;m(q?2;"6@q 
H=SKi!CDSSYY+ywt.V3eQ' 3F, 33ct2&Nr 
To judge fitness we might count the number of 
locations in which the candidate solution matches 
the target solution. E.G.; 
I evolve, therefore, I am flawed. 
AX6nldsY5sRPw9@aw6p\liQM0L@]SM)h 
No matches, so fitness for this string is zero. 
Applying the Genetic Algorithm, we see evolution (shown for selected generations); 
• gen[0], creat [ 0] : aiWFfmBNdBi:.!oiD^Hu Zu,; 5NB2'd5 
• gen[10], creat. [ 0 ] ; SAxNo3ve>;,/:r: ols wSN. " flqk<ip 
• gen[20], creat[0]: $AxNo3ve>% , /:r: ols wSN. " flqk<ip 
• gen[30] , creat[0]: $AxNolve> : r: ols ISN. flqk<ip 
• gen[40], creat[0]: IAxNoive>», / : r; ols I3N. flqw<ip 
• gen[50], creat[0]: IAxvolve>?, /:re ols ISN. flqw<ip 
• gen[100] ,creat[0]: lAevolve, ,here ors ISa. flqw<ip 
• gen[200] ,creat[0]: lAevolve, there ore ISam flaweip 
• gen[300] ,creat[0]; I evolve, there ore I am flawed. 
• gen[590] ,creat[0]: I evolve, there ore I am flawed. 
• gan[596J , creat f07 •' I evolfre, therefore X am flatted. 
Figure 2.11 The string evolver example. 
2.4 Market structure 
The e.xaa stnicture of the deregulated electricit>' markets emerging in various countries and control regions 
depends, to a large extent on the regulators. To attempt to stud>' each framework along the continuum fhDm power 
pool to a power e.\change like that in Australia in a single dissertation would be futile. Besides, things learned from 
an assumed market structure can often be used in another market framework. Therefore, this research predicts and 
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ftcomix that i^kmal O-C-. ctoctridty mereaiidk assodatioiis (EMAsD wiU flay an important role. 
Efccttidty trading of the fiiiuic will be aooompUslied through bilaicfal oondaas and throu^ EMAs where trados bid 
for contracts via a doiMe auction. The elcctric maiketplaoe used in this chapter has been refined and described in 
various Recent leseaidi (Falvi and Sbebli 1992] demonstiated an auction mrriianism Later [Sbeb^ 
1994b] the HHTtmif types of commodiQ^ and their operation and outlined how each could be applied in the 
evolved dectric energy marketplace were described. Others (Shebl^ and McCallcy, 1994] outlined how ^xjt, 
forwant fiiture, planning and swap maiicets can handle real-time control of the system (e.g., automatic generation 
control) and risk manggmiMit Later work brought the above ideas together and demonSiated a power syaem 
aiirtinn to be a training tooI (Kumar and SheUd, 1996b]. That game used the double anction 
iwrhanign in enmhinaiinn whh dassical optimization techniques. 
A fiamework in v^iidi electric energy is only sold to energy service companies (ESCOs), is ddivered on wires 
owned by distifliutian nnnnpanii's (DISTCOs) and transmission companies (TRANSCOs), and is only generated by 
generation oonqxmies (GENCOs) was descr3)ed [Kumar and Shdild, 1996a; Riditer and Shdild, 1997a; Riditer ct 
aL, 1999; Riditer et aL, 1998] and is represented in Figure 2.12. The North American Electric Reliability Council 
(NERQ sets the reliability standards. ESCOs and GENCOs may interact with ancillary services companies 
(ANCILCOs). The ""war* prices are determined throu^ a double auctiorL Buyers and sellers of electricity make 
bids and c^ers that are matrhwH sutgect to approval of the independent contract administrator (ICA) who ensures that 
the ooptrytg will result in a system operating safely within limits. The ICA submits information to an independent 
system operator (ISO) for implementaaon. The ISO is responsible for controlling the ^stem to maintain its security 
and reliability. 
NERC • Standards 
(reliability ft security) 
_ -J - - .J 
ICA/ISO/RTG 
Coordinator 
1 
EMA 
Markets 
(cash, futures 
& planning) 
GENCO 
Supplier 
(aacilUry 
ft main) 
DISTCO 
Buyer 
(anciUwy 
ft main) 
ANitoa 
Ancillary 
(•eoarity ft 
reliability) 
Trans, 
(ancillary 
ft storage) 
Services 
(quality ft 
reliability) 
BROCO 
Marketers 
(market 
ft broker) 
Figure 2.12 Brokerage system modcL 
The described fiamework [Sheble, 1996] allows for cash (spot and forward), futures, and planning 
markets as shown in Figure 2.13. The spot market is what we are most familiar within the electric industry. 
The qxK maricet is a market where sellers and buyers agree (either bilaterally or through an exchange) upon a 
price for a certain number of MWhr to be delivered sometime in the near future (e.g., 10 MWs from 1:00 p.m. 
to 4:00 p.m. tomorrow). The buyer needs the electricity, and the seller wants to sell. They arrange for the 
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electrons to flow through the electrical transmission sy stem and the>- are happ\-. Also in the cash market a 
forwards contraa is a binding agreement in which the seller agrees to deliver an amount of a particular 
product with a specified quality* at a specified time to the buyer. The forw-ard contract is fiirther into the future 
than is the spot market. In both forward and spot maricets. the buyer and seller want to exchange the physical 
good (i.e.. the electrical energy-). On the other hand, a futures contraa is primarily a financial instnmient that 
allows traders to lock in a price for a commodity in some future month. Buying a futures contraa is akin to 
purchasing insurance. It helps the traders to manage their risk by limiting potential losses or gains. 
Standardized futures contraas exist for commodities in which there is sufficient interest and m which the 
goods are generic enough that it is not possible to tell one unit of the good from another (e.g.. 1 MW of 
electricity of a certain quality, voltage level, etc.). A futures options contract (see Figure 2.14) is a form of 
insurance that gives the option purchaser the right but not the obligation, to buy (sell) a futures contract at a 
given price. The seller gets a certain and immediate cash payment at the time of sale of the options contraa 
for agreeing to take the risk associated with price fluctuations in the future. Both futures and options arc 
derivatives, meaning that their price is derived from the pnce of an underlying physical good. 
time horizon (in months) 
0 1 18 
swap market (moves contracts from market to market) 
spot 
mrkt 
futures market planning market 
forwards market 
Figure 2.13 Interconnection between the markets. 
As mentioned above, both the options and the futures contracts are financial instruments designed to 
minimize risk. Although provisions for delivery e.\ist. they are not convenient (e.g.. the delivery point is not 
located where you want it to be located). The trader ultimately cancels his position in the futures market either 
with a gain or loss. The physical goods are then purchased on the spot market to meet demand with the profit 
or loss having been locked-in \ia the futures contraa. Another market is the swap market. A swap contraa is 
a customized agreement in which one firm agrees to trade its coupon payment for that of the other firm 
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involved in the swap. Finally, we have the planning market which exists to finance long-term projects like 
transmission lines and power plants. 
There is some jargon used in the market and commodity trading area that might be new to people in the 
electric utility industry. For each options contract, there is someone "writing" the contraa who. in return for a 
premium, is obligated to sell (buy) at the strike price. "Long" denotes ownership; "to go long" means to 
purchase the item in question. In the figure, "long" indicates that the trader has purchased the option and now 
has the right to buy (call) or the right to sell (put) the future. A trader who wntes the option is "short"; to go 
short is to sell the item m question. Let's assume that the item in question is a MWhr of electricm-. In the 
long call diagram, the long trader has paid a premium (e.g.. SI) to the option writer for the call option. This 
call option gives the trader the right to buy a MWhr for the strike price (e.g.. $7). If the price goes above the 
strike price plus the premium (e.g.. S8). the trader has made a profit. The long trader has reduced risk b>-
limiting his losses to the premium. In the diagrams labeled short, we see what happens from the option 
writer s point of view. He receives the premium for assuming the risk and is obligated to sell the MWhr at the 
strike price e\'en though the market price is higher. The diagrams labeled "put" show how the put works. The 
long put trader pays a premium to lock in a ma.\imum price (e.\ercise price) that he will have to pay for the 
MWhr. The short put trader takes that premium in return for promising to sell the MWhr for that same 
c.\ercise pnce. For people who are unaccustomed to looking at the above diagrams. the> can be confusing at 
first glance. Table 2.1 gives the reader another way of looking at the long call e.\ample pre\ iously mentioned. 
LONG CALL SHORT CALL 
Profit Profit 
7 8 1 8 9 
-1 9 Tenninai 7 Termmal 
Price Price 
LONG PUT SHORT PUT 
Profit Profit 
9 Terminal 1 7 8 
r 7 8 9 Terminal 
Price Pnce 
Figure 2.14 Methods of using options. 
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Table 2.1 Long call example 
Strike Price Spot Price at 
Matiuitv-
Premium Profit w/out 
Long Call 
Profit w/ Long 
Call 
$7 $4 SI -S3 -SI 
$7 $5 $1 -S2 -$I 
S7 S6 SI -SI -SI 
$7 $7 SI SO -SI 
$7 S8 SI SI SO 
S7 S9 $1 $2 SI 
$7 $10 SI S3 S2 
S7 $11 SI S4 S3 
$7 $12 SI S5 S4 
2.4.1 Using the markets to manage risk 
With neither an obligation to ser\e nor guaranteed rates of return the energ\- trader s objeaive becomes 
the maximization of profit for his shareholders. In a competitive en\ironmenL there may be times when 
ESCOs may be unable to purchase enough energ>' for their customers, or times when GENCOs may have 
excess generation. This uncertainty , combined with fluauating pnces and demand, makes profit difficult to 
predict in any particular scenario. We might then consider a distnbution of bids and offers and de\-elop 
strategies that maximize the trader's e.\pected profit. If a trader uses the strategy- long enough, he should get 
the e.\pected profit associated with that strategy-. In the short run, he might see gains or losses very different 
from the e.xpected profit. This unpredictability- means we consider the strategy- nsky The term risk can be 
loosely defined as a measure of the lack of predictability- of an outcome associated with a panicular decision. 
Different strategies producing the same e.xpected profits might well have different nsks associated with each as 
we see in Figure 2.15. Since most traders cannot endure low or e%en negative profits for long periods, the 
trader would probably be willing to sacrifice some long-term expected profit m return for reduced risk. 
Economists use "utility fimctions" to describe and order preferences. Among other things, a trader's utility-
should vary directly with actual profit (should be similar to expeaed profit) and indirealy with risk. 
P D F  
/ \ L o w  R i s k  
/ M  c d i u m  R i s k  
,11  ^ / V ^  I F  i  1  l i  R i s k  
P  r o  f i  I  
Figure 2.15 DifTerent risks with the same expected profit. 
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2.4.1.1 Futures contracts 
Futures contracts allow producers to hedge so that they- can limit their losses. Other things being equal, a 
GENCO's profit \-aries with the price of electricity. Trying to predia the price months in ad\-ance so that 
profit can be known in advance is tricky. Suppose it is April, and because of some big decisions (unrelated to 
insider trading) the CEO ^v-ants to know what his or her GENCO's profit will be in July Simply by-
considering our fuel contracts and using demand forecasts we can draw a profit curve based on the price as in 
Figure 2.16(a). In the figure, this profit cur\e is drawn as the line segment labeled "with no hedge." Not 
knowing the price means that we have the potential for large losses. The CEO doesn't want to see just a line 
on a graph—he or she wants a simple number. This is where the futures hedging comes mto play. For the 
example in Figure 2.16(a), the GENCO can short (i.e., sell non-firm electricity they don't have yet) July 
elearicity with futures contracts. When July arrives, if the spot price is low, they make money on their futures 
contraa and lose on the electricity sold on the spot maiket. The gain on the fiitures market offsets the loss in 
the spot market. If the spot price in July is high, then the electricity sold on the spot market yields a profit 
while the futures contraa will produce an offsetting loss. The result is that the net profit is much more 
predictable due to the hedge, and now we can give the board members that number they- were looking for. 
Profit 
(a) 
'(\Mth no hedge) 
(net profit) 
• Spot pncc 
in Julv 
(short futures 
contract) 
ftofit (with no hedge) 
(net profit) 
Spot price 
in Julv 
(b) 
(profit from long put 
option contract) 
Figure 2.16 Hedging with futures and futures options contracts. 
2.4.1.2 Futures options contracts 
Futures options contracts give the holder the nght. but not the obligation, to buy or sell a fiitures contract. 
They- are not to be confused with option contracts on the physical good which are also available. Futures 
options contracts can be used to reduce risk. Consider the GENCO wanting to maximize its profit and reduce 
its risk. One alternative is that the GENCO pays a premium for an options contract that would give it the 
right to sell (short) electricity- at the strike price. (If the price w-as higher than the strike price, the GENCO 
would let the option expire). Figure 2.16(b) shows how the option contract can be used to hedge profit. Notice 
that when the price is low-, the GENCO can e.\ercise the option and have a futures contract as in the previous 
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to ofiset its losscs in the spat maiket When the price is high, the GENCO has no obligation to sell at 
the strike pricc; the net profit is the profit from the electricity produced the GENCO and sold on the spot 
m-itirM less the premium paid for the options contract The GENCO has limited the amount of mon^ that it 
can lose, but can still reap the benefits of a high price in July. Another alternative using futures options would 
be a short call. 
2.4.2 Auctions 
An auction is a method of matching buyer(s) and seUei(s) through bids and offers. A double auction has 
both seUer(s) and bayer(s) submitting bids and offers, while a single-sided auction only one of these is allowed 
to submit prices. The English electrical system uses a single sided auction in which electricity generators 
ciihmit generator unit commitment schedules with their offer. The buyers do not submit any price bids. The 
sellers are in competition with each other. In addition to double-sided and single-sided multi-participant 
a^i^innc in the elfcctric industry we should expect to see many bilateral agreements where two compaiues 
contract with each other outside of an organized exchange. It can easily be argued that bilateral agreements 
are special cases of double auctions in which there is only one buyer and one seller. 
The double auction is the pricing mechanism for the markets assumed in our framework. In each of the 
markptt bids offers are sorted into descending and ascending order respectively, similar to the Florida 
Coordination Group approach [Wood and Wollenberg, 1996]. If the buyer's bid is higher than the seller's 
offer to be matched, then this is a potentially valid match. The ICA must determine whether the transaction 
would compromise system security and whether sufficient transmission capacity exists. If the ICA approves, 
each potentially valid offer and bid helps to determine the final price, termed the equilibrium price. The 
average of the bid and offer of each pair of valid matches (weighted by the number of MWs) is used to 
determine one overall equilibrium price. Another pricing scheme we have used in some of our research is a 
discriminatoiy pricing in which the buy and sell bids and offers are matched and then the price for each 
transaction is the average of the bid and offer given by the partnered traders. An example of these two pricing 
schemes is given in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Example of auction bid matching. 
Buy bids 
C$/MW) 
Sell offers 
($/MW) 
MW 
amount 
Contract? Discriminatory 
Price ($/MW) 
One equilibrium 
price ($/MW) 
12.50 8.50 1 Yes 10.50 10.63 
12.00 9.00 1 Yes 10.50 10.63 
11.80 10.00 I Yes 10.90 10.63 
10.00 10.50 I No NA NA 
9.50 11.00 1 No NA NA 
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In the example shown in the table, there are three bids that are higher than the corresponding offers. If there is 
not a sufficient number of valid matches, then the tnie price has not been discovered. Price discoven- occurs when 
there are a sufficient number of buy bids and sell offers to allow a predetermined p»rtion of the total participants to be 
satisfied with the resulting contract. Submission of the bids marks the begiiming of the bidding CNrle. When the 
auctioneer reports the results of the auction to the market participants the c\x:le is complete. If. after the present c\°cle. 
the price has not been discovered, the auctioneer reports that price discov-ery did not occur, and asks for new bids and 
offers. The buyers may increase their bids and sellen may decrease their offers and another c>-cle of the auction is 
piav'ed. The cvcles continue until price discovery occurs, or until the auctioneer decides to match whatever \'alid 
matches exist and continue to the next round or hour of bidding. 
After phce discovery, the auctioneer asks if another round of bidding is requested. If the market participants hav e 
more po\\er to sell or bu>', they request another round. Allowing multiple rounds of bidding each tmie penod allows 
the participants the opportunit>- to use the latest pricing information in forming their present bid. This process is 
continued until no more requests are received or until the auctioneer decides that enough rounds have taken place. 
See Figure 2.17 for a block diagram of the auction process as we model it in our auction simulator. 
START 
ROUNDS = 0 
I 
ROUN DS += 1 
CYCLES = 0 
ESCOs & GENCOs 
submit bids to auctioneer 
ICA matches valid 
bids & offers 
Results reported 
to market participants 
STOP 
YES Anyone 
need another 
round? 
Check mventon.- & 
cak:ulate profit 
CYCLES +=1 
A 
NO 
Did 
price discov 
occur vet? 
Report results 
of auction 
YES 
Figure 2.17 The auction process. 
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2.5 Limitations of tbe model 
The model we assume is specified at a fairly high level and is meant to apph- to a large set of possible 
deregulated scenarios. It allows the trader and energ\- producer to develop general strategies. Ideally the details of 
the particular deregulated fiamevTOik m which one is interested can be incorporated into the model to idine the 
bidding strategies for actual use. Since w« keep the model at a high level for most of the woik described here, we 
avoid manv- of the complications that must be dealt with when using a more detailed model. For uistance. all the 
financial contracts in the wx)rld wxin't change the &a that electrical current follows the law3 of ph>-sics. The stead\-
state models of the generation and transmission system which wc use are a good start for deciding which transactions 
should be allowed or disallowed in the coming hours or days. Howiev-er. the laws of physics dictate that supph- and 
demand on the sv-stem must be in balance withm fractions of a second. Considering the dvnamic mteractions of 
generation and load is more demanding than simpK- adding up the megawatt-hours on a particular line and will 
likely produce difierent control re^nses than a stead\- state model might suggest. Since predictmg the e.\aa size 
and nature of the load at an\' given point in time is difficult the compl&x control responses to the changing load are 
also verv- difficult to spedfv' meaningfully in advance. Without these control actions, the sy-stem can become unstable 
quite quickh- and result in catastrophe. Therefore, the market framework that we describe here is built on the 
assumption that the power system is able to respond to sudden changes, and that accounting based on fle.xible 
ancillary service contracts can be done after the faa. 
The goal of regulators espousing deregulation is not to offer generation companies the chance to make 
unlimited profits at the expense of the consumers and sy stem mtegrit\-. Rather, the goal is to reduce consumer 
electricity' rates through competition, eliminating the inefficiencies and dead weight losses that came with the 
monopolistic pricing of the past, while maintaining sy stem reliability and integrity. To achieve that goal, the 
regulators of the power system must build in regulations that allows electrons to obey the laws of physics, and 
that will allow power system operators to mitigate the consequences of contingencies. Generator outages, 
transmission line failures, and transmission congestion are some of the challenges that power system operators 
will continue to face. Regulations must provide means of responding to these contingencies with minimal 
deviation from competitive pricing and no deviation from the laws of physics. Severe contingencies, e.g.. 
blackouts, may require operating in a temporary state of * martial law'. 
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3 EVOLVING BIDDING STRATEGIES WITH GENETIC 
ALGORITHMS AND GP-AUTOMATA 
3.1 Chapter overview 
The impending deregulation of the electrical industry- in the USA and electric sy stems around the globe 
promises to open a multi-biUion dollar industry to competition. Current research indicates that the double 
auction will be at the heart of se\eral regional electrical commodity- exchanges. The goal is to design 
comprehensive profitable bidding strategies for traders. This chapter reports on research using genetic 
algorithms to e\'olve bidding multipliers, bid amounts and selecting forecasting methods for trading agents. 
The second part of this chapter presents research that uses a technique that combines the use of genetic 
programming with finite state automata which we term GP-Automata. Adaptive strategies encoded by two 
populations of GP-Automata are tested in an auction simulator modeling distribution companies and 
generation companies buying and selling power \ia a double auction. In addition to e\oh-ing profitable 
bidding strategies, the resulting strategies can also be designed to imitate certain types of trading beha\-iors. 
These strategies can be used directly in on-line trading, or as realistic competitors in an off-line trading 
simulator. We report the results of specific e.xpenments which test the effect of changing the size of the GP 
trees, and the effect of changing the number of states. 
3.2 Introduction 
Regulations governing the electric utility- industry- in many parts of the world are being changed to 
promote competition. By increasing competition through deregulation of the US electncal transmission 
network. Congress and other regulators hope to increase power system efficiencies and to see benefits for 
elearic consumers. 
As mentioned before, for decades, electric consumers in the US had only their local, vertically integrated 
utility as a source of electricity. Electric utilities have always been guaranteed customers, and have not had to 
operate in a competitive environment. Both consumers and generators of electricity- (or their representatives) 
will soon be faced with having to sell or purchase power through a commodity exchange. To be successful, 
these electricity traders will need to de\'elop bidding strategies. This chapter focuses on developing such 
strategies. 
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The research piese2Ued in this chapter acoiingg an electric maiketplaoe which is stiuctiired similar to 
minmnriities exchanges like the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Oiicago Board of Trade, and New York 
Mercantile Fxchange (NYMEX) where commodities (other than electricity) have been traded for many years. 
In the research described in this chapter, trading agents use a genetic algorithm (GA) to evolve bidding 
strategies for the electric energy In one experiment, these strategies are encoded in the form of 
fyimhinatinn integer and binary strings. In subsequent experiments reported later in the chapter, bidding 
strategies are coded in the form of finite automata coupled with genetic programming (i.e., GP-Automata) 
[Ashlock, 1995, Ashlock and Richter, 1997], An optimal bidding strategy should be adaptive, able to pr(q)edy 
react as the trading behavior of its competitors changes. Coding information in the form of GP-Automata, 
which evolve in a GA, allows complex ad^tive strategies to develop. The results have been written up 
specifically for the electric energy market, but are directly ^)plicable for other markets. 
Section 3.2 suiv^ recently published work in this area, including research on evolving economic agents, 
genetic progranuning ^jplied to auctions, and auction environments. Section 3.3 reports experiments using 
the genetic algorithm to evolve non-adaptive bidding strategies. Section 3.4 describes GP-Automata and the 
auction environments in which the strategies are designed to perform. It also describes an experiment 
performed to test the effect of modiiying the tree size or the number of states in the GP-Automata, and presents 
the results of these experiments. 
3.3 Review of recent work 
Some research has been done in developing bidding strategies for electric systems in other countries. 
Researchers analyzed bidding strategies for the restructured Power Pool of England and Wales, and showed 
mathematically that there exists an optimal bidding strategy for its bidders [Finlay, 1995], Finlay's work 
differs in that his objective was not to maximize the profit of the individual generation companies, and the 
system itself is different from those proposed in the USA. Hence it is not directly applicable to our scenario. 
Research described the different types of commodity markets and their operation and outlined how each 
could be applied in the evolved electric energy marketplace (Sheble. 1994b]. Under the described framework 
[Sheble, 1996] compames presently having both generation and distribution facilities would, at a minimum, be 
divided into separate profit and loss centers. Power is generated by generation companies (GENCOs), 
transported via transimssion companies (TRANSCOs), and all power is sold to energy service companies 
(ESCOs) and subsequently dehvered to consumers on wires owned by the distribution companies (DISTCOs). 
The described firamework [Shebl^, 1996] allows for a cash market, a futures market and a planning 
market The cash market is for trading power for each 30 minute period in the next 30 days. The futures 
market allows electricity trading from 1 to 18 months into the future. Futures contracts are non-firm for a 
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mnnth This filtuits market provides a meaas for electriciQr tiadas to manage their risk. The other 
marifii^ is a planning marifff that can be used to develop capital to build new plants and would allow trading 
more *imn 18 months into the future. Figure 2.2 shows bow these markets are interconnected. Others 
niitiin^ how futuTC, planning and swap Can handle real-time control of the system (e.g., 
automatic generation control) and risk management [SbebK and McCallqr, 1994]. 
Additional work brought the above ideas together and demonstrated a power system auction game 
ri/'gigrvH to be a training tool {Kumar and Shdild, 1996b]. That game used the double auction mechanism in 
combination with classical optimization techniques. Buyers and sellers interact through a central coordinator, 
an Independent Contract Administrator (ICA), who matches the bids subject to all operational constraints. 
The central coordinator is responsible for ensuring that the energy transactions resulting from the matched 
bids do not overload or render the electrical transmission system insecure. GENCOs and ESCOs coordinate 
only via the prices transmitted to a central auctioneer. The ICA monitors and responds to the power system 
limits and transmission capacities. 
Developing bidding strategies with evolving trading agents for the deregulated electrical utility industry is 
a new field of research. Apart firom the electrical utility industry, interest has grown in recent years for using 
evolving, or adaptive, agents to simulate trading behavior. Research with adaptive agents has proved to be a 
useful means of exploring trading markets outside of the electrical industry. 
Evolving agents have learned to play financial markets [LeBaroo, 199S]. Research in which trading 
agents decide who to trade with based on an expected payofif was conducted (Tes&tsion, 1995], Genetic 
programming combined with a finite state automata was used to play a classic academic game called Divide 
the Dollar which involves bidding behavior and strategies [Ashlock, 199Sj. Later the same game was used to 
study kinship effects and concluded buyers and sellers should come firom separate populations to reduce the 
amount of collusion [Ashlock and Richter. 1997], 
A game based on a double auction was used to verify that genetic search is useful [Andrews and Prager, 
1994], Researchers showed that GP-based agents actually do leam, and they compare the performance of the 
GP-based strategies to those developed using simulated aimealing. In addition, they show that at the 
begmmng of the genetic algorithm it is possible to use a less rigorous fitness test than is needed in 
generations. While their findings may be useful to the genetic algorithm community, their experiments leave 
room for further improvements in strategy*building, including the use of a better auction model and additional 
actions for each of the GP-based strategies. 
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3.4 Evohing non-adaptive bidding strategies with a genetic algorithm 
3.-1.1 The marketplace 
This research assumes the existence of regional commodity exchanges in which buyers and sellers 
participate in a double auction. This framework can be considered an extension of the framework being 
implemented in California. For the results presented in this chapter. TRANSCOs are considered to be 
e.\ogenous to the market, while ESCOs and GENCOs are allowed to interact m an emironment as described in 
the pre\ious section. Although the frame^v'o^k covers the fiitures and options markets, the research described 
m this chapter is written up for only the cash/spot market. See chapter 2 for more details regarding the market 
framework. 
3.4.2 The basics of genetic algorithms 
A genetic algorithm is a search algorithm often used in nonlinear discrete optimization problems. Data, 
initialized randomly in a data struaure appropriate for the solution to the problem. e\olves over time and 
becomes a suitable ansner to the problem. GAs were inspired by the biological notion of e\-olution. See 
chapter 2 for additional details of genetic algorithms. 
3.4.3 Using genetic algorithms for trading agent representation and evolution 
In the research described in this section, parameters used to de%elop GENCOs' bids are evolved using a 
GA. Each member of the GA population corresponds to a GENCO partiapaung in an auaion. There are 
three distinct evolving parts, or genes, for cach of the GENCOs. First, the number of I MW contracts to offer 
at each round of bidding is e\'olving. This gene is filled with integer values. Valid integers are between 0 and 
a maximum value that corresponds to that GENCO's maximum capabilit> divided by the number of rounds of 
bidding. Second, bid multipliers for each round of bidding are evolved. These bid multipliers are used in 
combination with the GENCOs" costs and their e.\pected equilibrium price to develop a bid. This gene is 
represented by binar>- strings that are mapped to a value between the GENCO s cost and forecasted 
equilibrium price during the bidding process. Third, each GENCO has a gene that selects which prediction 
technique to use to forecast the equilibrium price. This is an integer valued gene with \'alid integers being 
from 0 to 4, since there are five prediction techniques (described later) from which each GENCO may choose. 
Additional forecasting methods can be incorporated easily. See Figure 3.1 for a representation of the trading 
agent's data structiues. 
Based on preliminary sensitivit>- testing, roulette selection was chosen to select parents in each generation 
of the genetic algorithm. Roulette seleaion is a parent selection method that chooses more highly fit creatures 
with a greater probability than the lesser fit creatures. This fitness bias is more pronounced (especially when 
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population sizes are small) than other parent selection methods like tournament selection or rank selection. A 
more thorough sensitivity testing could be done to determine which of these methods is the best for this 
problem. 
Based on sensitivitv' tests, three point crossover was seleaed to create the children. Crossover is used on 
both the number of contracts desired and the bid multiplier. The bid multipUers for each GENCO are 
concatenated together into one string prior to crossover, and three crossover locations are seleaed randomly 
from a uniform distribution over the gene's entire length. 
Aeent 0 Rounds of b dding 
MWs each round 12 4 20 14 
Mult, each round 01011 01101 10101 00101 
Prediction Technique 0 
Aeent 1 Rounds of bidding 
MWs each round 12 4 20 14 
Mult, each round 01011 01101 10101 00101 
Prediction Technique 2 o 
o 
o 
Agent N Rounds of bidding 
MWs each round 12 4 20 14 
Mult, each round 01011 01101 10101 00101 
Prediction Technique 3 
Figure 3.1 A population of agents/bidding strategies 
The standard bit-flip mutation operator is used on the binary' strings representmg the bid multipliers. The 
number of contracts gene has the possibility of being mutated by two different mutation operators. The first 
mutation operator (mutation_A) adds an integer to the e.Yisting integer. If the result is not a valid integer, the 
value is wrapped around, i.e. if the result is greater than the ma.\imum. then the ma.\imum is subtracted from 
it. (i.e.. the mod operator u-as used). Further investigation might reveal better results if the gene is set to its 
nmimum rather than wrapping it around. The second mutation operator (mutation B) shuffles the values 
among the different loci. This way if a good number is found in one loctis. it can spread to other locations 
more quickly. Mutation on the prediaion technique selection gene involves randomly selecting one of the 
valid predication techniques. 
The fitness of each creatiu^ is e.xactly equal to its profit after participating in an auction. A generation 
level for each GENCO can be determined by the number of contracts that the GENCO was able to obtain 
during the auction process. Profit is calculated as the total cost to generate at that le\'el. minus the total 
revenue. Total revenue is equal to the sum of the contract price multiplied by the number of contracts over all 
rounds of bidding. 
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At each generation, one half of the population is replaced with the children. Although the parents were 
not taken strictly from the top half of the population, it is always the creatures on the bottom of the population 
that are replaced each generation. 
3.4.4. Developing the GENCO offer 
This subsection explains how to develop an offer from the previously shown data structures. The number 
of 1 MW contracts is taken directly from the "MWs each round" gene. In the research here, the bid multiplier 
binar\- strings can be used in the following two different methods. In the first of these methods, the string is 
mapped into a range where a string of ail" I "s would set the offer price equal to the expected equilibnum pnce 
(EEP). and a stnng of all "0"s would set the offer price equal to the cost of the generator In the second 
method the string is mapped to a multiplier that could range from slightly below one to slightly above one. 
This multiplier is then multiplied b>- the EEP such that the offer will be within some tolerance of that EEP 
(e.g.. [number in the range of 0.75 to 1.25] x [expeaed equilibrium pnce] ). For the results shown in this 
section of the chapter the first method was used. Figure 3.2 shows how the data structures can be used to 
develop an offer. See Figure 3.3 for a block diagram of how the genetic algorithm, the pnce prediaion and 
the auction processes fit together to evolve the GENCOs that are trading electncit\. 
Evohmg population of 
solutions 
Pnce Prediction No. of MWs to bid Bid Multiplier 
technique of 
choice 
TEEP cost 
Submit 
offer to 
*• 
aucuoneer 
predicted .cost 
price 
Figure 3.2 Developing the ofTer from the data structure. 
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There are two methods included for arriving at the expected equilibrium price. The first method uses no 
prediction techniques, and simply assumes that the current round's pnce will be the same as the preMous 
round's equilibrium price. In the absence of additional information, this is a fair assumption given a stable 
market where the prices do not fluctuate ver\- much. The other method of arriving at the EEP involves using a 
forecasting technique. A gene in the GENCO's data structure determines which forecasting method to use. 
The GENCOs may use of any forecasting method ax'ailabie. The techniques which we investigated were the 
following methods (but any other methods could also be included); 
1. mo\ing average (MVA) 
2. weighted moving average (WMVA) 
3. exponentially weighted moving average (EWMVA) 
4 linear regression (LR) 
5 Multi-layer perceptron neural network with back-propagation learning 
STOP lax gens di 
s»done2^^ ves 
START 
Crossover 
Pnce prediction 
Parent Selection 
Mutation 
Generation = 0 
Generauon += 1 
Calculate titness/profit 
Replace less fit creatures 
Hold aucuon & report results 
Initialize e\olMng gencos 
Figure 3.3 The GA agent evolution process. 
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The MVA. WMVA. EWMVA and LR are standard and can be found in am- statistics text book. The 
inputs to be considered can be adjusted until the best forecasts are obser\'ed (minimum mean squared error). 
It was originally intended that each GENCO would have a unique set of parameters for its own forecasting 
technique, but tuning these parameters independently was foimd to be too computationally e.\pensive for the 
research we were doing. Therefore, each GENCO that uses the same forecasting technique gets the same 
forecasted equilibrium pnce. Since performing this research, many new neural nervvork techniques have 
emerged with reduced training times that would make them more practical for this application. 
3.4.5 Resubs 
The genetic algorithm was initialized with a rather small population size of 24. i.e.. 24 GENCOs. Each 
generation. 12 new creatures replaced the 12 worst fit of the population. Roulette selection was used to select 
the parents. Based on engineering judgment a mutation rate of twent>' percent was used at each loci of the 
new creatures for the standard mutation operation. Mutation B was used 50% of the time, and the 
Mutation A was used the other 50%. Three point crossover was used during reproduction. Fitness was taken 
as the raw profit each GENCO received. 
For simplicit}', one ESCO was bidding against all of the GENCOs. The buy bid was a constant amount 
each round. Neither transmission constraints nor system stability- violations were considered. The minimum 
generation of each GENCO is 200 MW; the maximum is 480 MW Trading occurs for 24 rounds each 
generation. A ma.ximum of 20 cvcles is allowed for price discovery , at which time the round number is 
incremented. Each of the GENCOs has the same generation cost curv e, represented by the following equauon 
(where MW is the generation le\el). 
Cost of generation = [200 + (8.0)(MW) (0.00251)(MW)-| [Fuel cost] (3.1) 
For the case shown in the following figures, the expected equilibrium pnce was taken to be the prev ious 
round's equilibrium price. The bid multiplier was used to bid between the GENCO s cost and the expeaed 
equilibrium price. The case shown is a seller" s market, where the electricit>- demand is twice the supply. The 
ESCO wants 960 MW each round, but the ma.ximum total supply is 480 MW/round. The ESCO bids 
$20/MWhr each round. The GENCOs are allowed to e\ olve for 400 generations. 
The graphical results in Figures 3.4-3.6 show that the auction simulator and GA bidding strateg\' evolver 
are working in an explicable manner. The average, maximum, and minimum fitness of the GENCO 
population is plotted on the top graph in Figure 3.6 for 400 generations. The number of MWs actually 
purchased by the ESCO is plotted in the second graph of Figure 3.6. In the remaining graphs in Figures 3.6. 
the average, minimum, and maximum offer prices of the GENCOs are plotted for each of the rounds of 
bidding at each generation. In the bottom graph of Figure 3.6. the resulting equilibrium price is plotted. In 
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Figure 3.4. the best GENCO's bid multipliers are plotted for the first generation and the last generation. The 
number of MWhr sold b>- the best GENCO each generation is plotted in Figure 3.5. 
The fitness of the best GENCO/agent generally increases over the generations. The best GENCO is 
taking advantage of the high demand bv* increasing the number of MWs it is offering for sale. However, many 
of the lesser fit GENCOs are not learning that it is beneficial to sell as much as possible. Consequently the 
ESCO is purchasing less than half of the electiicitv' it would like. Since the buy bid and sell offer are averaged 
to arrive at the price reported by the auctioneer, the agents e.\hibiting less savvy bidding beha\ior tend to keep 
the equilibrium price around the $17-$18/MWhr range. If they were all using the strategy of the best GENCO. 
in this particular case, the price would be $20/MWhr. Price fluctuations are fairly small over the generations, 
but tend to vary a great deal over the rounds during each generation. The average offer is about S15/MWhr for 
this case. The bid multipliers of the best GENCO e\'olved so that the offers were closer to the e.xpeaed 
eqmlibriuni price as opposed to the GENCO's cost. 
3.4.6 Conclusions of non-adaptive strategy evolution 
The auction simulation is working as e.xpected. The e\olution of the GENCOs is also proceeding as 
expccted. The framework used and de\'eloped for this research should be a helpful tool for those who will be 
participating in the competitive elearic marketplace of the future. It would also be helpful for those \\ishing 
to develop bidding strategies for other t\pes of markets. Se\eral other cases were run that have not been 
included in this dissertation. Multiple runs verified that the bid multipliers were funcuoning. The bid 
multiplier gene evolved to increase fitness while the other genes were held constant. The forecasting 
techniques must be properly tuned to get good forecasts. If the market is such that the equilibrium pnce does 
not fluctuate much, then using the previous equilibnum pnce works well. Market specific information 
including knowledge about the volatility can help to fine-tune the parameters for better performance. The GA 
IS able to make use of a more comple.\ data stniaure. Separate multipliers for each round of bidding e%'oIve to 
result in a better solution than that derived from a single multiplier for all rounds. 
The better agents of a particular generation have a strategj- which obtains a higher profit. Since all agents 
are adapting their strategies at each generation, a particular strategy- may prove to work well during one 
generation, but not so well during a later generation. It is difficult (but of great interest) to determine what 
makes a particular strategy a good one. Identify ing the common features of the best agents at each generation 
and building an expert system rule base is the subject of continued research. Sensitivity analysis and testing 
will pro\ide valuable infonnation on the robustness of the best strategies. 
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Figure 3.4 Bid multipliers of the best agent at the first and last generation. 
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Figure 3.5 IVTWs sold by best agent each generation. 
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Figure 3.6 Fitness and trading results. 
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Tliy mntainwl in this aedinn was a first attempt at evolviiig bidding sttategies. We have built oo this 
itseaidi in an effixt to build bidding strategies that are adaptive, that use mote of the iqxit infijimatian, and that are 
easier to develop. See the chapter on unit commitment fiirmne recent research that uses a more detailed model that 
considers and shutdown ramp constraints, minimum-up and mininunn-down times fiv the generators. 
The unit oommitmeotwoikiiidudessqiarate cost curves fir eadi generating unit See the chapter on fiizzy logic fir 
firTTy HiHrfing strat^ies. Hk iKxt section of this diqiter describes a continuation at this research whidi indudes 
power marketos that both buy and sell power. It also includes the use of dual populations (GENCOs and ESCOs) 
that co-evolve. The population ofESCOs has its own bidding strat^ies that reaa to the GENCO'soffias. 
3,5 Adaptive bidding strategies with genetic programming and finite state automata 
This section describes research on evolving bidding strategies that are adaptive. Hrst popularized by John Koza 
in his book. Genetic Programming, genetic programs allow the designer to get away finm the sometimes restrictive 
notion of a fixed data stnicture ofiered by traditional genetic algorithms. The GP field is still burgeoning and new 
and deverwatys of combining genetic programming with other techniques are being developed. One such tedmique 
is known as GP-Aiitomata and was developed a researcher at Iowa Slate University [Ashlock, 1995]. CP-
Automata combine finite state automata with genetic programs. This section of the chapter rqxiits on bkUing 
strategy development with GP-Automata It builds on the research reported earlier and uses the market structure, 
assumptions, and genetic algorithm techniques discussed in Oiapter 2. We first describe genetic programming and 
GP-Automata, and then report on several experiments using the GP-Automata technology. 
3.S.1 Hie basics of genetic programming 
The process of genetic programming has been called automatic programming and is a subclass of the ynttir 
algorithm field. Geneticprogrammingisa&irty new discipline and is attributed to Koza [1992]. Typically shown in 
either parse tree (see Figure 3.7), or S-expression form fe.g.: avg(ite(sub(hbb. cost), 20,asb),10))], genetic programs 
(CPs) are evolvable programs. Each parse tree contains some number of nodes and branches. The branches connect 
the various nodes which can be either an operational node which has arguments and performs ""mp operation 
involving those arguments, or a terminal node which returns a constant value. 
The designer specifies the set cf valid operators and terminals suitable to the problem i^ing investigated. For 
instance, in devdoping bidding strategies, suitable operators and terminals might be those described in Table 3.1. In 
designing GPs for the GP-Automata, it is desirable to give the trees an opportunity to return numbers in the range of 
competitive bids. 
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Figure 3.7 Sample GPs. 
The CPs are traditionally evolved in a standard genetic algorithm (as described in the previous section) 
with the following nwiififsitinnc Crossing over two parents involves randomly selecting a node fiom each 
parfpt and swapping the sub-trees rooted at those nodes. Mutation involves randomly selecting a iKxle in the 
ranHiHati> ch'M and throwing away its sub-tree. In its place a new sub-tree is generated randomly. See Koza 
[1992, 1994] for a more detailed look at GP. 
Table 3.1 Valid operators and terminals for the GP. 
Name Type Args Description 
gte oper 2 Return 1 if 1st arg is >= 2nd arg; otherwise return 0. 
Itn oper 2 Return 1 if 1st arg is <= 2nd arg; otherwise return 0. 
ite oper 3 If 1st arg is even after trxmcation. return 2nd arg: else. 3rd arg. 
abs oper 1 Returns absolute value of arg. 
mid oper 2 Returns average of the two args. 
mul oper 2 Returns multiplication of 2 args 
pis oper Returns addition of 2 args 
sub oper 2 Subtracts 2nd arg from 1st arg 
max oper 2 Returns the larger of the two args 
min oper 2 Returns the smaller of the 2 args 
eye term 0 Returns current cycle number 
est term 0 Returns the cost of gen. for the bid 
asb term 0 Returns the average sell bid 
hsb term 0 Returns the max sell bid 
isb term 0 Returns the min sell bid 
abb term 0 Returns the average buy bid 
hbb term 0 Returns the max buy bid 
ibb term 0 Returns the min buy bid 
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3.5.2 Tke basics of GP-Automata 
GP-Automata pnmhine finite gufninata with GPs. They were first described as such by a researcher 
at Iowa State [Ashlock, I99S] and were later used in experiments (Ashlock and Richter, 1997], The typical 
finifff ctati» aiitnmatnn specifies an action and "next state" transition for a given input or inputs. With only one 
or two binary iiqxits to work with, it can be &iriy simple to develop a finite state diagram to cover the possible 
input/output relations. When the number of inputs is large, the task is much harder. The number of transitions 
needed to cover all possible combinations of inputs grows exponentially (e.g., 10 inputs each having 5 possible 
values would require S'° transitions). This is where genetic programming comes in. The GP-trees are 
bandwidth conq)ressors. Thq  ^are used by the GP-Automata for selecting which inputs to consider and for 
performing computations involving these inputs. See Figure 3.8 for an example of a GP-Automaton. 
IF ODD IF EVEN 
State Action Next State Action Next State GP (Decider) 
1 14.5 1 U 1 Ite (mul(10, abs (hbb)) 
2 * 1 37 3 ite(max(10, asb). hbb. Ibb) 
3 12 2 5 I split (S. abb) 
4 U 3 * 2 47 
Initial Action 24 Initial State 2 1 
Figure 3.8 A four state GP-Automaton. 
Reading the rule encoded in the GP-Automaton in the figure is fairly simple. We see that this automaton 
begins by bidding the number in the 'initial action' field. Following the initial action, the 'initial state' tells us 
which state we would use next (in this case. 2). The GP-Automaton in the figure has four states. Coupled with 
each of these states is a GP-tree termed a decider. When executed, the decider returns a value between 0 and 
100. Based on that returned value, one of the following two things will happen: (a) if that value is even after 
truncation, the action listed under 'IF EVEN' is taken and we move to the next state listed under 'IF EVEN'; 
(b) if the returned value is odd after tnmcation, then we use the action and next state listed under 'IF ODD'. 
The 'action' is the number listed in the action field of the automaton, with two exceptions. The first exception 
is the 'U' which indicates that the value returned by the decider should be taken directly as the action. The 
second exception is a which indicates that ftinher computation is necessary and hence the GP-Automata 
refrains from acting immediately. Instead, it immediately moves to the next state. This gives rise to the 
possibility of complex (multi-state) computation as well as infinite loops. To prevent infinite loops, after an 
externally specified maximum number of '•'s, an action is selected at random firom actions uniformly 
distributed over the valid range. 
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In this chapter we evolve a population of GP-Automata in a GA. After selecting parents as described 
later, offspring are produced using crossover and mutation. Crossover for the GP-Automata imolves selecting 
(uith a uniform probability) a crossover point ranging from zero to the number of states. We then cop>- first 
parent's states from zero to the crossover point to the first child and the second parent's states to the second 
child. Following the crosso\'er point, the first child gets the second parent's state information and the second 
child gets the first parent's state information (including the associated decider). Before replacing less fit 
members of the population, each child is subjeaed to one of the following four t\-pes of mutation: 
• MutationA replaces a randomly selected state or action with another valid entry. 
• MutationB swaps the intact deciders of two randomly seleaed states within a candidate child. 
• MutationC performs the GP crossoxer on two randomly seleaed states from the candidate child. 
• MutationD generates an entirely new decider for a randomly selected state within the candidate child. 
3.5.3 Using the strategies in an auction 
In each generation, the performance of each GP-Automata in the population is tested b>- using the strategy 
in an auction. GP-Automata representing seller strategies from the first population attempt to contraa with 
GP-.Automata representing buyer strategies from the second population. The price and the resulting profit is a 
function of all bids and offers, not just the bids produced by an individual GP-Automaton. Randomly 
assigning members of the population so that the> aren't always paired with the same group of buyers and 
sellers helps to ensure that the resulting GP-Automata strategies will be robust. At the end of the competition, 
some fitness measure (e.g.. profit from the contracts) is assigned to each GP-Automaton. 
During the first c>cle of bidding in an auaion. the sirateg> defined b\- the GP-Automata uses the bid 
specified in the 'Initial Action" cell and goes to the state listed in 'imtial state". For each subsequent c>cle of 
bidding the results of the previous cycle of bidding are av ailable as inputs to the GPs. These inputs from the 
environment are supplied to the GP-Automata through the terminals listed in Table 3.1. The GP-trees use the 
statistics on the previous round"s bidding stored in the terminals as well as numerical terminals in the range 0-
100. For the experiments described in this chapter, the continuum from 0 to 100 was evenly divided into 
10.000 discrete values. When these values were required to be an integer value, the number was truncated 
after the decimal point. Bids are taken from the aaion cell of the automata. e.\cept in the cases where the 
aaion is listed as a or a 'U'. as described previously. The bids are submitted, along with the bids from the 
competing sellers and buyers, to the auaioneer for evaluation. The bids and offers are matched and a would-
be price is reported, completing one cvcle of the auction. The cvcles continue until price discovery occurs or 
until some maximum number of cv cles (ma.\cv cles) has passed. There is a maxcycles parameter, which is 
selected unifontily over a range to prevent the strategies from falling into a local optima in which the 
strategies work well when the number of cv cles is identical over the trials in a given generation. 
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3.5.4 Evolving and testing the strategies: A first attempt 
The following parameters were used for the results presented in this section. The population size (i.e. 
number of GP-Automata in the population) was selected to be twenty-four. We used the roulette selection, 
replacing eight members of the population each generation. During even' generation of the GA. each GP-
Automaton's fitness was calculated bv' having it participate in an auction fifh- times as a seller (GENCO) with 
five other sellers offering to supply 10 MWhr. and five buyers demanding 15 MWhr each. Each automaton in 
the population is attempting to sell 10 MWhr of electrical energy. The auction used for this e.\periment uses 
non-discriminating pricing, which means that each of the contracts awarded in a particular auction have the 
same equilibrium price. The $5/MWhr cost associated with generating the 10 MWhr is the same for each 
automaton being tested in our population. Each automaton being tested faces the same 50 sets of bids and 
offers encountered by the other automata in the population. The GA was evolved for 35 generations. Each 
expenment/case was repeated twenty times, and the results shown in this section are averaged across those 
twenty runs. 
In case 1, the buyers' bids are all set to a constant $15/MWhr, and the sellers" offers are set to a constant 
S5/MWhr. The top graph in Figure 3.9 shows the min.. ma\.. and average fitness of the automata in each 
generation of the GA. Because (as described previously) the maximum number of cycles is not always the 
same, the max. fitness will sometimes decrease from one generation to the ne.\t The bottom graph m Figure 
3 9 shows a histogram of the bids placed by our GP-Automata as they participate m the auction. We can see 
that the GP-Automata are learning to bid close to their cost of generation, which is S5/MWhr (Note. In 
Figures 3.9. 3.10. and 3 .11 the frequency of bids within a certain tolerance have been lumped together and 
shown with a single row of bars since the data are hard to read w hen including histograms for all possible 
bids. Bids shown on the far left of the histograms correspond to SO/MWhr. and bids shown on the far nght 
correspond to S20/MWhr. while the middle of the graph corresponds to SlO/MWhr. and so forth.) 
In case 2 (shown in Figure 3.10). the offers of the competing sellers are distributed about S5/MWhr and 
the buyers" bids are distributed around S15/MWhr as shown in the lower graph of Figure 3.10. This makes it 
harder for the GP-Automata to develop a general strategy that works against all competitors, and the result is 
that their maximum fitness is lower than that of case I. Their bids tend to be at or below cost which, w hen 
matched with buy bids as shown in the lower graph of Figure 3.10. results in some amount of profit. As we 
saw in case I and as we'll see in case 3. in case 2. they learn ven- quickly that they must not be underbid by 
the other generators, hence we see no successfiil strategies with bidding above $5. 
In case 3, which is shown in Figure 3.11. we initialize the competitors' bids for the first cycle of each 
auction with the same distributions as before, but now the distributions move toward each other over time. As 
the cycles pass, bids decrease and the offers increase, becoming a bit more competitive. The histogram for 
case 3 looks much like that of case 2, but the portion of the bids that are below the cost tend to be a bit more 
uniformly distributed, whereas in case 2, the closer the bids got to the cost from the left, the more common was 
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that bid. One explanation for this could be that since the ESCO bids are decreasing ov er the cv cles. and since 
the equilibrium price will be determined b>' these low ESCO bids as well as our own bid, that any successiiil 
GP-Automaton-based players must learn to be near their cost on the first cvcle. Contracts forming in 
subsequent cvcles invariably result in a loss, and these members of the population are replaced. Another 
explanation may be that when the competitors' bids are moving, learning what to bid becomes too difficult and 
the GP-Automata are unable to make any headway. Comparison of the top graph in Figure 3.9 with those of 
Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11 shows that the profit obtained bv- the GP-Automata decreases as the bids and 
offers of their competitors become more noisv. The profit level decreases further in case 3 where the 
competitors' bidding becomes more aggressive. 
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Figure 3.9 Case 1: Competitor buy bids at SlS/MWhr and sell offers at SS/MWhr. 
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Figure 3.10 Case 2: Competitor bids distributed as shown. 
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Figure 3.11 Case 3. Competitors' bids/offers mo\1ng toward together over cycles of the auction. 
In this experiment the results demonstrate that GP-Automata learn to bid in a sensible and explicable 
manner. The GP-Automata lend themselves well to scenarios where there are vast amounts of data available, 
and identiilcation of crucial data is important. The compam- models used in the simulations described in this 
section of the chapter were fairly straight forward. A sensitivity analysis should be performed to see how the 
various parameters affea the performance of the strategies that are construaed. Among these parameters are 
the parent selection methodolog>'. the population size, modifications on the auction, and tesung the effect of 
tree size and reduaion of the number of states. 
3.5.5 An experiment to test the effect of GP-Automata tree size and state number 
Initially engineering judgment was used to arrive at the nim^ber of states and the size of the deciders in 
the GP-Automata. This section describes a first attempt to perform a test on the sensiti\nt> of these two 
parameters. As in the last section, many of the parameters used here are set fairly closely to parameters used 
m the onginal Di%ide the Dollar experiment. Except for the parameters being tested, the GP-Automata were 
set up identically as in the previous section. However, m this experiment, two populations \\ere used: one 
population was for the GENCOs and the other for the ESCOs. For the control case, each of the GP-Automata 
was allowed six states/deciders. They were allowed to have GP-trees with no more than 16 nodes. We used 
tournament selection with tournament size four and a population size of 24. The deciders were allowed to use 
those terminals and operators described in Table 3.1, 
The double auction in which the strategies were tested matches 5 buyers and 5 sellers. While the GP-
Automata are being tested for fitness, they compete m an auction. 5 members of their own population, against 
5 members of the other population (not necessarily distinct). Smce each strategy 's performance depends on 
who It is competing with, buyers and sellers are arranged so that in each column, all buyers or sellers will 
appear e.\actiy once. An example is given in Table 3 .2. This is not an exhaustive testing of all groupings, but 
rather an indicative sample. After selecting a grouping (row ) of sellers, the buyers are assigned as shown on 
the right side of the table. That row of sellers competes against each grouping of bu\ers once. Each GP-
Automaton is assigned fitness in proportion to the profit it made from resulting contracts. At the next grouping 
of sellers, the buyers are reassigned m the same maimer, and the process continues. 
To put the GP-Automata on equal footing, the problem is constructed to be symmetric for the buyers and 
sellers. Each buyer will receive the same $15/MWhr rate from his customers (S15/MWhr is about 3/4 of the 
way from left to right since SO/MWhr is shown on the left and S20/MWhr is shown on the right) for the 
electricity- it buys in the auaion. and each seller is able to produce eleancit>- at the same $5/MWhr cost. Profit 
is calculated in the usual way. For the sellers, profit is the equilibrium price minus the cost of production, 
multiplied bv' the contraa amount. For the bmers, profit is the revenue received from their customers minus 
the equilibrium price, multiplied by the contract amount. 
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Table 3.2 Assignment of buyers and sellers to an auction. 
Sellers Buvers 
21 19 4 3 21 23 14 20 5 9 
4 11 2 7 16 7 24 13 1 3 
3 22 16 24 17 10 11 g 6 23 
12 9 15 8 5 19 1 3 17 1 
Although more cases u-ere actually- run. three cases are presented in the results section of this chapter The first 
is a control case, the results of which are shown in Figures 3.12 and 3.13. The control case has a population size of 
24 GP-Automata for both the buv-ers and the sellers. Each GP-Automaton has six states Each decider in the GP-
Automata is limited to a maximum of 16 nodes. The max.. min.. and av-g. fimess and a histogram of bids averaged 
across all 40 runs is show in Figure 3.12. The histograms show3 the number of bids that occurred within a particular 
range (the SO - S20/MWhr range is divided into 20 parts) at each generation. To demonstrate the t>-pe and qualitv- of 
information that goes into getting these averages, an individual run selected at random from the control case is shown 
in Figure 3.13. We can see from the fimess/profit plot on top that the ESCOs were making more profit than the 
GENCOs early on, but this switches about generation 10 when the GENCOs leam to bid better. Note from the 
histograms that both buv-ers and sellers favored a small number of the total possible numbers for their bids. 
In the second case we limited the sellers to a maximum of only one node in their deciders. The buv ers remam as 
described m the control case. Figure 3 14 shows the results averaged across 40 runs for case 2. Averaged across the 
40 runs, the maximum, minimum and average fimess are ver>- similar to the control case. The histogram shows that 
the GENCO bids seem somewhat less normally distributed than are the bids m the control ease, with what seems to 
be a tcndcncv to bid around S10/M\Vhr One explanation for the strong conccntrauon of bids around SlO/MWhr is 
that the GP-Automata cannot build complex formulas from which to develop sophisticated bids. If the bids are to be 
taken to be the output of the decider, they- must settle on either a fixed number, or one of the other terminals described 
in the operator and terminal table. Figure 3.15 shows an individual run seleaed at random firom all of the runs in case 
2. During the first 10 generations or so. the ESCOs are taking the bulk of the profit, when at that time the GENCOs 
leam that they can bid around $ 15/MWhr since this is a market which favors the seller. 
The third case presented in this chapter limits the number of states that the sellers can have to one. The deciders 
for the sellers are limited to a maximum of 16 nodes. The buyers remain as described in the control case. The three 
graphs in Figure 3.16 show the results averaged across 40 runs for case 3. Again the fimesses were very similar to 
the control case. The histogram show-s that the bids were distributed in much the same way- when av eraged across all 
runs, but there is a tendency- for them to be less e.xploratory- within a particular run (See Figure 3.17.) 
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Figure 3.12 Results for the control case. 
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Figure 3.13 An individual run selected at random from the control case. 
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Figure 3.14 Case 2, averaged across 40 runs. GENCOs are limited to one node GPs. 
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Figure 3.15 An individual run selected at random from the one node GP GENCO case (case 2). 
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Figure 3.17 An individual run selected at random from the single state GENCO case (case 3). 
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3.6 Qiapter coodiiiioes and future research 
As eaiiier in the chapter, the results demonstiate that when CP-Automata bid in a multi-paitidpant 
aiKiinn th  ^icam to bid in a sensible and explicable manner. The GP-Automata lend themsehres wdl to scenarios 
ntoe there are vast amounts of data available, and identification of cnidal data is important The company models 
used in the amniatinns described in this chapter were &iriy stiai^  fixwaid. Adding more detail (e.g. available 
transfia- aQjabilities, fixecasted prices, unit commitment schedules) will increase the volume of infixmation that the 
bidder needs to consider in making a bid. The facx that CS'-Automata suffer veiy little d^radatkn in performance 
v i^en th  ^are limited by number of states or tree size gives some indication of how powofiil the method is. 
The auction that we have used is more realistic for the coming deregulated electricity marketplace than in 
previous research [Andrews and Prager, 1994; AshJock, 1995; Ashlock and Richter, 1997], but more details 
remain to be added which will complicate matters. We plan to test in further experiments that the GP-
Automata are able to make use of this additional data to increase the performance of the strategies. As Figure 
2.7 shows, traders have to deal in more than one maiket Extending the strategies to cover multiple marif<^g is 
another area of future research. 
In addition to adding the above details, a more complete sensitivity analysis should be performed to 
determine how the various parameters affea performance of the strategies that are constructed. Among these 
parameters are the parent selection methodology, the population size, and modifications on the auction. 
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4 FUZZY LOGIC IN THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 
4.1 Chapter overview 
In the first part of this chapter, previous research done in the area of building bidding strategies for 
electnc utilities in the competitive environment is extended. The reader is given the basics of fuzz>- logic. A 
description of how fuzzy- logic can be utilized to make bidding strategies adaptive is presented. Four methods 
for building bidding strategies that use fuzz\- logic and/or genetic algorithms are discussed and outlined. This 
research discusses how economical inputs may be fuzzifled for use in determining a generator 's bid. Methods 
of tuning and searching for the optimal rule are discussed. A discussion of how an agent using the bidding 
strategies can compare them based on profitability is presented. 
Automatic generation control is an important service provided by electnc utilities in today s marketplace. 
Responding to mismatches between the scheduled interchanges between areas, it allows for load and 
generauon uncertainties. Careful control of this service is likely to become more important than ever in the 
fiiture. and may be delivered and priced as an ancillary service separate from electric power. In the second pan 
of this chapter, fuzzy rules for automatic generation control of an electnc power sv stem are developed and 
presented. Interchange error, time error, and area control error are used in conjunction with fuzzv- rules to 
control generation levels in a two-area system. The fiizzv- controller described here outperforms a traditional 
controller conneaed to a svstem with the same generator parameters and same load changes and also performs 
better than a fiizzv- automatic generation controller that uses onl> one mput 
4.2 Using fuzzy logic to build bidding strategies that handle uncertainty 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Due to recent deregulation intended to bring about competition, the US electrical industry is in the midst 
of some major operational changes. Although the details of the deregulated marketplace for each region of the 
coimtry are not yet fully defined, thev- are being more clearly defined as time passes. Many legislators, 
researchers, and electric customers and suppliers are convinced that electricitv will be traded in a manner 
similar to other commodities at exchanges around the countrv*. 
Configuration of the transmission system and the faa that electricity flow is subject to the laws of physics, 
have some speculating that we will see the formation of regional commoditv- e.\changes that would be 
oligopolistic in nature (having a limited numbers of sellers). Others postulate that the number of sellers will 
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be sufficient to have near perfea competition. Regardless of the actual level of the resulting competition, 
companies wishing to survive in the deregulated marketplace must change the way the\' do business and will 
need to develop bidding strategies for trading electricity via an exchange. 
Economists have developed theoretical results of how markets are supposed to behave under varying 
numbers of sellers or bmers with varying degrees of competition. Often the economical results pertain only 
when aggregating across an entire industry and require assumptions that may not be realistic. These results, 
while considered sound in a macroscopic sense, may be less than helpful to a particular company not fitting 
the industry profile that is tr>ing to develop a strategy that will allow it to remain competitive. 
Generation companies (GENCOs). energy- service companies and distribution companies (DISTCOs) that 
participate in an energ\' commodity exchange must leam to place effective bids in order to win energy 
contracts. Microeconomic theory- states that in the long term, a hypothetical firm selling in a competitive 
market should price their product at its marginal cost of production. The theon is based on several 
assumptions (e.g., market players will behave rationally, market players have perfea information). These 
assumptions may be true industry-wide, but might not be true for a particular region or a particular firm. 
Section 4.1.2 of this chapter describes the deregulated market-place to be considered during this research. 
Seaion 4.1.3. describes previous research on evolving bidding strategies for generation compames using 
geneuc algorithms. We build on the idea and begin to discuss some of the advantages of strategies that are 
adaptive. Section 4.1.4 provides the reader with the basics of fiizzy logic, and looks at how the economic 
inputs of DISTCOs and GENCOs might be fuzzified in order to build better bidding strategics. Seaion 4.1.5 
outlines the models we are using, and the research we are currently pursuing to build better bidding strategies. 
Finally, section 4.1.6 discusses how we can ftizzify decision analysis to decide which action to take for a given 
scenano. Conclusions and future research efforts for the entire chapter are presented in section 4.3 
4.2.2 The marketplace 
As in previous chapters, this research again assumes the e.\istence of regional commodity e.\changes in 
which buyers and sellers participate in a double auction. This framework has been adopted from Sheble 
Sheble. 1996|. and closely resembles the market framework being used in the Australian power system. Sec 
chapter 2 for more details regarding the market framework. 
4.2.3 Evolving bidding strategies with genetic algorithms 
Briefly, a genetic algorithm (GA) is an algorithm which allows evolution of the contents of a data 
struaure. GAs were developed by John Holland and are loosely based on the biological notion of evolution. 
The data structure being evolved contains a solution to the problem being studied. A population of 
syntactically valid solutions are initialized randomly during the first step of the algorithm. Each of the 
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solutions is yccign  ^a fitness based on its suitability for solving the particular problem being studied, If these 
are initiaXrrfA fanAimly the of them being highly fit during the first generation, is not veiy 
high At t-gt^h generation, the GA will randomly chose membeis of the population to be "parents" &voring the 
highly-fit members. The parents will then produce ofi^ ring via the crossover and mutation processes. 
Crossover is the which two parents produces two offering and involves combining parts of each 
parent to produce each child. Mutation can be thought of as copying eirois introduced into the children due to 
background noise. The newly produced offering replace the numbers of the population that have a low 
fitness. As the generations progress, there is a tendency for the contents of the data structures to adapt such 
that th  ^become more suited to solving the problem. See chapter 2 for a more complete description of genetic 
algorithms. 
Researchers previously used a GA to evolve a structure containing bid multipliers [Richter and Shebld, 
1997a]. Others have used GAs for computational economics [loannides, 1995, Tes&tsion, 1995]. The 
bidding strategies that come from the evolved structures (shown in Figure 3.1) are feirly simple. The expected 
price of the electricity (obtained via some forecasting scheme) is multiplied the bid multipliers and the 
result is used as the bid for that particular round of bidding. In addition to the bid multipliers, the number of 
MWs to offer for sale at each round of bidding and the choice of price prediction techniques are also evolved. 
The results of previous research [Richter and Sheble, 1997al are promising. As the GA progresses, the 
bidding strategies become better and yield more profit, indicating that "intelligent agents" are learning 
However, the strategies are somewhat limited because they do not make use of inputs that are available during 
a particular round of bidding. Evolving fixed string bidding strategies [Richter and Sheble. 1997a] is like 
learning the steps of a dance or memorizing a list of things to do mechanically in order to make a successfiil 
bid for a particular set of circumstances. Using that approach, means that the evolved niles will not be very 
adaptive, i.e., they don't react to the environment. Each set of rules is evolved to be used only for a specific set 
of circumstances. If the circumstances var)' from that, the set of rules may yield disappointing results. We 
could attempt to create scenarios in which we are interested, but we would find that the number of credible 
scenarios is so large that we could not possibly hope to cover them all. So the question becomes: How can we 
develop adaptive bidding strategies that will take advantage of currently available information? 
4.2.4 Fuzziness and uHcertainty 
When attempting to maximize the profit of a GENCO, other things being equal, the profit varies with the 
price of electricity. In reality, those other things (e.g., demand forecasts, production costs, etc.) have 
uncertainty associated with them. One natural way to deal with risky (uncertain) situations is to use decision 
analysis with big trees and we'll talk about that later. Another way, which we'll discuss now, is to use "fuz  ^
logic", made popular by Lotfi Zadeh during the 1960s. Fuzzy logic provides a methodical mean*; of rivaling 
with uncertainty and ambiguity. It allows its users to code problem solutions with a natural language syntax 
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with which people are comfortable. Many of us regularly use fiizzy terms to describe things or events. For 
instance, if we were asked to describe a person, we might use terms like "pretty tair. with a "big nose" and 
"somewhat overweight". These terms can be defined differently by different people. There is a certain amnpnt 
of ambiguity or uncertainty associated with an\' description involving natural language terms such as these. 
Most of the things we deal with daily in this universe are ambiguous and uncertain. "The only subsets of the 
universe that are not in principle fuzzy are the constructs of classical mathematics [Kosko, 1992| ." 
Fuzzv- logic allows us to represent ambiguous or uncertain quantities with membership ftmctions. The 
membership functions map the natural language descriptions onto a numerical \-alue. Membership to a 
particular description or class is then a matter of degree. Using frizzy logic, we might say that electrical 
demand is high in a region if it is 1200 MW or so. and normal if it is more or less 700 MW. What if the 
demand is 1000 MW? Using traditional logic we would classiiS- it neither high nor normal. However usmg 
fiizzy logic, we might find that this demand is actually both high and normal, each to a certain degree (based 
on its membership function). Similarly we could have fiizzy membership functions for other inputs like fuel 
costs, risk aversion, level of competition, etc. Figure 4.1 shows how these classifications (membership 
functions) in graphical form. 
Truth Value 
M, (x) 
low normal high demand 
1.0 \ A / 
M: (x,) \v y 
Ml (xi) f \  / \  
500 700 900 (demand in MW) 
Figure 4.1 Fuzzy membership functions. 
Once defined, these inputs can then be used in a set of fiizzy rules. Multiple input conditions can be 
considered by combining rules with the "and' and "or" fimctions. For instance, some simple rules might be as 
follows: 
• IF demand is HIGH, THEN bid should be HIGH 
• IF (demand is LOW) AND (risk aversion is HIGH) THEN (bid should be LOW) 
• IF (position is RISKY), THEN hedge with option contracts 
where "high" and "low" bid would be defined using another membership fimction. 
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Although it may not be neoessaiy, we could have an output for all combinations of inputs, A three input 
f\my niie system where input is broken into five classifications might be represented as in Figure 4.2. 
The qnati squares «»rh nnnfilin the output of a rule on bow to bid relative to cost Since some conditions might 
be very unlikely to omir of these squares need not have an output In addition, a particular input maybe 
piaccififiri in more than one square at a given iastant In the figure, the letters V, L, H, C, and N stand for 
veiy. low, high, cost, and normal respectively. 
FORECASTED PRICE 
VL L N H VH 
FUEL COST 
Very High VL 
High L 
Norm VL L C H VH 
Low L C H VH VH 
Very Low H VH 
ADDtnoNAL INPUT (E-G.. RISK AVERSION) 
Figure 4.2 Three input fitoy rule set to determine hid. 
Figure 4.3 shows the faziy system architecture. The inputs are fed into the rule base. The output (i.e., the 
bid values in the example) of each rule can be classified by a fiizzy membership function in the same manner 
as the inputs. The output of each rule may be assigned a certain weight depending on how important we 
determine that rule or corresponding inputs to be. We can then sum the weighted output of the rules and 
determine an overall fuzzy output However, when the time comes to place the bid we can't just say, "bid 
high". We need a way to convert the fiizzy output to a single number. This is called the defiizzification 
process. 
Defiizzification formally means to round off a fiizzy set from some point in a unit hypercube to the 
bit-vector vertex [Kosko, 1992J. Practically, defiizzification has been done by using the mode of the 
distribution of outputs as the crisp output or by the more popular method of calculating the centroid or 
of mass of the outputs and using that as the crisp output The fiizzy centroid, "B , can be calciilatftrf as follows: 
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ZwO'y) 
B = . vitKxc B = 
Z«sOy) 
/=i 
anri where B is the output distribution Hm* contains all information, and msOo) ^ ^ membership value of yj 
in the output fiizzy set B. 
[Kosko, 1992] 
w, 
INPUTS 
1' w. 
If Aj then B} 
If A| then B| 
DEFUZZIHCATION 
Figure 4 J Fuzzy system architecture. 
•f.2.S Building bidding strategies 
This section provides a comparison of approaches that we are taking in developing bidding strategies. We 
will be generating fiizzy bidding rules manually using expert knowledge. Following that, we shall search for 
good rule-sets from a limited search space. With a small number of inputs and a limited number of weighting, 
we can do an exhaustive search of all rules and determine the best possible rule. (The best rule is the one 
whose use results in the largest amount of profit for its user.) Next, we note tnat if we increase the number of 
fiizzy inputs, increase the number of membership fimctions describing the inputs, and allow more flexibility 
with the weighting, that perhaps it becomes desirable to use a genetic algorithm to search for the "optimal" 
rule, rather than do an exhaustive search. Finally, we will attempt the use of a developed technique [Richter et 
al., 1995] to extract, from a historical database containing the bidding details of an auction, the rules that were 
used by others in developing their bids. 
The research described here builds on described techniques [Richter and Sheble, 1997a]. To measure the 
performance of the bidding rules created in each of the methods described below, a group of GENCOs will 
compete to serve the electrical demands of the ESCOs. Electricity buyers will be aggregated into a single large 
ESCO. See Figure 4.4. TRANSCOs and transmission constraints will not be considered directly here, but can 
be accounted for after-the-f^ if desired. 
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Figure 4.4 Using the rule-set. 
4.2.5.1 Generating the fuzzy rule-sets manually 
If we consider only a limited number of fuzz>- economical inputs, (e.g.. expected pnce. nsk aversion, and 
generating costs) then it is possible to generate rules manually with expert knowledge from power traders. We 
can transform the rules-of-thumb used b>- e.xpenenced power traders into a fuzz\ rule base. We may also use 
theoretical economics to influence the rule-sets that we construct. If we have 3 inputs, each di\ided into 
5 classifications, then we could have need for as many as 125 rules in each rule-set (one for each little square 
in Figure 4.4). Each of the rules can be weighted according to its importance, if any weighting is allowed we 
have infinitely many possibilities. 
4.2.5.2 The search for the "optimal" fuzzy rule-set 
To reduce the amount of time spent timing the rule-sets, we can predefine a structure and allow a 
computer program to search through the possibilities to find the optimal rule-set. If we predefine each of the 
three inputs by five fixed ranges, and only allow discrete rule weightings (e.g.. 0.0, 0.1, 0.2 1.0), then there 
are a finite number of permutations to investigate. A possible indication of optimality would be obtained by 
having an agent use each of the possible rule-sets while engaging in a fixed set of trial-auctions. In each of 
these trial-auctions, the agent would be competing with a set of agents that had evolved to play the market 
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in otber leseaicb (Richter and Sbebid, 1997a]. To ensure that the rales aren't market specific, the 
set of ^gBnfs against which the rule will be competing can be taken firom different populations and from 
various gtagtijg of evolution. This increases the certainty the tested rule will be profitable against a diverse set 
of agents and drcumstances. 
4.2.5.3 Using aGA to evolve fuzzy rules for bidding 
If we relax the requirement that each rule must have a discrete weighting, we can see that the size of the 
search ^ pace quite large. If we also increase the number of inputs to consider, the search space grows 
even larger. The exhaustive search no longer remains feasible. In addition, if we do not wisely choose the set 
of agents against which our rules will be tested, then we would be left with rules that are not extremely robust 
Therefore, the plan is to use a GA to evolve rule-sets in a similar &shion as in previous research [Richter and 
Shebl^ , 1997a], but with slightly modified data structures. 
Each of the GENCOs will have its own evolving data structure consisting of a fiszzy set of rules, and 
weights associated with each of those rules. The weights will allow some rules to have more importance than 
others. Previous work allowed each of the individual GENCX)s to have their choice of price forecasting 
techniques. This created a lot of overhead, and for simplicity, current research has each GENCO receiving 
globally forecasted data. In addition, the contract size (i.e. number of MWs to offer) at each round of bidding 
would be fixed rather than evolvable to reduce the search space. 
4.2.5.4 Using a GA to extract expert-system bidding rules from a historical database 
An investigation of GAs and other so-called artificial intelligence techniques revealed their ability to 
search through large databases in order to team the expert system rules that can be used to reproduce decisions 
made to build the database. Presently this technique is being used to develop standardized treatment methods 
for hospital patients receiving medical care. Based on extensive records, the software is able to determine 
what the doctor did based on patient conditions. Similarly, a database of trading data could be fed into the 
software (which would require tuning and some restnicturization) to figure out what bidding rules were being 
used by the traders. Determining the rules that other electricity traders and brokers are using could be of great 
benefit to those who wish to gain a competitive edge when participating in the deregulated market See 
chapter 6 on improving bidding strat i^es through intelligent data mining for more 
4.2.6 Fuzzijying decisioH analyds 
Earlier in the chapter, we mentioned that decision analysis with really big trees offers a nyfh4Mf to 
compare different scenarios when inputs are uncertain. Traditional decision analysis involves drawing a 
decision tree, where trees consist of branches and nodes. Decision nodes are drawn with a square and mean 
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that there is a decision to be made. Each choice at a decision node will lead to a different possible set of 
circimistances/outcomes. Circular nodes are chance nodes where analysis has indicated that many possible 
futures exist each with a certain anticipated probability and each with a different effea on the final outcome. 
Each branch must be assigned a specific probability value. 
Consider the tree in Figure 4.5. The objective is to maximize expeaed profit subject to our nsk tolerance. 
The choice is to bid high, or to bid low. In the traditional case, our analysts would have to give us specific 
numbers to describe the possibilities. For instance, demand will be 1000 MW mth a probabiiit>- of 0.25. and it 
wll be 500 MW with a probability of 0.75. The costs will be SIO/MW with a 0.25 probability and $5.0/MW 
viith a 0.75 probability*. We can then calculate an e.xpected profit for each of the decision node branches. In 
the traditional case, we would have aaual bids (e.g., high = S15.0/MW and low = $10.0/MW). We would 
then make the bid that maximized our e.xpeaed profit. The crisp probabilities are taken as certain even 
though our planners might have liked to use fiizzy terms like "high" or "low" defined by a membership 
function. We are basically ignoring the part about "subject to our risk tolerance" when making the imtial 
decision. Risk can then be accounted for after the fact using the traditional means (fiitures and options), but 
the measures taken to reduce risk could change which decision produces the highest e.\pected profit. 
Fuzz}- logic provides a means of incorporating the uncertainty into the decision tree. We propose using 
fiizzy terms to describe the conditions that the chance nodes may take on and use membership fiinctions to 
describe how much emphasis to place on the various outcomes. In Figure 4.5. we may be fairly certain that the 
demand is high, but we think there is a small chance that it could be low (where high and low are described by-
demand costs 
(high/low) (high/low) ^ EP 
EP = Expected Profit 
Figure 4.5 Evaluating the alternatives with decision analysis. 
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m^h^rghip functions). Rather than choosing any one particular path through the tree, the fuzzy method is 
all possibilities. Likewise the expected value is expressed in a membership function ^ch 
basically has a built in description of the ri^ associated with that scenario. In addition to the inputs, the 
output is described by 3 fonxj membership function. 
43 Automatic generatioa control with a fitzzy logic controller 
4.3.1 Introductum 
The interconnected electrical systems of the United States and of other countries are often complex 
networks coordinated by agreement amongst individual utilities and regional power pools. Generation is 
predominantly produced by electrical utilities with their own generatioiL However, the number of independent 
power producers and other non-utility generation fedlities are increasing in the new business environment 
[Shebl^ 19%]. The utilities fiequently buy and sell power between themselves and others via the transmission 
lines. The power is transmitted to loads within control areas. Each control area normally has at least one 
generator that is controlled to provide regulation of area fiequency, and tie line flow. This coordinated action 
assists in maintaining the secure and reliable operation of the power system. This controlled generator may or 
may not be located in the same area as the load to which it is responding. It might even be a jointly owned 
unit or be a unit operating to fiilfill a contract specifically written to supply regulation capability. Automatic 
generation control (ACQ is responsible for varying the output of the selected area generators to maintain the 
system firequency and tie line flows, and to minimize accumulated time error and interchange error. 
Fuzzy control systems have been extensively used in Japan and have recently gained popularity for solving 
control problems in the United States. Fuzzy Logic Control (FLC) systems allow the use of fiizzy or ''non-
crisp" inputs in a control process. They allow precise control of plant or process using easy to imdenaand 
''English" rules that can be developed without knowledge of mathematical control theory. FLC has been 
successfully applied to problems in image processing, control of robotics, decision trees and expert systems 
[Kristjansson et al.. 1993]. 
The application of a fiiz^ logic controller to AGC has been described, but only used one input to control 
the plant [Indulkar and Raj, 1995], The research described in this chapter uses two additional inputs to 
control the plant By including the accumulated time error and the interchange error as wpamtp inputs to the 
FLC described here, the area control error, and the observed time and interchange errors should be reduced for 
the system. Because of incomplete information, we were not able to duplicate the results or perform a direct 
comparison with the results of previous researchers [Indulkar and Raj, 1995]. However, the results found for 
the classical system presented in this chapter are a significant improvement. 
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This section of the chapter presents the use of ftizzy logic for automatic generation control. We introduce 
the reader to AGC in section 4.2.2. In section 4.2.3, a brief overview of fiizzy logic is presented. Section 4.2.4 
describes our development of a fazzy logic controller for AGC. Section 4.2.5 presents the results obtained 
using a three input FLC. Section 4.2.6 describes several extensions to AGC using FLC systems for other 
applications. Conclusions and future research efforts for the entire chapter are presented in section 4.3. 
4.3.2 Automatic generation control 
As stated above, utilities and other power producers cooperate to operate in a coordinated fashion. These 
entities have agreed that it is beneficial for them to work together in the planning, control, and operation of the 
national electrical sy stem. They- purchase power over the transmission lines which connect generation with 
load in neighboring areas. To enforce the contracts, transmission lines are then monitored by equipment that 
measiues the amoimt of power flowing on the transmission lines and the frequency in each area. 
Electric utilities presently generate, or purchase, exactly the amount of power needed to supply their own 
distribution customers (native load), to sell to neighboring utilities, and to cover their losses on the system. As 
an agreed upon standard, the systems have been designed and built to operate at 60 hertz. They are able to 
produce their power very near the agreed frequency by careful control of their generators. In addition to the 
changes in generation, changes in load can also cause the frequency of the system to increase or decrease. 
When two isolated electrical utilities are intercoimected. their respective frequencies are synchronized. 
These two utilities may operate as a single control area or as two or more control areas. Assume that the 
utilities have agreed to operate as two control areas. If these two utilities have agreed to transmit power from 
one area to the other, the selling utility increases its generation and the buying utility decreases its generation. 
This maintains the system frequency but causes the voltage angle in the selling area to lead the receiving 
area's voltage angle. Power then flows from the leading system to the lagging system. If either control area 
improperly changes generation, then the system frequency Avill not remain constant. 
In an interconnected system, as generation or loads change unexpeaedly. the frequency and the 
interchange power change. This unscheduled change to the interchange power flow and to the frequency is 
undesirable. Furthermore, these unscheduled changes may mean that electric suppliers which are not party to 
the contraa could be supplying the energy which should be supplied by another utility. System frequency may 
increase or decrease, and errors may occtir in electronic devices which require regulated power. One problem 
with ofif nominal frequency operation is that synchronous \\-all clocks which will be slow or fast. 
Responding to the errors in frequency and power flow, adjustments can be made which minimize the 
disturbance to the electrical system. The faster the error can be eliminated, the interchange and time errors are 
reduced and the payments for the inadvertent energy flows are minimized. These adjustments may be made 
manually, or automatically by computer. Automatic generation control has been implemented at most electric 
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utilities, but some operators feel that they are better able to control the system using heuristics or their expert 
knowledge gained from years of experience controlling the system. 
The generator and the s>-stem load have a certain inertia associated \«ith their respective rotating masses 
which tends to dampen the effects of load changes. In addition, generators are installed with a controller, 
called a governor, which responds quickly to any changes in fluency. However, the amount of frequency-
sensitive load is not known. Even with the system inertia and the governor action, additional control is 
required, which is provided by the human operator or a traditional AGC controller using area control error 
(ACE) as a performance indicator. In contrast to the fuzzy controller which will be explained later, traditional 
AGC controllers are linear. Figure 4.6 shows a traditional AGC control block diagram representation. 
Classical AGC - Area I 
1 RI 
Kpl AF1(S) 
(1 -Tpl)  
Classical AGC - Area 2 
1R2 B2 
Figure 4.6 Traditional Automatic Generation Control Block Diagram [Wood and Wolienberg, 1996] 
The ACE represents the shift in generation needed to restore the frequency and net interchange power 
flow to the scheduled values [Wood and Wolienberg. 1996). The ACE in each area is traditionally calculated 
as ACE = - APtie - B*Aco, where APtie is the change in the connected load, and Atu is the change in 
frequency. In a two area system, the APtie for one area will be the negative of the other area. 
Controllers may use integrals or derivatives of their inputs to achieve more accurate and precise control. 
For automatic generation control, the ACE is often augmented with time integrals of these interchange and 
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time errors This ACE is then used as feedback into the linear plant controller and adjusts the plant output 
during the next control interval time step. This section of the chapter assumes that the control interval is 2/4. 
Two seconds for acquiring data and four seconds for communicating generation changes. 
4.3.3 Fuzzy logic control (FLC) 
FLC allows fairly simple control strategies, written in English, to be used to control a process. Inputs are 
assigned to ranges corresponding to some classification like large or small. However, an input can actually 
belong to more than one classification at the same time. We associate membership values with inputs 
indicating how well, or to what degree, the particular classifications represent the input. 
For e.xample, we might say that an objea is heavy if it weighs ten pounds, and light if it weighs only five 
pounds. What if the object in question weighs seven or eight pounds? Using traditional logic this objea 
would not be classified as heavy or light, but using fiizzy logic, we could say that this objea is heavy to a 
certain degree (based on its membership fimction). and that it was also light to a certain degree. In fiizzv- logic 
terminolog>'. this degree is called its membership value, or truth value as depiaed in Figure 4.7. 
Truth Value 
M,(x) f 
Small Large 
X (inputs) Xi 
Figure 4.7 Fuzzy input membership functions. 
The same way an objea can be both hea\y and light to a certain degree, an error value can be both large 
and small in value. By having a mathematical method that allows us to define control inputs and outputs less 
rigidly than a traditional classification, we can create controllers which are based on easv' to define rules 
written in English. Multiple input conditions can be considered bj- combining rules with the "and' and "or" 
functions. The truth value of two input criteria when using an "and" condition, is the minimum of the 
considered truth values. Inputs combined using the "or" fimction will have the highest truth value of the 
inputs being considered. 
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FLC allows us to develop control strategies without development of optimal rules as found in 
mathomarical cootTol tbeoiy. We Can obtain output values by correlating one input (or multiple inputs) to an 
output via one fxnx  ^ rule (or more) of the following form as shown in Figure 4.8; IF (lawn is green) AND 
(meteorologists predict no rain) THEN (water lawn a little). These output values can be divided into 6azy 
ranges in the ™niiar as the inputs. With defiizzification, a fiaxj output can be changed to a cri^ 
niimhftr wliich the pn^wr gallons of water to put on your lawn. The faaxi output is "defiizzified" to a 
number. e.g. "little" might range from 20-30 gallons. Many books have been written on fuzzy systems and 
the details of FLC systems. The reader is referred to "Essentials of Fuzzy Modeling and ControF by Yager 
and Filev [1994] for additional information. 
Rain Prediction 
Moderate 
Rain 
No 
Rain 
Lawn Color; Green White Brown 
noae 
some 
some 
little 
little 
a lot 
Figure 4.8 Using two inputs to determine a fuzEy output. 
4.3.4 FuzxyAGC 
For the results described in this section of the chapter, a two area system model was used. Area 1 was 
modeled with load and an equivalent single thermal generating unit, while area 2 was modeled with load and 
an equivalent hydroelectric generating unit For the fiizzy results shown here, the AGC controllers 
were replaced with PLCs as shown in Figure 4.9. In the figure APgl (change in plant 1 generation) and APg2 
(change in plant 2 generation) are the requested changes to the AGC controlled generation in areas 1 and 2. 
The fiiz^ control for each region, has three inputs, classical ACE and the augmented inputs: the time-
integral of the firequenQT error (time<rror). and the time-integral of the tie-line flow (interchange error) as 
shown in Figure 4.10. The prunary control is linked to the ACE. with the other two inputs being of secondary 
importance, especially in the short run. 
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Area Control Error 
Accumulated Time Error 
Interchange Error 
APgl 
APg2 
Area Control Error 
Accumulated Time Error 
Interchange Error 
FLC 
Area 2 
FLC 
Area 1 
Power System 
Simulator 
Figure 4.9 FLC block diagram. 
The input signals were diuded among ranges pnmarily by triangular membership functions. The 
different membership functions were labeled as negative large (NL). negative small (NS). zero (ZE). positive 
small (PS), and positive large (PL). The output was di^^ded similarly, but also had a negative medium (NM) 
and a positive medium (PM) range. This choice of divisions is based on the classical ranges for ACE as 
shown in Figure 4.11. The rules for determining whether the plant output should increase or decrease dunng 
the next control time step, are based on the errors from the pre\ ious control ume step 
Fuzz\-
Rules 
Interchange 
Error 
Change in 
Plant Output 
ACE Input 
Accumulated 
Time Error 
Figure 4.10 FLC Block Diagram. 
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Excess 
Generation 
Deficient 
Generation 
Condition Action MW off nominal 
Trip AGC 5 
Emergency Assist 4 
Excessive ACE 3 
Normal Region 2 
Deadband 1 
Target Generation Setpoint 0 
Deadband -1 
Normal Region -2 
Excessive ACE -3 
Emergence* Assist A  
Trip AGC - 5  
Figure 4.11 ACE ranges and associated actions and conditions. 
4.3.5 Results of the FLC AGC 
The two area power system was modeled as shown in the right side of Figure 4.6. The left area shows the 
proportional integrative control system used to control the response of the plants under the traditional control 
scenario. In each of the two areas one generator has been selected for AGC. The control s> siems shown on 
the left of Figure 4.6 were lifted out and a ftizzv- controller was inserted into each of these areas. The 
parameters shown in Table 4.1 were used in the system simulation for both the traditional control and for the 
fiizz> logic controller. Upon initiating the simulation, a steady state load delation m area 1 of 0.05 per unit 
was input. The time step used in our simulation was 0.05 seconds, the fiizzy rules in Figure 4.12 were used in 
the fiizz>- controller to achie\e to the plant output shown in the results. 
Table 4.1 Parameter settings for plant simulation. 
Parameter Setpoint 
kgl 1.0000 
ktl 1.0000 
kpl 120.0000 
rl 2.4000 
bl 0.4250 
al 0.0400 
k 0.0166 
kg2 1.0000 
kt2 1.0000 
kp2 120.0000 
r2 2.4000 
b2 0.4250 
a2 0.0400 
Parameter Setpoint 
tgl 0.0800 
ttl 0.3000 
tpl 20 0000 
tl2 0.0100 
alpha 1 0.1000 
kl 1.0000 
al2 -1 0000 
tg2 0.0800 
tl2 0.3000 
tp2 20.0000 
d 0.5000 
alpha2 0.1000 
k2 1.0000 
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Rules for Fuzzy AGC 
• If (ACE is NVS) then (plant_change is PVS) 
• If (ACE is NS) then (plant change is PS) 
• If (ACE is PS) then (plant_change is NS) 
• If (ACE is NM) then (plant_change is PM) 
• If (ACE is NL) then (plant_change is PL) 
• If (A(rE is ZE) then (plant_change is ZE) 
• If (ACE is PVS) then (plant_change is NVS) 
• If (ACE is PM) then (plant_change is NM) 
• If (ACE is PL) then (plant change is NL) 
• If (ACE is ZE) and (time_error is ZE) then (plant_change is ZE) 
• If (ACE is ZE) and (time_error is NS) then (plant_change is PVS) 
• If (ACE is ZE) and (time_error is NL) then (plaiit_change is PS) 
• If (ACE is ZE) and (time_eiTor is PS) then (plant_change is NVS) 
• If (ACE is ZE) and (tirae_error is PL) then (plant_change is NS) 
• If (ACE is ZE) and (interchange is PL) then (plant_change is NS) 
• If (ACE is ZE) and (interchange is NL) then (plant_change is PS) 
• If (ACE is ZE) and (interchange is ZE) then (plant_change is ZE) 
• If (ACE is ZE) and (interchange is NS) then (plant_change is PVS) 
• If (ACE is ZE) and (interchange is PS) then (plant_change is NVS) 
Figure 4.12 Fuzz>- rules for the AGC controller. 
Tnangular and trapezoidal membership fimctions were used to defme the various classification ranges. 
The ranges for small, medium and large were defined slightly different for the two areas. Howe\er, the same 
nineteen rules were used to control the plant m both areas of the simulation. The fuzzy logic toolbox available 
with MATLAB was used to develop the membership functions. The software produces a file contaimng the 
membership flmction definitions along with the ranges, this data is shown in Figures 4.13 and 4.14 which 
include all the data needed to define the membership fimctions that will allow the nineteen rules specified 
earlier to function as described in the results section of this part of the chapter. The data in the figiires comes 
from two files that are developed automatically when using the MATLAB ftizz>- logic toolbox graphical rule 
builder. 
As mentioned above, the rules were evaluated by modifying an existing program designed for the 
traditional linear AGC controller tuned for a two area system. The two interconneaed areas are operating at 
steady state with a scheduled interchange power flow and at required frequency'. When the load is perturbed in 
one of the areas, the traditional control responds to eliminate the deviations. Different load disturbances result 
in slightly different error patterns, but the controller is able to drive the error to zero, which is better than 
having no controller. 
The traditional controller was replaced with a fuzzy controller, using the rules listed in this section of the 
chapter. The load was perturbed with the same step change as was used for the traditional controller. Using 
the fiizz}- controller, the absolute values of ACE, the time error, the interchange error, the unscheduled power 
ZE := zero 
P := positive 
S := small 
V := very-
M ;= medium 
L := large 
N := negative 
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flow, and the frequency error were all decreased. Graphs showing the cases the traditional controller and the 
fuzz> controller are shown in Figures 4.15, 4.16. and 4.17. The graphs show the FLC as a thin line, and the 
response of the classical controller as heavier lines made of •+'s. 
The results shown in these graphs show that the FLC controller can be tuned so that it responds very-
quickly. In fact for this particular case, it may be responding a bit to fast as some of the error \-alues are the 
negative of the traditional controller, but the errors are smaller than that achieN'ed by the traditional controller. 
[System] MFI='NL':'tnmf,(-0.0015 -0.001 -0.0005] 
Name='AREA 1RUL' MF2='NS':'trimf,[-0.0006668 -0.0004 -6.668e-05] 
T\pe='mamdani' MF3=ZE';'tiiinf,[-0.0003334 0 0.0003332] 
Numlnputs=3 MF4='PS':trimf,[0.0001333 0.0004 0.0006668] 
NximOutputs=l MF5='PL'.tnmf,[0.0005 0.001 0.0015] 
NumRules=I9 
AndMethod='niin' [Input3] 
OrMethod-ma-V Name='interchange' 
ImpMethod='prod' Range=[-0.05 0.05] 
AggMethod='sum' NumMFs=5 
DefiizzMethod='centroid' MP l='NL':tnmf,[-0.075 -0.05 -0.025] 
MF2='NS':'lrimf,[-0.035 -0.02 -0.005] 
[Input 1 ] MF3=7E':'trimf,[-0.0125 0 0.0125] 
Name='ACE MF4=PS':trimf,(0.005 0.02 0.035] 
Range=[-0.04 0.04] MF5=TL'.'tnmf,[0.025 0.05 0.075] 
NumMFs=9 
MFl='NL':'trapmf,[-5 -4.5 -0.032 -0.0176] [CXitputl] 
MF2='NVS':'trmif,[-0.008 -0.004 -0.0004] Name='plant_change' 
MF3='ZE':'tnmf.[-0.002 0 0.002] Range=[-0.005 0.005] 
MF4='PVS';'tnmf.[0.0008 0.004 0.008] NumMFs=9 
MF5=PL':trapmf,[0.0176 0.032 0.08 0.088] MP l='NM':tnnif,[-0.003711 -0.002236 -0,0007615] 
MF6='NM':'tnmf,[-0.028 -0.018 -0.008] MF2='NS';'tnmf,[-0.001501 -0.000875 -0.0002494] 
MF7='PM':trimf,[0.008 0.018 0.028] MF3=ZE';'tnmf,[-0.00012 0 0.00012] 
MF8='NS':tiimf.[-0.012 -0.008 -0.004] MF4=PS':'tnmf,[0.000241 0.0008665 0.001492] 
MF9='PS':triiiif ,(0.004 0.008 0.012] MF5='PM';'trimf,[0.000958 0.002233 0.003509] 
MF6='NL':'traprnf.[-0.009 -0.008 -0.004 -0.0025] 
[Input2] MF7='PL':'trapmf,[0.0025 0.004 0.008 0.009] 
Naine='time_enor' MF8='NVS';'trimf,[-0.00035 -0.0002 -8.168e-05] 
Range=[-0.001 0.001] MF9=PVS';'triinf,[8.335e-05 0.0002 0.00035] 
NumMFs=5 
Figure 4.13 Ranges defining membership functions of area 1 controller. 
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[System] NumMFs=5 
Name^AREA2RUL' MFl=T>JL':tnmf,[-0.0015-0.001 -0.0005] 
Type='niamdanf MF2=T^S-:1rnnf,[-0.0006667 -0.0004 -6.673e-05] 
Numlnputs=3 MF3=^;trimf,(-0.0003333 0 0.0003333] 
NumOutpuis=l MF4=PS.tnmf,[0.0001333 0.0004 0.0006667] 
NumRules=I9 MF5=T^':'trimf,[0.0005 0.001 0.0015] 
AndMethod='piDd' 
C)rMethod=taax' [Input3} 
ImpMethod=tain' Nanie=^intachange' 
AggMethod='max' Range=(-0.05 0.05] 
DefuzzMethod-centroid' NumMFs=5 
MFl =T^';tnmf,[-0.075 -0.05 -0.025] 
[Input 1] MF2=T^S':tnmf,[-0.035 -0.02 -0.005] 
Naine='ACE MF3=^:tninf,[-0.0125 0 0.0125] 
Range=(-0.001 0.001] MF4=TO;1nmf,[0.005 0.02 0.035] 
NumMFs=9 MF5=T'L";tninf,[0.025 0.05 0.075] 
MFl =M.*:trapmf,[.0.125,-0.1125,-0.0008, 
0.00044] [Outputl] 
MF2=TvrVS':1nmf,[-0.0002-0.0001 -le-05] Name='plant_cfaange' 
MF3=?E;tnmf,[-5e05 0 56^5] Range=[-0.0005 0.0005] 
MF4=PVS::tnmf,[2e^5 0.0001 0 0002] NumMFs=9 
MF5=PL':tiapmf,[0.00044 0 0008 0002 00022] MFl =mr:tninf,[-0.0003711 -0.0002236 -7.6130^5] 
MF6=mf;tnmf ,[-0.0007 -0.00045 -0.0002] MF2=T^S':'lnmf.[-0.0001501 -8.747e-05 -2.494e-05] 
MF7=T'M':'tnmf,[0 0002 0 00045 0 0007] MF3=2F;tnmf,[-l 2e-05 0 1.2e-05] 
MF8=T«JS';'tnmf,[-0.0003 -0.0002 -0 0001 ] MF4=PS':'tnmf,[2.41e-05 8 667e^5 0.0001492] 
MF9=PS::'trimf,[0.0001 0.0002 0.0003] MF5=PM';tnmf,[9.58e-05 0.0002233 0.0003509] 
MF6=TJL':trapmf,[-0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.00025] 
[Input2] MF7=PL':1rapmf,[0.00025 0.0004 0 0008 0.0009] 
Naine=1iine_enDi' MF8=WS':tninf ,[-3.5e-05 -2e-05 -8.167^06] 
Range=[-0.001 0.001] MF9=PVS':'tnmf,[8.333fr06 2e-05 3 56-05] 
Figure 4.14 Ranges defining membership functions of area 2 controller. 
•t.3,6 Extensions 
Many enhancements are being de\'eloped and have been suggested to improve traditional AGC 
controllers, especially for operation in the competitive environment. Future e.xtensions to this research will 
propose that fuzzy logic be used to extend AGC in the following ways; 
• Fuzzy filtering of ACE, determining which signals are just noise, and which signals contain proper 
control information. 
• Fuzzy prediction of future load and ACE values based on historical load patterns to reduce the 
amount of control. 
• Fuzzy determination of when to minimize the ACE based on the different area control regions and 
loading of economic generators 
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• Fuzzy learning of the system model, which will allow the rules to adapt to correa for tolerances and 
errors in the rule ranges 
If a predicted ACE and load can be obtained, then this information can be used to determine when it is the 
best time to reduce the error. Some AGC responses are mandatory, but others are recommended, or permitted. 
The predictions and filtered signals, along with the allowed responses may be used to determine the correa 
signal to send to the governor. Adaptive fiizzy rules will allow the system to leam to change its response to 
different situations based on what happened during the previous time period or periods. 
0.05 
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Figure 4.15 Area 1 Frequency and Ptie Deviation. 
Figure 4.16 Area 1 and Area 2 Control Error. 
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Inadvertent Interchange Accum, Area 1 
Figure 4.17 Accumulated Time and Intercbange Errors. 
4.4 Chapter summary- and future research 
Building good bidding strategies for electricity- traders as the>' move into the deregulated marketplace will 
continue to be important for those companies wishing to remain profitable. This chapter described such 
research and points to new methods which are currently being mvestigated in order to build more robust 
adaptive bidding strategies. The deregulated market-place that this research assumes will becomc standard 
throughout the USA and is being mcorporated into our auction simulator. The bidding rule-sets or strategies 
obtained from each method described in this chapter should be tested in auction simulations. Comparisons of 
profitability- between the fiizzy- bidding rules to the method which uses bidding multipliers as described m 
chapter 3 should be performed in future research. 
In addition to maximizing profit, traders should consider the risk associated with a particular strategy-. 
Futures and options contracts can be used to reduce the risk associated with an energy- trader's position in the 
market. In addition to fiittires and options, we have proposed other methods of reducing risk including the use 
of fiizzy- logic, enhancement of our genetic algorithm and GP-Automata bidding strategy- evolvers so that 
fitness function incorporates risk. 
The fiizzy logic controller lends itself well to the AGC problem. It responds rapidly, and can be timed to 
outperform the traditional controller for the cases studied. The rules can be formulated in plain English, 
making it easy for the operator to see how they work, and how to easily modify- them. 
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The FLC AGC described in this chapter uses rules with fixed ranges. Future research will make these 
rule adaptive so that nigimai re-4uning is not necessary when generator parameters are changed. The electric 
utility industry is more competitive. This is changing the way transactions take place between 
companies. These changes will make it more important than ever to have tight control over the interchange 
contracts. Future research will incorporate control into a multi-area AGC controller as described the 
companion papers by Kumar et al. [1996a, 1996b]. 
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5 PROFIT-BASED UNIT COMMITMENT FOR THE COMPETITIVE 
ENVIRONMENT 
5.1 Chapter overview 
As the electrical industiy lestiuctuies, many of the traditional algorithms for controlling generating units 
are in need of modification or replacement Previously utilized to schedule generation units in a manner that 
mininiiwg costs while meeting all demand, the unit commitment (UQ algorithm is one of these tools that 
must be updated. A UC algorithm that maximizes expected profit will play an essential role in developing 
successful bidding strategies for the competitive generator. Simply bidding to win contracts is insufSdent; 
profitable companies require bidding that results in contracts that, on average, cover the total generation costs. 
No longer guaranteed to be the only electricity supplier, a generation company's share of the demand will be 
more difficult to predict than in the past Removing the obligation to serve softens the demand constraint A 
price/profit'based UC formulation that considers the softer demand constraint and allocates fixed and 
transitional costs to the scheduled hours is presented in this chapter. In addition, a genetic algorithm solution 
to this new UC problem is described, and results for an illustrative example are presented. This chapter 
discusses using different allocations of the fixed and transition costs to increase profitability, and look at ways 
of handling uncertainty in price and load forecasts. 
5.2 Introduction 
The US electric marketplace is in the midst of major changes designed to promote competition. No longer 
vertically integrated with guaranteed customers and suppliers, electric generators and distributors will have to 
compete to sell and buy electricity. The stable electric utilities of the past will find themselves in a highly 
competitive environment Although some states (e.g., California) are already operating in a restructured 
environment, a standardized final market structure for the rest of the US has not yet been fully defined. The 
research is performed with the belief that regional commodity exchanges, in which electricity contracts are 
traded, should play an important role. 
Previous ch^ters and research [Kumar and Shebl^. 1996a; Kumar and Shebl6, 1996b; Shebia, 1994b; 
Shebld, 19961 have described a framework in which distribution companies (DISTCOs), generation companies 
(GENCOs), energy services companies (ESCOs) and transmission companies (TRANSCOs) interact via 
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contracts The contract prices are detennined through an auction. Electricity traders make bids and offers that 
are subject to the approval of an independent contract administrator (ICA) who ensures that the 
system is operating safely within limits. 
Operating within a firamewoik, traders will create and implement bidding strategies to make their 
hiric and offers. These bidding strategies might be designed to limit the traders* risk, to maximize profit, or 
some combination of both. Ch^iter 3 reported research that uses genetic algorithms and genetic programming 
to evolve bidding strategies that maviiniya profit for the spot market An investigation of managing an energy 
trader's risk and profitability by combining spot market contracts with options and futures was performed 
[Richter and Shebli, 1998]. For simplification, the work described in chapter four avoided the UC problem by 
ignoring stait^up and shut-down costs, minimum up-times and down-times, ramp rates etc. In this chapter a 
profit-based UC is considered and its implication for bidding strategies is discussed. 
A genetic based UC algorithm was developed and implemented [Maifeld and Shebld, 1996]. The 
algorithm was able to consistently find multiple good unit commitment schedules in a reasonable amount of 
time. Another advantage it held over other UC solution techniques is that it could penalize solutions which 
violate constraints with additional non-linear costs. Rather than saying a solution is simply unacceptable, a 
cost associated with making it acceptable can be assigned to the solution. This is akin to paying a fine, or 
paying for damage associated with exceeding limits. These attributes remain desirable qualities. We have 
updated this algorithm for the price/profit based competitive environment and provide results of its use on 
some illustrative examples. Recent research describes a genetic algorithm unit commitment program for the 
less regulated environment (Kondragunta. 1997], Although there is some overlap between his work and the 
work described in this chapter, the market fiamework assumptions described in chapter 2 lead to different 
conclusions primarily regarding the way EDC is done and the obligation to serve. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Part 5.2 provides a brief description of the UC 
problem and formulation and highlights modifications needed for the competitive environment. Part 5.3 
describes a genetic algorithm solution to the updated UC problem. Part 5.4 presents the results of some 
illustrative examples. Part 5.5 discusses implications of the updated UC on bidding strategies. Part 5.6 
outlines a method for making the strategies more robust under conditions of uncertain demand and prices. 
Finally, part 5.7 provides some conclusions and identifies areas of future work. 
5.3 Updating unit commitmcot 
For the vertically integrated monopolistic environment, UC is loosely defined as the 'a-hc^niing of 
generating units to be on, off or in stand-by/banking mode, and is done in such a manner that costs are 
minimized and constraints like demand and reserves are met. Considering inputs like variable fuel costs. 
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start-up shut-down paranirtCTi;/mn!tfra'""t< of each power plant, and crew constraints adds to the 
complexity of the problem. The schedules aie valued based on their costs. In order to determine the cost 
accnriattvi with a given schedule, an economic dispatch calculation (EDC), where each of the non limit-
constrained operating units is set so that their marginal costs are equal, must be performed for each hour under 
consideration. One possible way to the optimal schedule is to do an exhaustive search. 
Exhaustively considering all possible ways that units can be switched on or aS for a small system can be done, 
but for a reasonably sized system the amount of time it would take is too long. Solving the UC problem for a 
realistic system generally involves using methods like Lagrangian relaxation, dynamic programming, genetic 
algorithms or other heuristic search techniques. Many references for the traditional UC are available [Sheble 
and Fahd, 1994; Wood and WoUenberg, 1996]. 
In the past, forecasts advised power system operators of the amount of power that needed to be 
generated. In the future, spot and forward bilateral contracts will make part of the total demand known a 
priori. The remaining part of the demand will be predicted as in the past However, the GENCO's share of 
the remaining demand may be difficult to predict since that share will depend on how its price compares to 
that of other suppliers. The GENCO's offer price will depend on its prediction of its share of this remaining 
demand since that will determine how many units they have switched on or have in banking mode. The UC 
schedule directly affects the average cost and indirectly the offering price, making it an essential input to any 
successful bidding strategy. 
In the past, utilities had an obligation to serve their customers. This was translated into a dgmanri 
constraint that ensured all demand would be met. For the UC problem, this might have meant switching on an 
additional unit just to meet a remaining MW or two. With the obligation to serv^e gone, the GENCO can now 
consider a schedule that produces less than the forecasted demand. They can allow others to provide that I or 2 
MWs that would have increased their average costs rather than altering their schedule to compete for a 
contract which they may be unlikely to secure. 
Demand forecasts and expected market prices are important inputs to the profit-based UC algorithm; they 
are used to determine the expected revenue which affects the expected profit. If a GENCO comes up with two 
potential UC schedules each having different expected costs and different expeaed profits, it should take the 
one that provides for the largest profit, which will not necessarily be the one that costs least. Since prices and 
demand are so important in determining the optimal UC schedule, price prediction and demand forecasts 
become crucial. A good description of the UC problem and a stochastic solution that considers spot marift^c 
has been presented (Takriti et al., 1997], Another one of the main differences of their work with the work 
described in this chapter is that they chose to minimize costs rather than maximiyi^ profits. 
The existence of liquid markets gives energy trading companies an additional source firom which to supply 
power. To the GENCO, the market supply curve can be thought of as a pseudo-unit to be dispatched The 
supply curve for this pseudo-umt represents an aggregate supply of all of the units participating in the marifpt 
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at the time in question. The price forecast essentially sets the parameters of the unit. This pseudo-unit has no 
minimum up-time, minimum down-time, nor ramp constraints; there are no direct start-up and shutdown costs 
associated with dispatching the unit. As described later, each GENCO is responsible for its own unit's 
transitional costs which must be recovered through adjustments in its offering price. The offer should roughly 
be equivalent to the marginal cost of the unit at the hour considered shifted by some amount to account for 
profit and for transitional costs. 
The liquid markets that allow the GENCO to schedule an additional pseudo unit also aa as a load to be 
supplied. The total energy supplied should consist of previously arranged bilateral contracts and bilateral or 
multilateral contracts arranged through the markets (and their associated reserves and losses). While the 
GENCO is determining the optimal unit commitment schedule, the energ>' demanded by the market (i.e.. 
market demand) can be represented as another DISTCO or ESCO buying eiectricit>-. Each entity buving 
electricity' should have its own demand curve. The market demand curve should reflect the aggregate of the 
demand of all the buying agents participating in the market. 
Producer Quadratic Cost Curves Demand Curves of Consumers 
Price ^ Price ^ 
ESCOs" demands 
GENCOs" units 
market demand 
MW produced MW demanded 
market suppK' 
Figure 5.1 The market as an additional generator and an additional load. 
Mathematically the traditional cost-based UC problem has been formulated as follows [Sheble. 1985]; 
Minimize F = + MAINTj  U^,  + SUP,, USDOWN(l ] 
subjea to the following constraints; 
^ ( U  ,  •  P , ) =  D  (demandconstraint) 
78 
f; {U„ P max,) > D, + (capacity constraint) 
.V 
^  (f ,  •  R s m z x  ) >  R ,  (system reserve constraint) 
m 
As w-e redefine the UC problem for the competitive environment, the demand constraint changes from an 
equality' to less than or equal (we assume that the buyers purchase reserves per contract) relationship, and the 
objective fimction shifts from cost minimization to profit maximization as shown in the formula below. The 
updated UC process is shown in block diagram form in Figure 5.2. 
.V r 
Max ~ ) • 6 „ - F (expected revenue - expeaed costs) 
subject to; 
f {L\, P,.)<D; (new demand constraint) 
Pmittn <= Pnt <= PmaXn (Capacity limits) 
1 Pm- Pn. 1-11 <= Rampn (Ramp rate limits) 
where individual terms are defined as follows: 
R. 
C„. 
SUPnt 
SDOWNn, 
MAINT„ 
N 
T 
Pmirin 
PmaXn 
Rsmaxn 
Pm 
D, 
D-. 
= up/down time status of unit n at time period t 
(Uni = 1 unit on. Um = 0 unit off) 
= power generation of unit n during time period t 
= load le\'el in time period t 
= forecasted demand w/ reserves for penod t 
= forecasted price/MWhr for period t 
=sysiem reserve requirements in time period t 
= production cost of unit n in time period t 
= start-up cost for unit n. time penod t 
=shut-down cost for unit n, time penod t 
= maintenance cost for umt n. time period t 
= number of units 
= number of time periods 
= generation low limit of unit n 
= generation high limit of unit n 
= maximum contribution to reserve for unit n 
79 
There may be a tendency to think that maxiniizing the profit is essentially the same as mimmiTing the 
cost. This is not necessarily the case. We have to remember that since we no longer have the obligation to 
serve, the GENCO may choose to generate less than the demand. This allows a little more flexibility in the 
UC schedules. In addition, our formulation assumes that prices fluctuate according to supply and demand in 
the past engineers assumed that if they could level the load curve, they would be minimizing the cost. When 
maximizing profit, the GENCO may find that under certain conditions it may profit more under a non-level 
load curve. The profit depends not only on cost, but on revenue. If revenue increases more than the cost does, 
the profit will increase. 
F o r e c a s t  P r i c e  A n d  D e m a n d  
H o u r  I  2  3  . . .  T  
L o a d ;  4 0 0  4 2 5  4 5 0  . . .  i O O  ( M W h r )  
P r i c c ;  1 8  1 8 . 5  2  0  . . .  5  ( S ' M W h r )  
U n i t  F u e l  C o s t s  1  
% 
^  U C  S o l v e r  
S w i t c h  u n i t s  o n ' o f f  t o  
m a x i m i z e  p r o f i t .  C a l l  
E D C  t o  s e t  g e n  l e v e l s .  
O u t D u t  U C  S c h e d u l e  
H o u r  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  . ,  T  
G e n = l :  I  I  1  1  1  1  1  . .  0  
G e n  =  2 :  0  0  0  I  I  I  1  . .  1  
G e n  =  3 ;  1  I  I  0  0  0  0  I  
G e n = N ;  1  1  I  I  1  I  1  .  .  0  
C o s t ;  S X . 0 0 0 . 0 0  
P r o f i t ;  S Y . 0 0 0 . 0 0  
Figure 5.2 The UC problem. 
The economic dispatch calculation (EDC) is an important part of UC. Formerly used to set generation so 
that costs were minimized subject to meeting a demand constraint (Figure 5.3 (a)), for the price-based UC that 
we present in this chapter, it was necessary to redefine EDC. Where the old EDC ignored transition and fixed 
costs to adjust the power level of the units until they each had the same incremental cost (i.e., /.i=^:=...= 
out new EDC attempts to set production so that a pseudo /. equals the competitive price (i.e., 
produce until the marginal cost equal the price). The pseudo /. is the incremental cost modified to account for 
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transition and fixed costs and is shown in Figure 5.3 (b). A simple wa\- to allocate the fixed and transitional 
costs which results in a S/MWhr figure is shown in the following formula: 
^^{transition costs) ^ T". (.fixed costs) 
= fP. 5-15 
t m 
Other allocation schemes that adjust the marginal cost/price according to the time of day or pnce of power 
would be just as eas\' to implement and should be considered in building bidding strategies. Other allocation 
schemes are discussed later in this chapter. Transition costs include start-up, shut-down and banking costs, 
and fixed costs (present for each hour that the unit is on), which would be represented b\- the constant term in 
the t\-pical quadratic cost curve approximation. For the results presented later in this chapter, we approximate 
the summation of the power generated b>' the forecasted demand. 
o l d  E D C ;  m i n  X. pseudo A. $ $ / M W h r  
$ $ / M W h r  $ $ / M W h r  ^ idemand^^ 
^  i d e m a n d  
' 
\ 
Y 
P  
k 
t '  
M W  M W  q M w '  
a  b c 
Figure 5.3 Defining a pseudo A.. 
The competitive price is assumed to be equal to the forecasted price. If the GENCO s supply auve is 
indicative of the system supply curve, then the competitive price will correspond to the point where the 
demand and supply curves cross in Figure 5.3 (c). The EDC sets the generation level corresponding to the 
point where our GENCO's supply curv e crosses the demand cur\'e. or to the jx)int where the forecasted price is 
equal to the supply curve, whichever is lower. 
Figure 5.4 attempts to show how the fixed costs, the start-up costs, and the shut-down costs are allocated 
for a simple example. For this example, the load is assiuned to be described by a simple triangular fimction as 
81 
shown in the top graph of Figure 5.4. This example assumes that 2 imits are required to co\'er the peak load 
and that one unit can handle the load on the off-peak hours. For simplicitv'. the variable fuel costs are roughly 
proportional to the amount of electricity being generated. In the bottom graph of Figure 5 .4 it can be seen that 
an average cost is added to the variable fiiel cost resulting in a cost that looks like the \-ariable costs, but 
shifted up. 
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SS4 startup f 
costs 
fixed cost 
I  M  I I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  
shutdown costs 
^wariable fuel costs 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  l »  
1 unit operating 2 units 1 unit tune ~> 
$$/MWhr 
variable fuel costs 
I I  I  I  I  I  M  I  I  I  I I  I  I  I  I I  l »  
time —> 
Add fixed and transition 
costs to variable 
fuel costs 
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Figure S.4 Example of fixed and transition costs allocation. 
5.4 Genetic-Based UC algorithm 
5. •/. 7 The basics of genetic algorithms 
A genetic algorithm is a search algorithm often used in nonlinear discrete optimization problems. Data, 
initialized randomly in a data structure appropriate for the solution to the problem, evolves over time and 
becomes a suitable answer to the problem. GAs were inspired by the biological notion of evolution. See 
chapter 2 for additional details of genetic algorithms. 
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5.4.2 GA for price-based UC 
The algorithm presented in this chapter for solving the new UC problem is a modification of the genetic-
based UC algorithm described by [Maifeld and Sheble, 19%]. Most of the modifications are to the fitness 
fimction which no longer minimizes cost but maximizes profit. In addition, more user friendly I/O routines 
were added to make it easier to load input data and export the results. The intelligent mutation operators are 
preserv ed in their original form. The form of the schedules are the same. The updated algorithm is as shown 
in block diagram format in Figure 5.5. 
gen += 1; 
Print 
results YES 
No 
Select parents 
Perform cross-over 
Do standard mutation 
Call EDC 
Figure 5.5 GA UC block diagram. 
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Another modification which the algorithm described here difieient than the previous algorithm is 
that a new EDC routine was written. This new EDC sets each unit's generation level such that its marginal 
cost (modified to account for fixed and transition costs) is equal to a hourly price as described earlier in this 
chapter. Any power generated in excess of the will not generate any revenue, but will add to the cost 
This will be reflected in the fitness of the schedule which is equal to the profit and these schedules should die 
out quiddy. 
The algorithm first reads in the contraa demand and prices, the forecast of remaining demand and 
forecasted spot prices (which are calculated for each hour by another routine not described here). During the 
initialization step, a population ofUC schedules is randomly initialized. See Figure S.6. For each member of 
the population, EDC is called to set the level of generation of each unit The cost of each schedule is 
calculated fiom the generator and data read in at the beginning of the program. Next, the fitness/profit is 
calculated, '^ ne?" checks to see whether we have reached the maximiun generations allowed, or whether we 
have met other sto^iing criteria (at this time we are simply using the number of generations). If done, then 
the results are written to a file which will be used as an input for our bidding strategy builder described in 
other chapters. If not done, the algorithm goes to the reproduction process. 
U C  S c h e d u l e  M  
Hour I 7  1  4 S T 
I  '  
UC Schedule I 
Hour 1 2 3 4 5 .. T 
Gen«l; 1 1 1 1 1  .  .. 0 
Gen#2; 0 0 0 I 1 . .. 1 
Gen#3; 1 1 1 0  0  .  .. I 
Gen#N: 1 1 1 1 1  .  .. 0 
Figure 5.6 A population of UC schedules. 
Dunng reproduction, new schedules are created. The first step of reproduction is to select parents fiom 
the pcqnilation. After selecting parents, candidate children are created using two point crossover as shown in 
Figure S.7. Following crossover, standard mutation is applied. Standard mutation involves turning a 
randomly selected unit on or off within a given schedule. 
An important feature of the previously developed UC-GA [Maifeld and Sheble, 19961 is that it gp'nHc as 
little time as possible doing EDC. After standard mutation, EDC is called to update the profit for the mutated 
hour(s). An hourly profit number is maintained and stored during the reproduction process which 
dramatically reduces the amount of time required to calculate the profit over what it would be if EDC bad to 
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woik ftom scratch at evaluation. In addition to the standard mutation, the algorithm uses two 
"intelligent" mutatinn operatois that woik by recognizing that, because of transition costs and minimiim up 
and down times loi or 010 combinations are undesirable. The first of these operators would purge this 
combination by randomly changing Is to Os or vice versa. The second of these intelligent 
fniitatinn openoors puiges the undesirable combination by changing 1 to 0 or 0 to 1 based on which of these is 
more helpftd to the profit otyective. 
UC Schedule Parent 1 
Hour 1 2 3 4 5 ... T 
Gen#l 1 1 I 1 1 ... 0 
Gen#2 0 0 0 1 1 ... 1 
Gen#3 I 1 1 0 0 ... 1 
Gen#4 I 1 1 I I ... 0 
Gen#S 0 0 0 1 1 ... 1 
Gen#6 1 1 1 0  0  ... 1 1 
Ginm^ 
UC Schedule Child I 1 
Hour 1 2 3 4 5 ...T 
Gen# I 1 1 11 1 ... 0 
Gen#2 0 0 ... 1 
Gen#3 1 1 l u n  ... I 
Gen#4 1 1 1 fl ... 0 
Gen#5 0 0 1,11 ... 1 
Gen#6 1 1 t r i  ... 1 1 
UtJ^cnedSii ^ IKlc 
p^l 
ml Gen#U;i 1 
SGen#2:4 1 
1 1 1 
0 1 1 
Gcn#3: r 
Gen#4ri 1 
1 0 0 
I 1 1 
Gen#5:^ i 0 1 1 
1 0 0 • •• - w 
Figure 5.7 Two point crossover on UC schedules. 
5.5 Price-Baaed UC-GA results 
The UC-GA was run on a small system so that its solution could be easily compared to a solution by 
exhaustive search. Before running the UC-GA, the GENCO needs to first get an accurate hourly rfemanH and 
price forecast for the period in question. Developing the forecasted data is an important topic, but beyond the 
scope of our analysis. For the results presented in this section, the forecasted load and prices are talriijn to be 
those shown in Table 5.1. In addition to loading the forecasted hourly price and demanri. the UC-GA program 
needs to load the parameters of each generator to be considered. We are modeling the generators with a 
quadratic cost curve (e.g., A + B(P) + C(P)^ ), where P is the power level of the unit. The data for the 2 unit 
case is shown in Table 5.2. 
In addition to the 2 unit cases, a 10 unit, 48 hour case is included in this chapter to show that the GA 
works well on larger problems. While dynamic programming quiddy becomes too computationally expensive 
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to solve, the GA scales up linearly with number of hours and units. Figure 5.8 shows the costs and average 
costs (without transition costs) of the 10 generators, as well as the hourly price and load forecasts for the 48 
hours. The data was chosen so that the optimal solution was known a priori. The dashed line m the load 
forecast represents the maximum output of the 10 units. 
Table 5.1 Forecasted demand and prices (2 generator case). 
Hour Load forecast Price forecast 
(MWhr) (S/MWhr) 
1 285 25.87 
2 293 23.06 
J 267 19.47 
4 247 18.66 
5 295 21.38 
6 292 12.46 
7 299 9.12 
Hour Load forecast Price forecast 
(MWhr) (S/MWhr) 
8 328 8 88 
9 326 9.12 
10 298 8.88 
11 267 25.23 
12 293 26.45 
13 350 25.00 
14 350 24 00 
Table 5.2 Unit data for 2 generator case. 
Generator 0 Generator 1 
Pmin (MW) 40 40 
Pmax (MW) 180 180 
A (constant) 58.25 138.51 
B (linear) 8.287 7.955 
C (quadratic) 7.62C-06 3.05e-05 
bank cost (S) 192 223 
start-up cost($) 443 441 
shut-down cost($) 750 750 
min-up time (hr) 4 4 
min-down time (hr) 4 4 
Before running the UC-GA, the user needs to specif>- the control parameters shown m Table 5.3. 
including the number of generating units and number of hours to be considered in the stud>-. The 'popsize' is 
the size of the GA population. The execution time varies approximately linearly with the popsize. The 
number of generations indicates how many times the GA will go through the reproduction phase. System 
reserve is the percentage of reserves that the buyer must maintain for each contract. Children per generation 
tells us how much of the population will be replaced each generation. Changing this can affea the 
convergence rate. If there are multiple optima, faster convergence can trap the GA in local sub-optimal 
solution. 'UC schedules to keep' indicates the number of schedules to write to file when finished. There is 
also a random number seed that is set between 0 and 1. 
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In the 2 generator test cases, the UC-GA was run for the units listed in Table S.2. and for the forecasted 
loads and prices listed in Table 5.1. The parameters listed in Table 5.3 were adjusted accordingly. To ensure 
that the UC-GA is finding optimal solutions, an exhaustive search was performed on some of the smaller 
cases. Table 5.4 shows the time to solution in seconds for the UC-GA and the exhaustive search methods. For 
small cases the exhaustive search was performed and solution time compared to that of the UC-GA. Since the 
exhaustive search solution times were estimated to be prohibitively lengthy, the latter cases were not compared 
against exhaustive search solutions. Cases with known optimal solutions were used to verif>- that the UC-GA 
\\-as. in fact woridng for the large cases. 
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Figure 5.8 Data for 10 unit, 48 hour case. 
Table 5.3 OA control parameters. 
Parameter Setpoint 
# of Units 2 
# of Hours 10 
Popsize 20 
Generations 50 
Parameter Setpoint 
System Reserve (%) 10 
Children per generation 10 
UC Schedules to keep 1 
Random number seed .20 
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Table 5.4 Comparing UC-GA with exhaustive search. 
No. of Na of GA finds Solution Solution time 
generators hours in optimal time for exhaustive search 
in schedule schedule solution? GA (sec.) (sec.) 
2 10 ves 0.5 674 
2 12 ves 2 6482 
2 14 ves 10 (estimated) 62340 
10 48 ves 730 (estimated) 2E138 
Table 5.5 shows the optimal UC schedules found by the UC-GA for selected cases. Figure 5.9 shows the 
maximiun. minimum and average fitnesses (profit) during each generation of the UC-GA on the 2 generator. 
14 hour/period case. The best individual of the population climbs quite rapidly to near the optimal solution. 
Half of the population is replaced each generation; often the child solutions are poor solutions, hence the 
minimum fitness tends to remain low throughout the generations which is typical for GA optimization. 
Table 5.5 The best UC-GA schedules of the population. 
best schedule for 2 unit, 10 hour case 
Unit 1 1111100000 
Unit 2 0000000000 
Cost S 17.068.20 
Profit S2.451.01 
best schedule for 2 unit, 12 hour case 
Unit 1 111111000011 
Unit 2 000000000000 
Cost $24,408.50 
Profit S4.911.50 
best schedule found by UC-GA for 10 unit, 48 hour case 
Unit 1 m i l l  11111000000000000000000000000111111111111 
Unit 2 m i l l  1111lOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
Units m m  11111000000000000000000000000000000000000 
Unit 4 m m  11111000000000000000000000000000000000000 
Unit 5 m m  11111000000000000000000000000000000000000 
Unit 6 m m  11111000000000000000000000000000000000000 
Unit 7 m m  11111000000000000000000000000111111111111 
Units m m  11111000000000000000000000000000000000000 
Unit 9 m m  11111000000000000000000000000111111111111 
Unit 1 0  m m  11111000000000000000000000000111111111111 
Cost $325,733.00 
Profit $676,267.00 
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In the schedules shown in Table S.5, it may appear as though minimum up and down times are being 
\iolated. When calculating the cost of such a schedule, the algorithm ensures that the profit is based on a 
valid schedule by considering a zero surrounded by ones to be a banked unit and so forth. In addition, note 
that we only show the best solution of the population for each of the cases. To show more would take too 
much space. The additional valid solutions, which may have nearly as much profit, are one of the main 
advantages of using the GA. This gives the system operator the flexibility to choose among a group of 
schedules to accommodate things like forced maintenance. 
Max. tnin & avg fttness averaged over 10 runs (2 gen. 14 hours) 
8000 
6000 
4000  
^ 2000 
-2000  
-4000  
-6000 
40 20 60 80 1 00 
generations 
Figure 5.9 Max., min., and avg. fitness vs. GA generations for the 2 generator, 14 hour case. 
5.6 UC and bidding strategies 
UC will remain an important tool in the new environment. Although customers are no longer guaranteed, 
bilateral contracts will ensure that the GENCO knows the majority of its load ahead of time. An accurate 
forecast of the remaining demand and hourly prices will be important inputs for solving the UC problem. Once 
the UC schedules are generated, they will be of little use to the GENCO unless it can aaually win customers 
from competitors at the price that it assimied in determining the UC schedule. For this reason, the UC 
schedule becomes an important input to the hourly bidding strategy builder. 
When using a GA to solve the UC problem, solutions with more profit are valued more highly than those 
with less profit. GAs evolve because of selection pressure that worics well when a fitness gradient exists. The 
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population of solutions that the GA ultimately finds, tends to be filled with solutions that have roughly the 
same profit levels. If all of the solutions have the same profit level, evolution may come to a standstill. It is 
quite common in the GA field to add a secondary fitness measure that takes over when the fitness gradient of 
the primary fitness fimction becomes small. A natural application of that procedure for this problem would be 
to measure the solution's flexibility. Since forecasts of load and prices may vary widely from the actual prices 
and loads, we may wish to reduce or increase the amount of power that we are generating as we get closer to 
the time of production. A schedule that allows a wider range of possible power generation le\'els without 
switching additional units on or off is more valuable that a schedule that is ver\- rigid. So the primary fitness 
measure becomes the profit level, but the flexibility of the schedule also plays a part in judging which schedule 
is better. When a GA has a second (or more) fitness measure, it is said to have a lexical fimess fimction. 
One can begin to think of an entire UC schedules as being a bidding strategy, or as haMng a very close 
connection to hourly bidding strategies. Another area in which this is e\ident is the method of assigning the 
transition and fixed costs associated with the schedule. Above we described a scheme that allocated these costs 
in proportion with the number of MWs being produced at any given period. Allowing other faaors (e.g., time-
of-day. day-of-week, time of increased competition) to influence this allocation could pro\ide additional 
profits. In a market in which one is submitting an entire schedule this can be very important. One might shift 
peak penod costs to ofiT peak hours to win the bid which may be decided on the price of a particular time of 
day. Howe\er. in a market framework as described earlier in this thesis, this is less important. One can argue 
that allowing utilities to shift costs to off-peak hours to win a bid will decrease the total social welfare, since 
the their total cost of generation is higher. Furthermore a market framework that awards utilities contracts 
based on the price or cost the>- quote for a certain hour of the day or week and then guarantees that the 
generation companies will recover their start-up and shut-down costs is sub-optimal. 
5.7 Handling uncertainty in price and load forecasts 
After the solution is found, one might be curious as to what would happen if the forecasts were different. 
Suppose the price at hour 100 was 10% higher than anticipated. At present the UC-GA user can modify' the 
forecasts and re-run the algorithm. Howe\-er, the possible set of cases that might be of interest could be large. 
Re-rtmning the algorithm for each case could be quite time consuming, even if the algorithm starts from the 
near optimal solution found before making the change to the forecast. 
When forecasting loads and prices, the fiirther into the future is the time period, the more likely it is that 
the forecast will deviate from the expected value. So, along with the expected price and load for each time 
period, our industrious engineer in the forecasting department decides to give us these expeaed values along 
with error bars which indicate how confident he is of their precision (see Figure 5.10). How can we use this 
additional information? 
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We intend to use this additional information as follows. Rather than use the profit calculated directly b\-
using the expected price and load curves, we assume that there is a distribution (probably gaussian) of values 
about that data point. We use Monte Carlo sampling to determine an expected profit. We draw a number of 
data points from the distribution of profits at that hour and a corresponding number of data points from the 
distribution of load forecasts at that hour. These will be used in determining the expeaed profit of that 
partictilar unit commitment schedule. During each generation of the genetic algorithm we momtor the fitness 
of each member of the population. Early on in the e\'olution of the genetic algorithm, we will use a small 
number of data points to speed up the evolution. As the UC schedule solutions in the population come closer 
to the optimal, we increase the number of data points. With no proof that we are e\er going to get to the 
optimal, how do we know when to begin increasing the number of Monte Carlo sample points? The variance 
of the solutions is a good indicator of when to increase the number of data fwints. 
'E{Price} 
10 1 1  12 N Hours 
Figure 5.10 Expected prices with error bars. 
The result of the above should be a schedule which would pro\ide the largest e.\pected profit. The method 
described above, is e.xpeaed to increase the computational requirements of the GA. but we still e.xpect 
reasonable solution times as the UC-GA performs quite rapidly. 
5.8 Conclusions and future research 
The UC-GA has been rewritten for price-based operation. Some might argue that UC schedulers are no 
longer needed—a GENCO can just go to the spot market to buy the electricit\' it needs. This can and should be 
considered a valuable option, but the GENCO's business is still one of generating electricit\- and the\-
ultimately need to come up with a schedule by which they operate their generating units. The GA is a usefiil 
tool in searching large discrete solution spaces, and the space of solutions is quite large, making GA 
appropriate for the UC problem. 
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Ideally, the CENCO would run the UC-GA for the expected prices and demands that thev- consider most 
likely. These prices and demands may be uncertain. Running several cases would allow the user to know how 
sensitive the schedules are to variations in the inputs. Our UC-GA is presently being enhanced to pnnide the 
user with additional information that identifies which schedules allow the user more market flexibility for a 
given level of profit. We are essentially building in an on-line sensitivity analyzer. 
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6 IMPROVING BIDDING STRATEGIES THROUGH INTELLIGENT 
DATA MINING 
6.1 Chapter overview 
This research reports that an investigation of GAs and other so-called artiflcial intelligence techniques 
revealed their abilitv' to search through large databases in order to leam the expert sv'stem rules that were used 
to develop that database. Commercial grade software using this techmque which is presently being used to 
de\'elop standardized treatment methods for hospital patients receiving medical care has been de\'eloped. 
Based on extensive records, software (which has since been sold to hospitals) is able to determine what the 
doctor did based on patient conditions. Although some modifications may be required to make this marketable 
for the trading industry, this GA-based software can be used on a database of trading data to infer the bidding 
rules that traders used to generate the bids in the database. The GA evolves a population of bidding rtiles that 
achie\-e the same results as those being used b\' the traders who generated the bidding data. Determining the 
rules that other eiectricit>- traders and brokers are using should be of great benefit to those who wish to gain a 
competitive edge when participating in the deregulated market. Such a tool would also be welcomed by 
rcgulatmg agencies who wish to ensure that the markets are efllcient and fair. 
6.2 Introduction 
Many industries, (e.g.. power s\stems. commodit\- trading, health care) have problems that require highly 
specialized knowledge to solve or diagnose. These problems have t\pically been addressed by human experts 
who have had much training and have domain specific knowledge. This knowledge is the fundamental 
ingredient of an expert's problem solving abilities. Systems equipped with the appropriate knowledge have 
been shown to demonstrate expert level performance in many applications. Despite the success, the current 
state of expert system technolog\° suffers from some serious limitations. One of these limitations is that the 
development of an e.xpert system, for the most part, remains an art. While tools and methodologies have 
emerged to provide considerable help, the process of representing and refining the knowledge utilized by the 
domain expert remains ill-defined and time consuming. Application of expert systems still remains restricted 
to fairly narrow, self contained problem domains, and performance typically degrades sharply as the system 
approaches the boundaries of human knowledge. With traditional computer based expert systems, there is 
little ability to adapt or reorganize knowledge as performance requirements change over time. The greatest 
potential for removing these limitations lies in the area of machine learning. Expert systems for problems 
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with a large number of inputs can be quite complex and the best solution may be di£Bcult to identify. This is 
especially true when the fimction is a nonlinear problem. A group of expensive experts may disagree on the 
best method to solve the problem in question. This can be quite expensive if the experts are paid large salaries 
like hoq)ital doctors. In this chapter we present an intelligent data-mining technique for searching through a 
database of historical information that infers the expert system rules used by the human experts, and compares 
competing sets of expert system rules based on the profit associated with using them. Our solution to the 
limitations of expert systems developed by the Delphi Method (where people sit at a table discussing each 
point of a problem until they agree on the best action for that aspect of the problem) involves an adaptive 
learning strategy based on genetic algorithms. 
6.3 Applicatioas of expert systems 
Many industries have control applications that are appropriate for expert systems. For example, in the 
health care field, there are many areas that might be improved through the use of an expert system. Many 
doctors would welcome an expert system that could instantaneously suggest a diagnosis or prescribe tests 
based on symptoms and history of an admitted patient Power system operators operating in an environment 
where many inputs are changing simultaneously could benefit fix>m an e.xpert control system. On occasion, 
differences in doctors' training, opinions and methodologies could lead them to diagnose the same patient's 
problem differently. Likewise, a commodity trader who is faced with a set of inputs (e.g., Dow Jones Index 
has fallen 10% in the last two hours, the fed raised interest rates yesterday, etc.) might decide on a different 
position than his peer at the same firm. If an e.\pert system were to be implemented in these cases, it could 
reduce the number of these inconsistent diagnoses or reactions to market information. An e.xpert system 
implemented at a hospital would be useful in diagnosing patients more quickly, which would be especially 
helpfiil in trauma centers where correct decisions must be made immediately. Implementation of an expert 
system can sometimes provide a solution or diagnosis for a problem that in the past was not solvable since 
computers are able to handle many more inputs than a trained human expert. A number of expert systems 
have already been implemented successfully in the healthcare field. 
Electrical power system operators have applications that have also benefited from expert systems. In 
recent research, expert systems have been used to help the operator in control of electrical power systems to 
maintain safe operating conditions by controlling real time data acquisition and numerical algorithms Goad 
flow, stability analysis) [Germond and Niebur, 1992; Huneault et al., 1994]. In fact, the use of expert systems 
has been studied for many areas within the electric utility industry and many papers have been published 
regarding the subject Some of these areas include; distribution plaruiing, system design, feeder 
configuration, substation considerations, planning, operations, transmission planning, operations, load 
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forecasting, generation commitment scheduling, load shedding, security assessment, and line overload 
alleviation. 
If the limitations of the expert system de\'elopment discussed in the introduction were removed, we might 
see a more widespread implementation of expert systems. In this chapter we report on research being 
conducted that explores the use of genetic algorithms to leam or infer the expert system rules used in treating 
patients in a hospital. We also describe how to use this research for inferring bidding strategies for the 
competitive electric marketplace. The techniques presented here were de%'eloped for the healthcare field, but 
the methods are directly applicable to other industries. Some minor modifications may be needed to tailor the 
software for inferring bidding rules from trading data, and these modifications will be pointed out if 
appropriate. For the most part, the method of using genetic algorithms to leam or infer expert sy stem rules 
from a generic database remain the same as those used for the healthcare industr\-. 
6.4 The basics of machine learning 
Artificial intelligence is a term that is often heard when people are talking about s> stems that can do a job 
that would normally require a human. People will often have long debates defining terms like mtelligence and 
what makes it real or artificial. We will leave the defimtions to others for the time being and be a bit more 
practical. Among these so-called artificially intelligent systems are neural networks, complex lookup tables. 
fiizz>° logic systems and genetic algorithms. It is quite common when using these techniques to have a 
learning phase during which the sy stem s performance is tested. In the neural network field, researchers talk 
about supervised and unsupervised learning. During supervised learning, the svstem is presented with a set of 
inputs for which the correct response is known a priori. An output is generated and the svstem is rewarded or 
reinforced for producing what we think of as correct responses. In a system with unsupervised leanung, a set 
of inputs is presented to the system and the sv stem draws conclusions based on the spatial relationship of the 
data in a domain space. In general, machine leanung can be thought of as the automatic improvement in the 
performance of a computer system over time, as a result of e.xperience. Machine learning can be applied to 
almost any domain, but in practice the greatest successes have been related to classification tasks. Some of the 
advantages of an expert system based on a learning algorithm over the traditional type, are that the system 
with the learning algorithm; 
1. Delivers more consistent solutions 
2. May find inconsistencies in the data 
3. Can find a rule for situations that don't occur very often 
4. Obtains answers less expensively 
95 
In order for a machine or complex system to learn, one can argue that the following components are 
needed; system rules, a system model, a means of evaluating the rule's performance, a means of updating the 
rules or nde generating mechanism based on the evaluation of the rules performance, system inputs, and 
system outputs. See Figure 6.1. In such a setup, the rules are a set of information structures that encode the 
s>-stem's present level of expertise. The performer is a task algorithm that uses the rules to guide its activity. 
The critic is a feedback module that compares actual results with those desired, and the learner is a mechanism 
tliat uses feedback from the critic to amend the rules. 
Rule generating mechanism 
for a given system model 
Rules time += I 
System 
System 
Outputs 
Expert's 
response 
Ideal 
System 
System Model / Performer 
Critic compares the system 
outputs with expert responses 
Learner / evolving weights 
that are updated each iteration 
Figure 6.1 A general teaming structure 
Many problems are discrete in nature, \\ith an mput requiring a particular response. When such a 
problem has many inputs, it is often helpfiil to draw a decision tree that helps to separate and identify- the best 
course of action for each combination of inputs. In any decision, and in any decision tree, we have natural 
nodes that represent inputs or conditions in the world, and decision nodes that represent a decision that must 
be made. In the decision tree, decision nodes are conunonly drawn as squares, and natural nodes are often 
drawn as circles. See Figure 6.2 for the best path through a sample decision tree. For any set of inputs, there 
is an optimal combinations of decisions to be made. There is a specific cost and benefit associated with each 
path through the decision tree. If we are attempting to minimize the length of a hospital stay, then the 
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combination of decisions that results in discharging the healthy patient most quickly is the best. If we are 
anempting to find a bidding strategy that maximizes our profit, then the decision tree path representing the 
combination of decisions resulting in the largest profit for a given set of inputs is the optimal path. In most 
practical problems, there are many decision and natural nodes to be considered for a given problem. Decision 
trees with 40 or SO levels, with each level having only a binary decision or input, approach the limits of what 
we can solve quickly with today's computers, assuming we search through all possible combinations to find 
the optimum. 
Hew to treat patient How to bid in an auction 
prescribe medicine A? buy or sell energy? 
Yes, No 
Buy Sel 
medicine B? bid high or low? 
Yes X 
high blood /^^ high 
pressured 
No X M? 
lowVjiigh demand? 
Yes 
low 
...State .Of. 
generators 
(last bid 
profitable? 
coma.' 
lab result positive' - heavy competition? 
etc. etc. 
Figure 6.2 A sample decision tree for patient treatment or auction bidding. 
a
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>^hi vA^^i
W W W W 
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A A A A  A A A A  
p^? / \ / \ / \ / X . A ./ A. . /. \l
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In discrete problems, we can think of the learning process as a search through the space of possible 
decision tree paths to find the one with the best response to a given set of inputs. In anything other than trivial 
problems, the number of paths becomes enormous, and to use a completely enumerative search technique 
would be computationally infeasible with existing computer technolog\\ When solving a problem, many of the 
available inputs may not have a large effect on the outcome of the decision, and can be ignored. The research 
we report on in this chapter uses a genetic algorithm to learn the expert system rules to correctly classify- a 
system's inputs. The GA performs two fimctions while inferring the rules that experts have used to build the 
database. First, it learns which of the inputs are actually important, weeding out unnecessarv- inputs that 
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simply take up memory and slow down the decision process. Second, after deciding what input data is useful, 
it finds the appropriate output decisions to be made in light of the given inputs. 
6.5 Genetic algorithms 
Developed by John Holland, genetic algorithms are a fairly robust optimization techniques that work well 
for many nonlinear discrete applications. They often will produce solutions to a problem when more 
traditional techniques fail. Inspired b\' the biological notion of e\-olution, populations of solutions to the 
problem being investigated evolve according to the principle of survival of the fittest. The research described 
in this chapter involves the use of genetic algorithms. The reader is encouraged to read more about the details 
of genetic algorithms in Chapter 2. 
6.6 Expert systems 
The building of critical decision criteria can be accomplished by expert sv stems. In general terms, an 
e.\pert s\-stem is a classification system which uses a production system of rules that embod>- the knowledge 
and experience of the expert. An expert system of rules can represent a knowledge base in a compaa. 
computationally complete manner. The rules consist of an antecedent and a consequent. The antecedent 
identifies the condition to which you would like to respond. The consequent spells out the action to be taken 
for a given antecedent. Commonly the expert s> stem rules are written in an if-then-else program construction 
(much like the decision trees described earlier). These statements allow the user to easily incorporate the 
problem specific criteria into the rule base. 
The expert system rtUes are essentially set up in the form of a decision tree. Each node in the tree 
represents an if-then-else operator and each branch represents the path of the decision made at the preN ious 
node. For problems fitting this if-then-else construction, the number of possible outcomes doubles with each 
additional if-then-else node layer included. The expert system rules are evaluated beginning at the top node 
and then with each subsequent layer of nodes. Eventually, each node and branch of the tree will be tested. 
Typical inputs in our patient treatment research might be patient demographic and dietary information, 
observed symptoms, preliminary test results, medications administered, and procedures prescribed. Among 
the typical inputs for our auction bidding strategy' research might be fuel costs, transmission costs, forecasted 
prices, forecasted demands, unit outage information, and level of competition. Inputs like these are presented 
to the rules at the decision nodes. For e.xample. if the patient has high blood pressure, then the corresponding 
node chooses to perform some action, if not, it will choose to perform some other action. 
Generating the tree of structured if-then-else statements is a matter of deciding on the proper action for 
each of the possible inputs or combination of inputs. One traditional method of generating such a tree is 
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known as the Delphi method. The Delphi method is where a group of expert meet and then sit and argue 
about the best action for each input. The Delphi method can be expensive and time consuming. 
6.7 Using GAs to evolve expert system rules 
So if the Delphi method is expensive and time consuming, what can we do? Well, the method described 
in this research assumes that experts have been soKing problems or responding to inputs and that both the 
inputs and corresponding responses have been stored in a database. If the database is large, it very- well may 
contain sufficient information to determine most of the input-output relationships commonly observed in the 
system. A non-expert can 'simply' sort through this database and come up with these relationships. This is 
sometimes called data mining. When a database is large, data mining that performs an exhaustive search can 
be too computationally intensive. This is why we allow evolution (through genetic algorithms) to decide what 
part of the database should be searched. See Figure 6.3. 
historical 4 
database » 
GA-based 
"intelligent" 
data miner 
or rule inferrer 
—Ms 
A population of 
structured sets 
of if-then-else 
rules 
Figure 6.3 The GA ''intelligently" searches through the database for rules. 
6.7.1 Data storage and preprocessing 
The database stores information by patient or trader record, arranged also b>- the various inputs and either 
8 hour shifts or rounds of bidding. Some of the inputs are aaive decisions that the expert made in the previous 
8 hour shift or round of bidding (e.g., Tylenol was prescribed). Other inputs are more passive and may or may 
not be indirectly related to the experts decision (e.g.. the interest rate decreased a half a point). As we 
increment time or the rounds of bidding, a previous hour's decisions/outputs become the active inputs. See 
Figure 6.4. The way the GA reads from the database was developed specifically for the data we were getting 
from the healthcare industry. For each patient, at each 8 hour shift, for each input, there are either one or five 
bits that can be zero or one describing that input. For the single bit inputs, one signifies that the input was 
given, observed, or prescribed. For the five bit data, the first bit indicates whether that input w-as tested for, 
the second bit indicates whether the condition was normal or abnormal, the third indicates whether the 
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observed value was high, the fourth bit indicates whether the observed value was low. and the final bit 
indicates if the condition was extreme or not. 
One could guess that the vast majority of these data points will be zeros. If the GA string is too long, 
there is a chance that evolution will take a long time to converge to the optimal. In order to focus the GA on 
those input-output relationships for which a rule is really necessary, a compression routine was deseloped. 
The compression routine removes inputs from the GA string if thev* were never observed, or if they were 
always observed. These inputs are stored and re-injected into the solution at the appropriate location, when 
the GA is done evolving. 
Patient information in database Trading information in database 
traders patients 
Input 1 
Input 2 
Input 3 
Input 1 
Input 2 
Input 3 
Input N Input N 
time in 8 hour shifts • rounds of bidding *• 
Figure 6.4 Database information. 
6.7.2 A data structure to encode the solutions 
The process begins with the initialization of a population of solutions each representing an expert s>-stem 
with its own set of rules. Initializing each member of the population involves filling a veaor representing the 
inputs to consider and the output actions to be taken randomly with zeros and ones (where the inputs and 
outputs may be represented as zeros and ones). An assumption that we make is that the e.xpert uses some 
subset of the total amount of input information available in making his decision. Part of the vector identifies 
which inputs should be considered important. The remainder of the randomly initialized data veaor consists 
of the outputs to be performed when encountenng the inputs identified in the first part of the gene. In our 
research, the first part of the gene is called the in_gene, and the second pan is called the out_gene. See Figure 
6.5 for a sample population. A gene is evaluated by first looking at the in_gene. The in_gene specifies which, 
of all possible inputs, should be considered when using this particular e.xpert system rule. The out_gene is a 
vector of ones and zeros where the ones correspond to possible actions to be taken and zeros are actions not 
requested or prescribed. For instance, in rule 1 from the figure, if inputs 1. 4. 5, 7. 8, and 12 are true, then the 
actions to be taken are identified by the ones in positions 1, 5, 6, 8. 9, 10,11. and 14 of the out_gene. 
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6.7.3 Calculating the fitness 
To judge the fitness of the rules, each rule is used to develop bids or prescribe treatments for the traders 
and patients in the database. The actions taken by the GA generated rule are then compared with the actions 
originally taken by the expert. For each of the binary outputs there are four possible rewards that the rule may 
receive. The best scenario is to have the GA generated rule calling for an action which the human expert also 
called for. Second best is to have the GA generated rule calling for no action when none was taken b>- the 
expert. Third best is when the GA calls for action when the expert took no action. The remaining situation is 
when the GA does not take any action in a scenario where the expert did take action. The fitness is a 
summation of the rewards associated with the above four scenarios occurring for each output for each patient 
on which the rule is used. The weightings of these four situations are parameters of the program and can be 
changed based on the knowledge of the problem. We set them using our engineering judgment. 
1 IF ( 1. 4. 5. 7, 8. 12) THEN (1 0 0 0 1 1 0 I 1 1 1 0 0 1) 
2 IF ( 1, 3. 6. 9. 10, 12) THEN (1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1) 
3 IF ( 1. 2. 5. 7. 9. 12) THEN (1 010101 101000 1) 
4 IF ( 1. 4. 7. 8. 11. 12) THEN (1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1) 
5 IF ( 2, 3, 4, 9. 10. 11) THEN (I 0 0 0 I 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1) 
N IF ( 4. 5. 6. 8, 9. 12) THEN (1 0 1 0 I 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1) 
Figure 6.5 Sample GA population. 
When the rule's fitness is being calculated, a s\ntch m the parameter file allows fitness to be determined 
either by its usage on only the best fitting patient or trader, or by the rules usage on as many traders or patients 
as there are which fit the in_gene pan of the rule. The goal of the user should help to determine what fitness 
calculation method is preferred. Increasing the length of the in_gene reduces the number of patients or traders 
for which the rule will be suitable. Decreasing this in_gene length increases the number of patients or traders 
for which the rule will be suitable. If we require that all of the in_gene elements of a particular rule match a 
given trader's or patient's input data prior to its use, it will not be suitable for many scenarios. In order to 
increase the number of patients or traders for which the rule is applicable, a threshold value was included. 
The threshold is the minimum number of items within the in_gene that must be true for it to be suitable for 
treating a particular patient. The higher the threshold is set. the more specific the rule is (fitting only a small 
number of patients or bidding scenarios), and the lower the threshold is set, the less specific is the rule. The 
threshold is an easily adjustable parameter in the program. 
Early prototypes of the software designed for health care assumed the doctor's decision for the ne.\t 8 hour 
shift (n+1) was primarily dependent on inputs from the present 8 hour shift (n). To include a limited 
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dqjendence on previous shifts, a feature (admittedly a hacked feature) that allowed inputs from the two shifts 
(n-1. n-2) prior to the current shift. While writing the software, preliminary' discussions were held regarding 
future versions of the software based on genetic programming. A genetic programming version would allow 
the program to automatically determine dependencies on any input data prior to the current shiit in the 
database. The developed software package has easily adjustable parameter settings which allow part of the 
input gene to speciiy inputs from shiit n-1 and part from shift n-2. The adjustable parameters discussed in this 
section are listed with sample setpoints and descriptive remarks in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Adjustable parameters used in the program. 
Parameter Setpoint Remarks 
no of oneAs 29 Inputs coded w/ 1 bit that are taken as inputs and outputs 
no of fivAs 15 Inputs coded w/ 5 bits that are taken as inputs and outputs 
no of oneBs 10 Inputs coded w/ 1 bit that are taken only as inputs 
no of fivBs 0 Inputs coded w/ 5 bits that are taken only as inputs 
no of shifts 8 Number of 8 hour shifts or rounds of bidding in database 
in gene len 10 How manv inputs to consider in the in gene 
no shift p2 1 No. of inputs in in gene that should come from 2 shifts ago 
no shift pi 3 No. of inputs in in gene that should come from 1 shift back 
rqstd threshold 8 Minimum no. of inputs in in gene which must be true 
generations 5001 No. of generations that the GA should e\'olve 
mut percent 20 Percent of mutation when creating child solutions 
Xoverpts 3 No. of crossover points used in creating child solutions 
best 50 Evolving rule took a positive aaion which doctor also took 
secbest 10 Rule prescribed no action, and neither did the e.xpert 
thirdbest -1 Rule prescribed an action, but e.vpen did not 
worst -25 E.xpert took action, but rule did not 
LOS bias 50 (1-100) rule bias to favor patients w/ short length of stay 
method 1 (0/1) Base fitness on all fitting rule or only the best match 
popsize 32 Population size of the GA 
number new 16 How many children solutions to create each generation 
no to save 10 How manv ev olved solutiotts to store to file when finished 
no of patients 5 How many patient or trader records are available in database 
select method 1 Parent selection method (0 rank. I roulette. 2 tournament) 
6.7.4 Creating new solutions through evolution 
After the fitness for each member of the population is calculated, parents are seleaed with some bias 
towards more highly fit solutions. The program has a s\vitch in the parameter file that allows the user to selea 
between three parent selection methods each having a different fitness bias. There are reasons which makes 
one more appropriate than the others depending on the situation we are in. For instance, roulette selection 
may have a tendency to prematurely converge to a local optima when the population size is small. After 
parents have been selected, the crossover and mutation operators are used to create children solutions. As 
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described earlier, crossover promotes the exploration of new regions in the search space. Crossover is a 
structured, yet randomized mechanism of exchanging information between strings. Mutation ensures that no 
string position will ever be permanently fixed at a certain value. Mutation in a binary- alphabet operates bv-
toggling the value in any given matrix position with some probability of mutation. The number of crosso\-er 
points and mutation rate can be easily adjusted in the parameter file. 
The best members of each generation are preserved for the next generation. The children replace the 
members of the parent generation with the lowest fitness. This is an elitist replacement strategy- and ensures 
that the best indi\iduals are nev er lost in moving from one generation to the next, meamng that if we were to 
graph the maximum fitness of the population at each generation, it would ne\'er decrease. Figure 6.6 shows 
the genetic algorithm used for this program in block diagram format. 
Initialize Solutions 
^ Generations = 0; 
^ 
hi<;tnn>.al ^ Calculate Fitness 
(compare rule w/ 
experts decisions) 
4 
Yes >/^Done\ Generations +=1 
m 1^^ 0 
Parent Selection / / \  y y \  \  1 
A evolved pop. Crossover 
Each member is 4 
a structured set of Mutation 
if-then-else rules 
Place Children 
Figure 6.6 The GA searches through the database for good rules. 
6.8 Results 
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The genetic algorithm expert system developer engine has been installed in several hospitals and clinics. 
It is presently being used to assist in the development of '^critical pathways" for the healthcare industry. 
Because of the importance of ensuring the system of rules that make up a critical pathway will not endanger 
the patient, the intent is that qualified experts perform a comprehensive review- process that identifies 
professional reasons for treating patients with the evolved rules. At present the rules evolved by the GA only 
indicate the input to be used or prescribed and do not prescribe any levels or dosages. Even critical pathways 
developed by the E>elphi method are reluctant to do this as it is best left to the doaor treating the patient. 
For application to an auction bidding problem, we need to identify the parallelisms to the healthcare 
industry and set the parameters accordingly. For instance, the number of patients would be akin to a number 
of generation buses at which power would be sold (the idea being that a trader might have a separate set of 
trading rules for each bus): the number of shifts contained in the database becomes the number of bidding 
rounds contained in the database. The decisions are related to the bids which are to be submitted to an energy 
exchange. The set of rules that evolves may be specific for particular generation bus. 
The inputs consisted of single bit data like which medications have been given, which procedures have 
been ordered, what symptoms have been observed, and five bit data which give the results of various lab tests 
that have been ordered. Often the results of lab tests are not available during the 8 hour shift that the test was 
performed. Outputs consisted of single bit data indicating tests that w ere prescribed, procedures ordered and 
medications prescribed b\- the doaors treating the patients. As described in the fitness calculation seaion. the 
expen systems constmaed by the genetic algorithm were compared to the actual decisions made by the 
doctors. If needed, the five bit data trading data can indicate at what le\-el an input is observed. The single bit 
data w hich serve as inputs only might indicate whether; 
• system is (or is not) heavily loaded 
• auction bidding is (or is not) currently highly competitive 
• weather is (or is not) warm 
• the time in question is (or is not) a weekday 
• the time in question is (or is not) a holiday 
• the time in question is (or is not) a peak penod 
The number of single bit data which are both input and output (depending on what point in time we \iew 
them fn)m) should be equal to the number of binary decisions being made in any given problem. This could 
be correlated with the number of products that one is offering for sale, i.e., bid a high or low number of MWhr, 
make a high or low (S/MWhr) offer for the real energy-, likewise for reactive power, and the various 
components of the bids for each of the ancillary service desired or offered. 
104 
6.8.1 An example 
We provide a small example to demonstrate the type of output generated by the genetic algorithm. 
The parameters used in this example are those listed in Table 6.1. The data was taken from patients 
who were admitted to an Iowa hospital for total knee replacement. The input data encoded with five bit 
which consist of things that the doctor might prescribe (active) is shown in Figure 6.7. For this 
particular example, there is no five bit passive data. The single bit data is shown in Figure 6.8. The 
goal is to build a rule that indicates what medicines to prescribe or procedures to order for the 
subsequent 8 hour shift. The choice of rewards for matching the doctors decisions favors a positive 
action on the part of the GA. Because the raw data shown in the figures is largely zero, equal rewards 
for positive and negative outputs would tend to produce rules that do nothing. 
Shift 1 
pat1: 11010 10000 1000010000 10000 10000 100001110010000 00000111001110011010 10000 10000 
pat 2.11010 OOOOO 11000 OOOOO 10000 11000 10000 1110010000 OOOOO OOOOO 10000 11010 10000 10000 
pat 3: 10000 1000011000100001000011000110101000010000 00000 1000010000 1101010000 10000 
pat 4: OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO 10000 10000 OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO 10000 
pats. 11010 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 1110011100 00000 10000 10000 11010 10000 10000 
Shift 2 
pati: 00000 10000 0000011010 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 0000010000 0000010000 00000 
pat 2; 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 
pat 3: OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO 11000 OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO 
pat 4: OOOOO 10000 11000 10000 OOOOO 11000 00000 00000 00000 00000 11100 OOOOO 11010 10000 OOOOO 
patS: 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 
shifts 
pati: OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO 10000 OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO 
pat2; OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO 10000 OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO 
pat 3: OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO 
pat 4: OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO 10000 OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO 
patS: OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO 10000 OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO 
Shift 4 
pat 1: OOOOO 10000 OOOOO 10000 OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO 11100 11100 00000 00000 11100 11010 10000 OOOOO 
pat2; 00000 10000 0000010000 00000 00000 000001110010000 00000 0000010000 1101010000 00000 
pat 3: OOOOO 10000 00000 11100 00000 00000 00000 1110011100 00000 00000 11100 1101011100 00000 
pat 4; OOOOO 10000 OOOOO 10000 OOOOO OOOOO OOOOO 11100 11100 OOOOO OOOOO 10000 1101010000 00000 
pat 5: OOOOO 10000 00000 11010 00000 00000 00000 1110011100 00000 00000 10000 1101010000 00000 
Figure 6.7 Five bit ''active" input data. 
The GA was run for 5000 generations with the parameters shown in Table 6.1 which took about four 
minutes. After the GA evolves, the information is re-injected into the rule. A sample output rule taken 
from the evolved population is shown in Figure 6.9. Part of the data preprocessing is to remove input 
data that is non-changing. For example, if aspirin is always prescribed, then this is written to file and 
removed from the list of things for which the GA is searching. Figure 6.10 shows the data which is 
removed through the compression process for the example shown here. Per request of the company for 
which this software was developed, separate rules for each shift of the patient stay are evolved (vs. a 
general set of rules that would work at any given shift). The data shown in this example is meant to 
provide the reader with an example of the types of rules that the GA produces. The rule has not been 
reviewed by competent medical experts for validity. 
105 
Sinele bit active decision inout data Sineie bit data (input onlv) 
ShiA Shift 1 
pat I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  pal 1 I  1  1  0 0 1 0 0  I  0  1  
pat2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  pal2 1 0 0  1 0 0  1  1  1  0 0  
pat 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  pat3 0 0 0  1  1  1  0 0  I  1  1  
pat 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  pat 4 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0  
pal S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  pat S 0 1  1 0 1  l O I O l  1  
Shift 2 Shift I 
pat I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  1  I  1  1  1  1  pat 1 0  I  1  I  1  1  1  1 0 0 0  
pat 2 O O O O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I I O O I I  pat2 0  1  I  1  0 0 0 0  1  1  I  
pal 3 O O O O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I I O O I 1  pat 3 O O I O O O O O O O I  
pat 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1  I  0 0  I  I  pat 4 1  I  0 0 0  I  0 0 1 0  1  
pat 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  I  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  I  0 0  I  1  pat S I  0 0 0  I  0  1  1  1 0  1  
Shift 3 Shift 1 
pat 1 O O O I O O O O O O O O O I  I  I  l O O O O O O O O O O O I  pat 1 0  1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0  
pat 2 O O O I O O O O O l O O O I I O l O O O O O O O O O O O l  pat 2 0 1  1 0 0  I  1  1  I  0  1  
pat 3 0 1  1  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  l O I O O O O O O O O O O O I  pal 3 1  0  I  1  0  I  I  0  1  1  0  
pat4 O O O I O I O O O O O O O l I O I O O O O O O O O O O O l  pat 4 I  0 0 0 0  1  1  0 0 1 0  
pat 5 O O O I O O O O O O O O O I  I  I  l O O O O O O O O O O O I  pat S 1  1  1  1  1 0 0 0  1  0  1  
Shift4 Shift I 
pat I 1  1  1 0 1  l O O O O O O O I  l O I O O O O O O O O O O O I  pat 1 1  0  1  0 0 1 0 0 1  1  1  
pat 2 l O O O I O O O O O O O O l l O I O O O O O O O O O O O I  pat 2 1  0 0  I  0  1  0 0  1  1 0  
pat 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1 1 0  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1  pat3 O O O O O I O O I O I  
pat 4 0 1  l O O O O O O O O O O I  l O I O O O O O O O O O O O I  pat 4 0  1 0 0 0 0 0  1  1  0  1  
pat S 0 1  l O O O O O O O O O O I  l O l O O I O O O O O O O O l  pat S I  0 0  I  1  I  I  0  I  0 0  
Figure 6.8 Single bit input data. 
(ALL patients that meet m_gene contribute to rule fiuiess) 
This rule's fitness: 827 
Fitness of best rule: 827 
Fauent 0 is best treated by this rule. 
4 patients treated by this rule, including patient(s): 
0  1 2 4  
7 of 10 must be true. 
If dunng shift 0 FIVA 0 was abnormal 
If dunng shift 0 FIVA 1 was given 
If durmg shift 0 FIVA 5 was given 
If durmg shift 0 FIVA 5 was abnormal 
If durmg shift 0 FIVA 7 was low 
If during shift 0 FIVA 11 was abnormal 
If durmg shift 0 FIVA 12 was abnormal 
If dunng shift 0 FIVA 12 was high 
If during shift 0 FIVA 13 was gi^-en 
If during shift 0 ONEB 5 was given 
THEN do the following in shift 1: 
Prescribe oneA(s): 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
and order fivA(s): 12 5 10 12 
Figure 6.9 Sample output data. 
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Sbifl(0) 
oneAs; O.O 1.0 2.0 3.0 4,0 5.0 6.0 7,0 8,0 9.0 10,0 11.0 12.0 13.0 14.0 15.0 16.0 17.0 18.0 19.0 20.0 
21.0 22,0 23,0 24,0 25.0 26.0 27.0 28.0 
fivAs: 0JCXOXOlJCOOOO2JCXOOO3J<OOOO4.X0OOO5JCX0OO6J<XOXO7.1XXOO 
8 . 1  X X 0 0 9 . 0 0 0  0 0 1 0 J < X X 0 0  I I J C X X O O  1 2 J C X O X O  1 3 J C 0 0 0  0  1 4 . 1  0 0 0 0  
oneBs; 
fivBs; 
output; 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 9.0 10.0 11,0 12.0 13.0 14.0 15.0 16.0 17.0 18.0 19.0 20.0 21.0 
24.1 27.1 28.1 29.0 33.0 35.0 36.0 37.0 43,0 
Shifl(l) 
oneAs: 0,0 1,0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 13.0 14.0 15.0 16,0 17.0 18,0 19.0 20,0 21.0 
f i v A s :  O J V X O X O  U \ 0 0 0  0  2 J > C X 0 0 0  3 J C X O X 0  4 J < 0 0 0 0  5 J S : X 0 0  0 6 „ \ X O X 0  7 J < X X O O  
8 „ X X X 0 0 9 J C X 0 0 0  l O A ' X X O O  I I J C X X O O  1 2 „ X X 0 X 0  I 3 - X O O O O  H A ' O O O O  
oneBs: 
fivBs: 
output: 0.0 3.1 4.0 6,0 7.0 8.0 10.0 11,0 12.0 13,1 14.1 16.1 17.0 18.0 19.0 20.0 21.0 22.0 23.0 24.0 
25.0 26.0 27.0 28.1 29.0 30.0 31.0 32.0 33.0 34.0 35.0 36,0 37.0 39.0 40.0 41.0 42.0 43.0 
Shifl(2) 
oneAs: 0.0 4,0 6.0 7.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 17.0 18.0 19.0 20.0 21.0 
fivAs: 0.XX0X0 1J(0 000 2AX00 0 3J<XOX0 4.X0 0 00 5-XX0 00 6_\XOX0 7A'XXOO 
8 J < X X 0 0 9 J C X 0 0 0  l O J C X X O O  1 I _ X X X 0 0  1 2 „ X X 0 X 0  1 3 A 0 0 0 0  1 4 „ X O O O O  
oneBs: 
fivBs: 
output: 3.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 13.1 14.1 15.0 16.1 17.0 18.0 20.0 21.0 22.0 23.0 24.0 25.0 
26,0 27.0 28.1 29.0 30.1 31.0 32.1 33.0 34.0 35.0 36,1 37,1 38.0 39,0 40,1 41.1 42.1 43.0 
Shifl(3) 
one.-Vs: 6.0 7.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 17.0 18.0 19.0 20.0 21.0 
fivAs: 0.0 00001.x 0 0 0 0  2 J C X 0 0 0  3 J C X X X 0  4 . 0  0 0 0 0 5 - X X 0 0 0  6 . 0  0 0 0 0  7 A X X 0 0  
8JCXX009J<X000 lOJCXXOO lUXXXOO 12-XXOXO 13„X X X 0 0 14,0 0 0 0 0 
oneBs: 
flvBs: 
output: 3.0 4.0 5.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 13.1 14.1 15.0 16.1 17.0 18.0 20.0 21.0 22.0 23.0 24.0 25.0 
26.0 27.0 28.1 29.0 30.0 31.0 32.0 33.0 34.0 35.0 36.1 37.1 38.0 39.0 40.0 41.1 42.0 43.0 
Shift(4) 
oneAs: 6.0 7.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 17.0 18.0 20.0 21.0 28.1 
fivAs: 0.0 0 0 0 0 1.x 0 0 0 0 2.0 0 0 0 0 3A X X X 0 4.0 0 0 0 0 5.0 0 0 0 0 6.0 0 0 0 0 7„X X X 0 0 
8-XXX009J<0000 10.0000 0 ll-XXXOO 12„XX0X0 13.XXXOO 14.00 0 00 
oneBs: 
ftvBs: 
output: l.O 2.0 3.0 5.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 13.1 14.1 15.0 16.1 17.0 18.0 19.0 20.0 21.0 22.0 23.0 
24.0 25.0 26.0 27.0 28.1 29.0 31.0 33.0 34.0 35.0 36.1 37.1 38.0 39.0 41.1 43.0 
Figure 6.10 Data removed by the compression function. 
6.9 Conclusion and future research 
In test runs, the genetic algorithm has demonstrated its abilit\- to leam from a system's inputs and outputs. 
The genetic software engine described in this chapter has been integrated into a complete healthcare software 
package which has been installed at several sites around the country-. Preliminary reports from the company 
for which it was developed indicate that the GA-based software engine finds 70% of the rules that should be 
contained in a standardized critical path. There are some inherent problems with the software in its present 
form. The form of the solution that we are forcing the GA to use assumes dependence on only the three shifts 
prior to the decision to be made. This is an obvious problem. Another problem is that the form of the solution 
assumes we can convert all the input data points and output decisions to a binary fonnat which is often 
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cumbersome. A possible solution to this problem might be obtained by using genetic programming [Koza, 
1992]. For inferring rules, genetic programming is similar in principle to genetic algorithms, but it allows the 
number of facts and rules included in a rule to be a variable of the algorithm. 
Discussions were held with the company funding the research regarding the use of genetic programming 
for the next phase of this research. The consensus was to continue the research, but due to problems with the 
fiinding, work was delayed. Since that time the company has had some difficult financial problems and is 
currently being purchased b>- the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M) compam*. Future versions are 
still under consideration for development but will most likely be geared toward determining the bidding riiles 
that were used to develop bids contained in a database. Traders who participate in markets where all 
information is disclosed (such as the Australian deregulated electric market) should be very interested in an 
enhanced version of this software. Regulating agencies that oversee markets should be interested in this 
software for detecting collusion, and ultimately for verifying market e£ricienc> . 
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
7.1 Commentary 
Read>' or not, deregulation around the world is changing the way electrical sy stem is operated. In our new-
and more competitive environment, we can expect to see the power system moving closer and closer to its 
limits with profit motivating every operating decision. Now a profit driven industrN". we can expea to see 
vendors developing and marketing new operating tools designed to help the participants eke out e\'ery dollar 
the\- can. Many of those tools will be borrowed from other industries, and some will be modifications of 
existing electrical industry tools. This dissertation has reported on several research projects that, directly or 
indirectly, have significance to the competitive electric generation company or energy- trader participating in a 
competitive environment. The financial tools reported in this dissertation were not meant to provide easy 
answers to the problems that participants will face. Rather, in much of the work we are attempung to develop 
methods of studying complex competitive behavior and learning from these behaviors. Other tools (e.g.. the 
unit commitment and fuzzy AGC) are modifications of existing algorithms that needed updating to maintain 
their usefulness to participants of the competitive environment. 
7.2 Future market framework and assumptions 
Chapter 2 provided the reader with an introduction to the framework of competuive marketplace we 
assume. The actual framework of any given market is determined by regulators and may likely differ from our 
market framework. We also presented many of the assumptions we used for the research reponed in later 
chapters. The basics of genetic algorithms were highlighted for the reader. 
In the competitive deregulated electric energy marketplace bidding strategies will be important to 
profitability. In addition to maximizing profit, traders should consider the risk involved with a particular 
strategy. Keeping that in mind, we presented an introduction to using options and futures contracts to reduce 
the risk associated with an energy trader's position in the market. 
In the vein of building less risky and more comprehensive bidding strategies, future research should 
investigate allowing evolving economic agents access to options and futures contracts. The shape of an 
options position could be defined by four numbers. One needs only specif' the type of option (long call, long 
put. short call, or short put), the strike price, the contraa amount, and the premium. The agents which learn 
to use the options properly will have an advantage in reducing the risk of their strategies. The agent's fitness 
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will not consist only of short term profit in the spot market, but will depend on the trader's performance 0%'er 
the long term as they participate in an auction simulator which must be extended to include multiple markets. 
7.3 Evolving bidding strategies 
The results provided in the chapter demonstrated that GA and GP-Automata based agents leam to bid in an 
explicable manner in a multi-participant auctioa The Sad that GP-Automata suffer very little degradation m 
performance when thev' are limited by number of states or by tree size gi\'es some indication of how powerlul the 
method is. Since the GP-Automata lend themselves well to scenarios where there are vast amoimts of data available, 
adding more detail (e.g. available transfer capabilitN' information, forecasted prices, unit commitment schedules) to 
the agent models is an easy suggestion to make. Ideally this larger v-olume of information would help the bidder in 
making a bid. As Figure 2.7 shows, traders have to deal in more than one market. E.xtending the strategies to 
cover multiple markets is another area of current investigation. In addition to adding the above details, there 
is a need to perform a more complete sensitivit>' analysis to see how the various parameters affect performance 
of the strategies that are construaed. Among these parameters are the parent selection methodolo^ and the 
population size. 
7.4 Fuzziness in the competitive environment 
Building good bidding strategies for electncit>- traders as the>- move into the deregulated marketplace will 
continue to be important for those companies wishing to remain profitable. Chapter 4 described research 
performed in this area, and points to direaions of current investigation designed to build more robust adaptive 
bidding strategies. Future research should actually utilize these techniques to implement strategies in an 
auction simulator. The fuzz>' membership functions for inputs like demand and costs can be defined through 
the use of forecasting methods. Functioits describing others bidding behaMor can be defined from historical 
data. The GP-Automata adaptive agent work can be coupled with this research to evolve the fiizz>- rules. To 
provide a more realistic auction situation, a user friendly means of inputting different types of bidding 
strategies should be developed so that a heterogeneous set of strategies may be pitted against one another. 
In the second half of the chapter we saw that fuzzy logic controller lends itself well to the AGC problem. 
It responds rapidly, and can be tuned to outperform the traditional controller for the cases studied. The rules 
can be formulated in plain English making it eas>' for the operator to see how they work, and how to easily 
modify' them. 
The FLC AGC described in this chapter used rules with fixed ranges. Future research could make these 
rule adaptive so that manual re-tuning is not necessary when generator parameters are changed. The electric 
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utility industiy is becoming more competitive and more modernized. The proliferation of microptDcessor 
based control equipment distributed or networked throughout the power system makes using fiizzy logic a very 
feasible possibility. The introduction of increased competition in the power systems of the world will make it 
more important than ever to have tight control over the interchange contracts. Another area of future research 
is to incorporate fiizgr control into a multi-area AGC controller as described in the companion papers by 
Kumar etal. [1996a, 1996b]. 
7.5 Unit commitment 
The UC-GA has been rewritten for price-based operation to help the GENCO come up with a schedule 
with which they can operate their generating units in a profitable manner. The GA is a useful tool in 
searching large discrete solution spaces, and since the space of unit commitment solutions is quite large, the 
GA is quite appropriate for the UC problem. Ideally, the GENCO would run the UC-GA for the expected 
prices and demands that they consider most likely. Since these prices and demands may be uncertain it may 
be necessary to run several cases would allow the user to know how sensitive the schedules are to variations in 
the inputs. Future research should augment the algorithm by implementing the Monte Carlo sampling in the 
fitness function discussed in the chapter. Other methods of looking at uncertain prices (such as ways of 
inputting a deterministic price versus demand curve at each hour) should be investigated. The UC-GA 
formulation described here is presently being enhanced to provide the user with additional information that 
identifies which schedules allow the user more market fle.xibility for a given level of profit. Future research 
should modify the code to implement the changes described above which would akin to building in an on-line 
sensitivit>' analyzer. 
7.6 Inferring rules by intelligently mining a database 
In test runs, the genetic algorithm demonstrated its ability to learn from a system's inputs and outputs. As 
mentioned in the chapter, the genetic software engine described in this chapter was designed to be part of a 
complete healthcare software package. It was successfully installed at several sites around the country. 
However, there are some inherent problems with the software in its present form. The form of the solution 
that we are forcing the GA to use assumes dependence on only the three shifts prior to the decision to be made. 
This is an obvious problem. Another problem is that the form of the solution assumes we can convert all the 
input data points and output decisions to a binary format that is often cimibersome. A possible solution and 
suggestion for future research is to use genetic programming [Koza, 1992], or GP-Automata. For inferring 
rules, genetic programming is similar in principle to genetic algorithms, but it allows the number of facts and 
rules included in a rule to be a variable of the algorithm. 
I l l  
As mentioned in the chapter, discussions were held with the company funding the research regarding 
additional research, but due to difficult financial problems it is unlikely that this will happen soon. Future 
research should be geared toward tuning the method for inferring bidding rtiles fiom a database. Traders who 
participate in markets where all information is disclosed (such as the Australian deregulated electric market) 
should be very interested in an enhanced version of this software. Regulating agencies that oversee markets 
should be interested in this software for detecting collusion, and ultimately for verifying market efficiency. 
Therefore, future research should focus on the trading arena, and should use either GP-Automata or GP 
making the data structures used in evolution more generic, and less likely to be industry specific. 
7.7 Additioaal suggestions for future research 
7.7.1 Evohmg mulA-market electric commodity portfolios and bidding strategies 
This research involves extending the auction simulator to allow agents to participate in multiple markets. 
Fitness will not consist only of short-term profit in the spot market, but will depend on the trader's 
performance over the long term. Among the possible ideas for developing good strategies is to allow a GA to 
determine an options position. An evolving data structure of four numbers could specify the type of option 
(long call, long put, short call, or short put), the strike price, the contract amount, and the premium. As 
mentioned above, the agents which leam to use the options properly will have an advantage in reducing the 
risk of their strategies. 
7.7.2 Forecasting electric prices and demand with uncertainty 
Given historical data on electricity, we would like to evolve GP-Automata to do forecasting. Electricity 
prices and demand may fluctuate based on the weather, time of the day, time of the week, time of the year, or 
for various other reasons. These forecasts may depend on input data from various time periods. The GP-
Automata will be given the task of selecting which inputs are important in predicting price or demand. Given 
a matrix of data, the GP-Automata evolves footprints (in a manner similar to texture classification work 
[Ashlock and Davidson, 1997]) that indicate which data are important for predicting the price. The inputs 
identified by the foot patterns are then used in a second process where a GP or GP-Automata leams the 
regression coefficients to produce the smallest mean squared error in the predictions. 
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